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General introduction and background 
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1.1 The scope of the dissertation 
In Europe, patient cost-sharing (patient charges for goods and services in the public health 
care system) is common for pharmaceuticals and medical devices. For other health care 
services, it is less common, especially in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. 
The absence of patient cost-sharing for services in most of these countries is primarily caused 
by a lack of political will and ability to introduce such charges rather than based on evidence 
on their positive or negative effects (Tambor et al., 2011). This dissertation focuses on the 
assessment of patient charges for services in the public health care systems in CEE countries. 
In particular, the focus is on the charges for primary outpatient services, i.e. visits to a 
physician, including GP and medical specialist. 
Designing and implementing patient cost-sharing is a complex process in any country 
irrespective of the level of economic development. The complexity consists in the trade-off 
between their effects on efficiency and equity in health care provision. The former are rather 
uncertain while the latter are overall negative (Sepehri and Chernomas, 2001). 
As a policy tool, official patient charges for services and goods in the basic package have two 
main objectives: reducing excessive use of health care resources (ex-ante and ex-post moral 
hazard) and raising additional funds for the health care system (Drummond and Towse, 2012; 
Pavlova et al., 2012). At a system level, patient cost-sharing is found to have a positive impact 
on overall efficiency in OECD countries (Wranik, 2012). However, it has a relatively low 
ability to generate additional funds due to the high collection costs (Pavlova et al., 2010). 
Earlier studies exploiting data from natural experiments, such as the RAND experiment held 
in the 1970s in the USA, suggested a very wide range of price elasticities of health care 
consumption (see Zweifel and Manning, 2000). Studies from Ireland (Nolan, 1993), France 
(Chiappori et al., 1998), Belgium (Van de Voorde at al., 2001; Cockx and Brasseur, 2003; 
Carrin and Van Dael, 1990; Van Doorslaer, 1984), Germany (Winkelmann, 2004; Schmitt et 
al., 2009; Rückert et al., 2008), and Taiwan (Chen et al., 2009) report different consumer 
reactions to the introduction or increase in co-payments for in- and outpatient care. Most of 
them find a payment increase or introduction to have a significant negative impact on service 
use, though opposite findings exist as well (Chiappori et al., 1998; Augurzky et al., 2006).  
Another important policy objective of official patient charges for services and goods in the 
basic package is regulating the market, in particular dealing with informal patient payments to 
health care providers (Lewis, 2007; Ensor and Thompson, 2011; Gaál et al., 2010). Informal 
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payments are widely spread in most CEE countries (Balabanova and McKee, 2002; Belli et 
al., 2004; Ensor, 2004; Gaál et al., 2010; Gaál and McKee, 2005; Szende and Culyer, 2006; 
Thompson and Witter, 2000). Kyrgyzstan and Cambodia are often presented as successful 
example of formalizing informal payments (Jakab and Kutzin, 2009; Baschieri and 
Falkingham, 2006; Barber et al., 2004; Akashi, 2004). But overall it is recognized that official 
charges cannot eradicate informal payments on their own and should be applied together with 
other measures (Stepurko et al., 2013). 
Despite these potentially beneficial features, patient charges for services and goods in the 
public health care system may have adverse effects in terms of prohibiting or reducing 
necessary health care use for those who cannot afford to pay, impairing access and equity, and 
causing a double financial burden to patients in case of persistent informal payments (Aarva 
et al., 2009; Baji et al., 2012b; Ensor, 2004; Lewis, 2000; Thompson and Witter, 2000; 
Sepehri and Chernomas, 2001). Also, some studies show formal patient payments to be 
regressive and to have significant impoverishing effects on household wellbeing (e.g. Baji et 
al., 2012a; Rückert et al., 2008; Ching, 1995; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1992).  
The evidence about the effects of patient cost-sharing mentioned above mostly comes from 
the USA, Western Europe and developed countries in Africa and Asia. Virtually all these 
studies are based on actual expenditures or past choices of consumers in real markets, which 
is called the revealed preferences approach (RP). However, it is difficult to use such data for 
the analysis of the effects of patient charges for basic health care services in CEE countries 
since most of these countries provide these services officially free-of-charge. Thus, there are 
no data about consumer behavior under different pricing regimes. In this case, the stated 
preferences approach (SP) might provide the necessary information. This implies eliciting 
values that people attach to certain health care services, or more broadly health benefits, by 
asking them to state these values, e.g. in terms of willingness to pay (WTP) for the benefits, or 
asking them to make hypothetical choices across benefit profiles.  
Although SP have found a broad application in the assessment of health care programs and 
benefits, their application to policy analysis, and specifically the analysis of patient payment 
policies, is rare. The main problem with SP is their hypothetical nature and uncertain 
predictive validity (Groot et al., 2006; Murphy et al., 2005). Policy-makers, who are 
unfamiliar with SP, may find it difficult to adopt such data in the policy-making process. 
Therefore, this dissertation focuses on the application of the SP techniques to the assessment 
of patient charges for outpatient physician services, taking the CEE countries as a case study.  
Chapter 1 
10 
1.2 Background 
In the last years, SP approaches are increasingly used to value benefits in health care 
including health outcomes and health care services (Bridges et al., 2011; Smith and Sach, 
2010). This is however, accompanied by a debate about the validity of the obtained results 
and the possibility to make policy and allocation decisions based on them. In this section, we 
review the most recent applications of SP in health care in order to demonstrate in which 
manner these methods are usually applied, and which design and methodological aspects 
make them applicable to policy decisions. This also justifies the methodological choices made 
in this dissertation and outlines gaps in research, which motivate this dissertation. 
1.2.1 Stated preference techniques 
The two most applied SP techniques are discrete choice experiments (DCE) and the 
contingent valuation technique (CV). The main difference between these two techniques is the 
way the values are obtained. In CV, a benefit is typically valued in a holistic manner either by 
open- or close-ended questions. In the former case, respondents are asked to state their 
willingness to pay (WTP) an amount for obtaining that benefit or willingness to accept 
(WTA) an amount for the loss of the benefit. In the latter case, WTP or WTA is assessed in 
the form of yes-no or double-bound question(s), or a bidding game. The obtained values are 
integral (sometimes referred to as discrete), i.e. they represent a mean value for a unit of the 
benefit (Mogas et al., 2009). In DCE, in contrast, the value of the benefit is described through 
a set of its characteristics (attributes of a profile), their impact is evaluated jointly, and the 
decomposed effects of the attributes on the value of the benefit are obtained. Thus, the 
retrieved values are marginal in nature and represent the relative weight of the characteristics 
in the value of the benefit. The marginal rate of substitution with the price attribute, 
consequently, represents the marginal WTP level for a small improvement in the non-price 
attributes under consideration (Mogas et al., 2009). Both DCE and CV are applied in this 
dissertation to study WTP for physician services. 
Theoretically, choice-based elicitation methods are considered to be superior to non-choice-
based methods as the former better resemble the real market (Zweifel et al., 2006; Louviere et 
al., 2000). In earlier applications, conjoint analysis in the form of rating and ranking of the 
presented profiles has been applied. However, nowadays these forms are considered to be 
outdated and DCE (choice-based method) is overall applied. In CV applications, however, the 
variety of both close-ended choice-based and open non-choice-based formats still remain, 
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though a general shift towards choice-based elicitation formats is observed (Smith and Sach, 
2010; Klose, 1999; Diener et al., 1998). 
Such enthusiasm about choice-based techniques is, however, not supported by the results of 
the empirical literature. Typically, WTP in a real market (actual money contributions) is 
considered as a benchmark for exploring the theoretical validity of WTP obtained in SP. 
Evidence from inside and outside health care suggests that open-ended format of SP yields 
WTP that is either higher (Blumenschein et al., 2001) or close to WTP in real market choices 
(Ryan and Watson, 2009). The choice-based format, in turn, including both DCE and CV, 
usually yields WTP, which is substantially higher than that obtained in open-ended elicitation 
formats (e.g. Whitty et al., 2013; Loh and Shapiro, 2013; Danyliv et al., 2012a). Thus, WTP 
from the choice based format is even further from the real WTP than the one from the open-
ended formats. In any case, WTP obtained via SP is to a large extent affected by the design of 
the survey and the empirical strategies used to model preferences.  
The main motivation to use SP is their ability to provide monetary values for previously 
unknown and non-market traded benefits. Apart from this, the actual price people pay in a real 
market may not represent the maximum price they would be willing to pay and thus, estimates 
might be far from optimal. SP, in contrast, may provide a good estimate for the reservation 
price. SP, in addition allow capturing passive use values, i.e. utility obtained from the mere 
availability of a benefit without usage. This feature is especially important in primary health 
care (the application area of this dissertation) where every citizen is a potential user. All these 
advantages lead to an increased use of SP for valuing health benefits (for reviews see Ryan et 
al., 2001b; Smith and Sach, 2010; Klose, 1999; Diener et al., 1998). 
The problems of SP are caused by their hypothetical nature. In case of the RP approach, 
values are based on real consumer behavior. SP values are based on hypothetical scenarios 
which respondents might not be familiar with and do not require real monetary commitments 
form the respondents or respective behavior in future. Moreover, it is often cognitively 
difficult and respondents may not fully understand the specification of the benefit or risks 
involved. All this leads to the hypothetical bias, i.e. respondents might state the values which 
are not true and are different form their WTP that would occur in real market decisions. 
Moreover, respondents might behave strategically and give on purpose answers which are not 
true but correspond to some desirable patterns. For example, if they believe that high stated 
values increase the probability of the benefit provision at zero prices, they might overstate 
their WTP. On the other hand, if it seems likely that the stated price has payment policy 
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consequences, respondents might understate the true value. All these problems might be 
addressed to certain extent through the correct design of the hypothetical tasks and/or 
appropriate data analysis and interpretation of the obtained results. 
1.2.2. Willingness and ability to pay 
In economics, the value of a benefit is assessed through one of two competing concepts: WTP 
or WTA, which basically seek to obtain the reservation price of a benefit. WTP is defined as 
the maximum amount that an individual would accept to pay in order to obtain a benefit or 
avoid loss. WTA, in contrast, is the minimal compensation an individual would accept for a 
loss of a benefit or acquiring something undesirable. It is well recognized, that WTA 
estimates are in general higher than WTP estimates (Whynes and Sach, 2007). There are 
several possible effects explaining this discrepancy and they might apply simultaneously. The 
discrepancy might occur due to the fact that WTA, unlike WTP, is not constrained by the 
individual’s budget (Brown and Gregory, 1999). Endowment effect or loss aversion explains 
this effect through the idea that people value more that they are entitled to than something that 
they can probably acquire (Thaler, 1980). Finally, losing a benefit requires its substitution, 
and the lack of substitutes might increase its valuation (Hanemann, 1991).  
In case of measuring ordinal preferences, i.e. mapping the relative desirability of the benefits 
or their characteristics, the discrepancy between WTA and WTP does not make much 
difference and both measures might provide consistent results. However, the preferences 
measured in cardinal monetary terms have meaning only with respect to a budget constraint. 
Hence, in this case application of WTA is theoretically inconsistent. Therefore, WTA is very 
rarely applied in health care for valuing benefits or losses with the purpose of investment 
decisions. In most cases when WTA is applied, it is to obtain providers’ values (e.g. Wang 
and Hong, 2012; Rischatsch and Zweifel, 2012) or for the purpose of comparison with WTP 
(e.g. Martin-Fernandez et al., 2010a). NOAA recommends the use of WTP measures for the 
valuation of environmental amenities with the motivation that it yields more conservative 
estimates (Arrow and Solow, 1993). In this dissertation, we use the WTP concept as a more 
theoretically consistent approach, especially because we focus on the pricing effects. 
The assumption that WTP, representing a payment, is anchored on a budget constraint (in 
contrast to WTA) might be erroneous in its turn. Russell (1996) argued that many policy and 
research debates tend to rely only upon WTP assuming that it is synonymous with ability to 
pay, which is not true in practice. WTP, whether stated or observed in actual purchase 
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behavior, does not necessarily represent affordable purchase decisions. The households may 
apply resource mobilizing strategies, such as selling assets, sacrificing other needs, or 
borrowing money (Russell, 1996). Such decisions might be unaffordable in principle as they 
lead to long-term adverse effects on household welfare. 
Actual health expenditures in many developing countries, and in CEE in particular, are shown 
to have impoverishing effects causing substantial assets depletion (e.g. Arsenijevic et al., 
2012; Tomini et al., 2012b; Bredenkamp et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2011; van Doorslaer et al., 
2006; Damme et al., 2004; Xu et al., 2003). Thus, they should not be regarded as affordable. 
Moreover, individuals faced with serious economic problems and at the same time with the 
necessity of substantial health expenditures, may change the structure of their preferences 
towards health care rather than other consumption categories (Mataria et al., 2006). They 
might even be unable to formulate their preferences definitely (Sen, 1992). Thus, their 
expressed WTP and amounts they actually pay for health care services might substantially 
exceed what would be affordable to them under normal conditions (without adverse long-term 
welfare effects). Therefore, in the valuation studies, especially those informing policy 
decisions about patient payment policies, it is crucial to account for the ability to pay. 
Separate estimates of the ability to pay and WTP, however, provide little information for 
policy decisions. In economics, the well-known willingness and ability to pay (WATP) 
concept represents the demand and, therefore, provides the needed information about 
consumer reactions to the price changes. In many studies, actual expenditure is assumed to 
represent demand, i.e. WATP, for health care services (Ching, 1995; Gertler and van der 
Gaag, 1990; Mocan et al., 2004). However, actual expenditure is a poor representation of the 
true WATP which might be higher or as discussed above even lower than the amounts spent 
(Russell, 1996). Some studies use the opportunity cost of the undertaken purchase decisions 
(e.g. Saulo et al., 2008) as an indication of ability to pay, but not WATP. 
In this dissertation, we focus on eliciting WATP rather than WTP. In the SP framework, the 
discrepancy between WTP and ability to pay might be exacerbated by the hypothetical bias as 
the respondents do not consider their real budget constraints when making hypothetical 
choices (Loomis et al., 1994). Thus, for the purpose of eliciting WATP in CV tasks of this 
study it is specified that the respondent should consider his/her own conditions and express 
what s/he would be willing and able to pay for the valued service. In DCE, incorporation of 
the ability to pay is not straightforward due to the choice-based elicitation format. In this 
dissertation, we simply assure that the respondent considers his/her own budget by asking one 
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to consider one’s own real conditions before making the hypothetical choice. Due to the 
common practice of using WTP concept, we further refer to WATP when talking about CV 
results only. For the DCE results and for general use, e.g. referring to its use in the literature, 
we still use the term WTP. 
1.2.3. Integral and marginal WTP, and study perspective 
Most of the current SP literature in health care adheres to the perspective of an investment or 
health care provision agenda, or providing specific information for cost-benefit analysis. That 
is these studies seek to quantify benefits that would be gained from a provision of a certain 
service or from the improvements in the quality or access characteristics of these services 
(e.g. Regier et al., 2012; Naik-Panvelkar et al., 2012; Kjaer et al., 2012; Glenngard et al., 
2012; Gidengil et al., 2012; Corso et al., 2013; Brandt et al., 2012). Some studies, however, 
are rather cautious even in interpreting the WTP estimates as benefit gains and simply use 
them as an indication of relative preferences (e.g. Whitty et al., 2013; Sadique et al., 2013; 
Carroll et al., 2013; Hancock-Howard et al., 2012; Ethier et al., 2012; Dixon et al., 2012). 
That is they answer questions like which characteristics are most important for the 
patients/consumers, what is the trade-off between the characteristics, and which of the 
improvements may facilitate consumption. On the other hand, many studies do consider WTP 
obtained as an indication of the value of the real benefit and discuss possibilities of the 
service/benefit provision by comparing gains to its cost (e.g. Shafie & Hassali, 2013; Loh & 
Shapiro, 2013; Lang et al., 2012; Kjaer et al., 2012; Glenngard et al., 2012; Asgary, 2012) or 
define this WTP as an acceptable cost range (e.g. Regier et al., 2012; Naik-Panvelkar et al., 
2012). 
WTP yielded from SP techniques, however, can also provide information to quantify the 
potential consumption effects of the price arrangements, or more generally, estimating 
demand. Such perspective represents the specific interest of this dissertation. As discussed in 
section 1.2.2., it implies the stronger assumptions that stated WTP (in this case WATP) well 
reflects the price that people would actually be willing and able to pay in the real market. 
Therefore, this perspective is very rare in health care. Some papers adopt this perspective, but 
straight away state that these estimates might be subject to a hypothetical or strategic bias 
(e.g. Mattsson et al., 2013; Lynn et al., 2013). Other studies call for the development of a 
special framework for the payment design that incorporates also actual consumption data (e.g. 
Naik-Panvelkar et al., 2012; Marti, 2012). Very few studies so far have fully relied upon SP 
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for estimating demand and/or discuss pricing effects (e.g. Sadique et al., 2013; Mataria et al, 
2007; Ho et al., 2005; Cropper et al., 2004). 
The perspective of the study determines the choice of the SP eliciting technique (DCE or CV). 
Given the nature of the values estimated, DCE best suits the purpose of eliciting and 
quantifying relative preferences for benefit attributes, while CV is best used for obtaining the 
holistic value of the service, good, or other benefit. However, the correspondence is not 
always straightforward. 
Most applications of CV use holistic evaluation principles (e.g. Whitty et al., 2013; Shafie and 
Hassali, 2013; Loh and Shapiro, 2013; Hansen et al., 2013, Corso et al., 2013, Wang and 
Hong, 2012; Sogaard et al., 2012; Lang et al., 2012; Havet et al., 2012; Gyrd-Hansen and 
Kjaer, 2012; Ethier et al., 2012; Dixon et al., 2012; Brandt et al., 2012; Bobinac et al., 2012b; 
Asgray, 2012). This leads to the idea, that the choice of CV technique is driven by the aim of 
obtaining holistic values. However, there are applications where CV is also used for valuing 
certain attributes of health care services. In this case, WTP is elicited for a certain 
characteristic separately or a decomposed scenario is applied (e.g. Mataria et al., 2007; 
Hammerschmidt et al., 2004; O’Brien and Gafni, 1996). In the former case, there is a loss in 
the theoretical validity of the results as the consumers are believed to make choices based on a 
whole set of relevant characteristics, not a single one. The decomposed scenario approach 
produces so-called sub-additive values that cannot be simply added to obtain the holistic 
value, and an aggregation function is offered as a solution to this (Hammerschmidt et al., 
2004). 
DCE produces marginal WTP values, which allows for defining relative preferences across 
the set of characteristics relevant for the choice. Hence, the primary purpose of DCE should 
be to define relative preferences, i.e. the main choice or value drivers. This application is 
observed in a substantial share of current studies (e.g. Sadique et al., 2013; Prosser et al., 
2013; Moia et al., 2013; Naik-Panvelkar et al., 2012; Hodgkins et al., 2012; Gidengil et al., 
2012). Nonetheless, nowadays, most DCE studies aim at deriving the integral value for a 
valued benefit. 
A simple approach to obtain the integral value is when the benefit of interest is embedded into 
the DCE tasks as one of the attributes of a more complex service (e.g. Hancock-Howard et al., 
2012). The majority of the DCE studies, however, apply integration of marginal WTP across 
the changes in the attributes, which are deemed to represent the benefit (Whitty et al., 2013; 
Mattsson et al., 2013; Carroll et al., 2013; Regier et al., 2012; Marti, 2012; Kjaer et al., 2012; 
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Jendle et al., 2012; Hancock-Howard et al., 2012; Glenngard et al., 2012). This approach is 
however not always possible to apply as it requires comparison of a valued benefit with 
certain attributes to a meaningful alternative with its own level of attributes. Some researchers 
design such goods/services (e.g. Mattsson et al., 2013; Regier et al., 2012) or use evidence on 
the characteristics of available alternatives (e.g. Jendle et al., 2012). Others use the total 
variation change in all the attributes (e.g. Glenngard et al., 2012) or calculate a change from 
the ‘worst’ to ‘best’ profiles of a benefit (e.g. Carroll et al., 2013; Lancsar and Savage, 2004).  
In any case, integrating marginal WTP across the changes in the attributes of the benefit is 
subject to a scale problem (Mogas et al., 2009). In essence, this means that the marginal WTP 
values are true only for very small changes in attribute levels from those that are common to a 
respondent. Integrating across large discrete changes in attribute levels imposes a restrictive 
assumption that the marginal WTP is constant across the whole range of an attribute, which is 
erroneous from an economics perspective. In addition, this approach is criticized for not 
accounting for the uncertainty inherent to the choices (Lancsar and Savage, 2004). Lancsar 
and Savage (2004) offered to use Hicksian variation measures instead, which implies 
predicting latent utility functions with and without a benefit and weighting their difference on 
the marginal utility of income (Hicks, 1943). This approach has been very rarely applied in 
health care (e.g. Kjaer et al., 2012). For small changes in attributes, it is argued to reduce to 
the integration of marginal WTP (Ryan, 2004b; Santos Silva, 2004). 
In this dissertation, we keep to the point of view that CV is best for holistic WTP/WATP 
measures, while DCE only provides marginal WTP estimates. We also treat marginal WTP as 
the representation of the relative importance of the valued service attributes which cannot be 
integrated to obtain holistic values. Therefore, for the purpose of studying payment effects, 
CV is applied. DCE values are discussed from the perspective of priority setting, i.e. for 
ranking investment options related to quality and access improvements. 
1.2.4. Health benefits 
SP studies are applied in a vast variety of clinical fields with the most popular field being 
infectious diseases (e.g. Sadique et al., 2013; Prosser et al., 2013; Hansen et al., 2013; Regier 
et al., 2012; Gidengil et al., 2012; Asgray, 2012). Other popular fields are cardiovascular 
diseases (e.g. Whitty et al., 2013; Moia et al., 2013; Sogaard et al., 2012), cancer (e.g. Lang et 
al., 2012; Havet et al., 2012; Ethier et al., 2012), women’s reproductive health (e.g. Mattsson 
et al., 2013; Lynn et al., 2013), mental health (e.g. Hancock-Howard et al., 2012; Glenngard 
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et al., 2012), asthma (e.g. Naik-Panvelkar et al., 2012; Brandt et al., 2012), digestive system 
disorders (e.g. Hodgkins et al., 2012; Dixon et al., 2012). Other clinical fields of SP 
application include genetic disorders (e.g. Carroll et al., 2013), nephrology (e.g. Kjaer et al., 
2012), glucose related problems (e.g. Jendle et al., 2012), smoking cessation (e.g. Marti, 
2012). The list is however not exhaustive and these techniques can be successfully applied in 
many other clinical fields. There are, in contrast, applications of SP to the valuation of more 
integral benefits, which are not related to a specific clinical field, i.e. health state or health 
problem. Those are assessments of WTP per QALY (e.g. Gyrd-Hansen & Kjaer, 2012; 
Bobinac et al., 2012a, 2012b), prevention or care programs to specific groups (e.g. Corso et 
al., 2013; Loh & Shapiro, 2013) or for insurance packages (e.g. Shafie & Hassali, 2013). 
The range of valued benefits in these studies is also broad: models of disease management or 
treatment (e.g. Mattsson et al., 2013; Moia et al., 2013; Naik-Panvelkar et al., 2012; Whitty et 
al., 2013), specific diagnostic, treatment procedure or a drug (e.g. Lynn et al., 2013; Hansen et 
al., 2013; Regier et al., 2012; Marti, 2012; Jendle et al., 2012; Hodgkins et al., 2012; Havet et 
al., 2012; Hancock-Howard et al., 2012; Glenngard et al., 2012), screening program (e.g. 
Carroll et al., 2013; Dixon et al., 2012; Sogaard et al., 2012), vaccination (e.g. Sadique et al., 
2013; Asgary, 2012), QALY (e.g. Prosser et al., 2013). Health benefits are not always 
expressed through service provision. Alternatively, benefits are evaluated through WTP for 
the mere availability of the services (e.g. Kjaer et al., 2012), or for the elimination or 
prevention of undesired health outcomes (e.g. Brandt et al., 2012; Ethier et al., 2012; Lang et 
al., 2012). 
The presentation of the benefit under valuation is a very crucial question in the design of a SP 
study as it basically defines what will be valued by respondents. In CV studies, this is done in 
the scenario specification, while in DCE, the presentation is distributed between the scenario 
and attributes of the benefit. In any case, the elements that are presented to the respondent 
depend not only on the study purposes, but also on the relevance of the information to the 
respondents. Olsen and Smith (2001) classified the characteristics of the valued benefits into: 
health outcomes, process-utility, and non-health outcomes. Additionally, the monetary and 
non-monetary cost of acquiring should be specified in case of indirect valuation, i.e. choice-
based techniques. Process utility refers to the quality and access characteristics of the health 
benefit, e.g. service, and may broadly consist of the indicators of clinical and social quality, 
and spatial, temporal, and psychological access (Berki and Ashcraft, 1980). In this 
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dissertation, we address a broad range of quality and access characteristics of physician 
services. 
Health care services consumption is unlikely to bring satisfaction per se. Most probably, 
health care services are valued for their expected health outcomes, i.e. the reduction in the risk 
of mortality, morbidity, adverse effects or pain. Therefore, most of the valuations are focused 
on health outcomes (Ryan, 1999). Many studies explicitly describe direct health and related 
outcomes, like reduction in the risk of the disease (e.g. Regier et al., 2012; Sadique et al., 
2013), decrease in symptoms or adverse effects (e.g. Brandt et al., 2012; Corso et al., 2013; 
Ethier et al., 2012), changes in functional status (e.g. Gyrd-Hansen & Kjaer, 2012), days of 
sickness and absence from the job (e.g. Prosser et al., 2013), symptom free days (e.g. Naik-
Panvelkar et al., 2012), specific efficacy of the treatment (e.g. Marti, 2012; Jendle et al., 2012; 
Hodgkins et al., 2012; Glenngard et al., 2012). Other studies specify potential changes in the 
factors that may have health impacts like detection rates for screening and diagnostics (e.g. 
Carroll et al., 2013; Dixon et al., 2012; Lynn et al., 2013), or population coverage for 
vaccination (Gidengil et al., 2012). Side effects are sometimes specified additionally to the 
main health outcomes (e.g. Regier et al., 2012; Marti, 2012; Gidengil et al., 2012; Glenngard 
et al., 2012) or without the main outcomes (e.g. Moia et al., 2013). 
In cancer studies, there is a practice of eliciting WTP for a hypothetical ‘magical pill’ that can 
guarantee a full remission or symptom elimination (e.g. Lang et al., 2012; Ethier et al., 2012). 
In these studies, however, a current state is also specified in health outcome terms as a 
meaningful comparator. Another interesting strategy is using the self-reported risk perception 
as the basis for identifying possible health outcomes of the health care service (e.g. Asgary, 
2012). Some studies that compare modes of service delivery assume no differences in 
expected health outcomes and concentrate only on the preferences for the modes themselves 
(e.g. Whitty et al., 2013; Havet et al., 2012). 
Still, there is some portion of the SP studies that do not specify the potential health outcomes 
and value services or treatment modes per se (e.g. Kjaer et al., 2012; Loh & Shapiro, 2013; 
Mattsson et al., 2013; Hancock-Howard et al., 2012; Shafie & Hassali, 2013). This approach 
is also justified in case of integral services that may have many different health outcomes 
and/or are not related to a specific health problem and/or are meaningful and familiar to the 
respondents. This may include but is not limited to primary care, long-term care and insurance 
plans. 
General introduction and background 
 19 
The focus of this dissertation on the patient payments for outpatient physician services, also 
favors the latter approach. First of all, in real life, health care consumers make choices under 
conditions of uncertainty about the properties and effects of the services. Moreover, primary 
and outpatient services have very complex outcomes including risk reduction, but also 
positive benefits from obtaining correct recommendations, referrals or prescriptions. In 
addition, these services are rather common for the whole population or at least everyone has 
his/her own prior expectations about their clinical properties. Thus, it is a convenient strategy 
in our research to use social expectations about the clinical effects without specifying them, 
concentrating more on other quality and access characteristics of the services. 
1.2.5. Application of discrete choice experiment design 
The design of the DCE involves several steps including the selection of attributes through 
which the valued health benefit is expressed, constructing benefit profiles, and matching them 
to obtain choice tasks. These decisions influence the empirical strategies for modeling 
choices.  
As discussed earlier, the attributes of the health care services might include health and non-
health outcomes, and process utility (Olsen and Smith, 2001). Inclusion of health and related 
outcomes was discussed earlier. Attributes that belong to the process utility are various and 
depend on the features of the health benefit provision, often referred to as quality and access 
attributes in case of the valuation of a service. In case professionals are involved in the 
provision of the benefit, the professional level is often expressed through their skills and 
training, or composition of the provision team (e.g. Kjaer et al., 2012; Hancock-Howard et al., 
2012; Lynn et al., 2013). 
Another group of factors relates to the mode and convenience of the administration of a 
benefit valued. In case of valuing services or therapies, this may include the description of 
who delivers it and how (e.g. Hancock-Howard et al., 2012), the frequency of contacts with 
specialists (e.g. Whitty et al., 2013; Moia et al., 2013; Naik-Panvelkar et al., 2012), the place 
of the service delivery (e.g. Kjaer et al., 2012; Pavlova et al., 2009). In case of valuing drug 
therapies, this attribute relates to the convenience of drug intake, frequency, dosing, and route 
of its administration, (e.g. Naik-Panvelkar et al., 2012; Jendle et al., 2012; Hodgkins et al., 
2012; Glenngard et al., 2012). Additional efforts or inconveniences that the therapy might 
cause, can also be specified (e.g. Moia et al., 2013; Mattsson et al., 2013) as well as additional 
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conveniences or services may also be presented (e.g. Naik-Panvelkar et al., 2012;, Whitty et 
al., 2013; Kjaer et al., 2012). 
An important aspect of care is the interaction between the patient and the health professional. 
In this regard, we find two main aspects that might be embedded in the DCE tasks. One of 
them is the attitude of medical staff and the way they provide information (e.g. Naik-
Panvelkar et al., 2012; Lynn et al., 2013; Hancock-Howard et al., 2012). Another aspect is the 
continuity of care, i.e. the possibility to be seen by the same or familiar specialists during the 
care course (e.g. Whitty et al., 2013; Hancock-Howard et al., 2012). 
A special set of attributes, often used in DCE for valuing health benefits is an indication of the 
time cost. Time cost directly invested by the benefit users, like travel time, waiting in the 
facility, time of utilization etc., should be distinguished from the passive time attributes, e.g. 
waiting for the results or the waiting list (e.g. Carroll et al., 2013; Essers et al., 2010; Nieboer 
et al., 2010; Clark et al., 2009). In the latter case, health benefit users do not invest this time 
directly as they may perform their usual tasks while being on the waiting list. It should be 
noted, however, that indications of time cost are often embedded in the delivery mode and 
placing descriptions, e.g. a home based program requires no travel time as opposed to a 
hospital-based program (e.g. Whitty et al., 2013). Sometimes, time commitments required are 
specified explicitly (e.g. Hancock-Howard et al., 2012), especially if there is an objective to 
estimate the time that may be traded for other attributes (e.g. Prosser, 2013; Ethier et al., 
2012). 
In DCE, the number of valued attributes and their levels is limited by their feasibility. Even a 
low number of attributes and/or their levels result in a very high number of all possible 
profiles (full factorial design) and, consequently, a high number of choices. In the current 
literature, commonly between four (e.g. Mattsson et al., 2013; Lynn et al., 2013; Carroll et al., 
2013; Regier et al., 2012; Glenngard et al., 2012) and eight (e.g. Naik-Panvelkar et al., 2012) 
attributes are embedded in the DCE tasks, with a tendency to fewer attributes. The attributes 
are usually selected on the basis of previous theoretical and empirical evidence on the 
importance of the attributes from prior qualitative investigations and quantitative tests. 
A few solutions are applied to reduce the number of possible choice tasks: fractional factorial 
designs, random assignment (in particular split sample), or both. Full factorial designs are 
very rare and they definitely require random assignment of the small number of tasks to the 
respondents (e.g. Prosser et al., 2013; Kjaer et al., 2012). A more common approach is to use 
fractional factorial designs, which seeks to find the best trade-off between mathematical 
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properties of orthogonality, balance, minimal overlap and efficiency (Huber and Zwerina, 
1996). Recently, the emphasis has been shifted from orthogonality to efficiency and a number 
of search strategies have been developed to search the most efficient designs (Bridges et al., 
2011, Olaru et al., 2011). The most prominent of them is D-optimality (Huber and Zwerina, 
1996). In health care, however, only some of the empirical studies apply D-optimality (e.g. 
Whitty et al., 2013; Regier et al., 2012; Hancock-Howard et al., 2012). A lot of studies still 
rely upon orthogonal designs as we do in this dissertation (e.g. Sadique et al., 2013; Moia et 
al., 2013; Lynn et al., 2013; Carroll et al., 2013; Marti, 2012; Jendle et al., 2012; Glenngard et 
al., 2012; Gidengil et al., 2012). 
The resulting number of choices in a DCE task, after factorial designs and matching, rarely 
directly leads to a number of choice tasks manageable by the respondents (e.g. Lynn et al., 
2013; Carroll et al., 2013; Regier et al., 2012). Therefore, in case of a very high number of 
choice tasks, a random assignment of the tasks is applied (e.g. Prosser et al., 2013), i.e. each 
respondent is assigned a target number of choices randomly derived from the full design. A 
split sample approach (or ‘block design’) is a very common option if the resulting design 
contains a number of choices that is high and can be split into two or more sets with 
manageable numbers (e.g. Whitty et al., 2013; Sadique, Moia et al., 2013; Naik-Panvelkar et 
al., 2012; Marti, 2012; Kjaer et al., 2012; Glenngard et al., 2012). In the latter case, 
respondents are randomly assigned to one of the sets with the reduced number of choices. 
There is no conclusive evidence on which number of choices may be considered as 
manageable by respondents (Ryan and Gerard, 2003). Recent empirical applications in health 
care contain a great range of choice tasks numbers starting from four (e.g. Jendle et al., 2012). 
The upper limit is commonly 16 choice tasks (e.g. Moia et al., 2013; Lynn et al., 2013; Regier 
et al., 2012). Rarely, a higher number of choice tasks is used, i.e. up to 32 (e.g. Bijlenga et al., 
2011); however, this might not be considered as feasible for a respondent. 
The absolute majority of the DCE studies are designed so that a respondent makes a binary 
choice between two unlabeled profiles of a health benefit (e.g. Whitty et al., 2013; Sadique et 
al., 2013; Prosseret al., 2013; Moia et al., 2013; Mattsson et al., 2013; Lynn, et al., 2013; 
Carroll et al., 2013; Naik-Panvelkar et al., 2012; Jendle et al., 2012; Hancock-Howard et al., 
2012; Glenngard et al., 2012; Gidengilet al., 2012). In this specification, empirical estimation 
and interpretation is much easier by the application of standard regression models for a binary 
response variable. However, in real situations, consumers consider a larger number of options. 
Therefore, to make it more realistic, some studies design a choice set with more than two 
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options (e.g. Kjaer et al., 2012). Moreover, where there is the explicit aim of estimating a 
preferred option (e.g. home-based vs clinic-based care, place of delivery, team vs single 
specialist consultation), these options might be labeled (e.g. Whitty et al., 2013; Kjaer et al., 
2012). This reduces the number of attributes to be varied. However, the preference of the 
main interest might be also embedded in the choice design as an attribute.  
Forcing a respondent to make a definite choice between the presented options is believed to 
inflate WTP estimates obtained from DCE (Ryan and Skåtun, 2004). A solution to this is the 
introduction of the opt-out option, i.e. the choice of none of the presented alternatives or the 
status-quo (Lancsar and Louviere, 2008; Ryan and Skåtun, 2004). Despite its advantages, the 
opt-out option is rarely applied (e.g. Regier et al., 2012; Marti, 2012). It also slightly increases 
the complexity of the analytical modeling, which probably can explain the relative 
unpopularity of this approach. Another challenge is that the opt-out option cannot always be 
meaningfully expressed in terms of the attributes, which disables its inclusion in the conjoint 
analysis. 
There has been a development in another technique called the best-worst scaling method, 
which might be regarded as an extension of the traditional DCE, though in some versions it 
might be seen as a separate elicitation method (Flynn, 2010; Flynn et al., 2007). Originally, it 
required the presence of the attribute that has the most and the least importance (Finn and 
Louviere, 1992). It was developed to the profile valuing case, where a respondent chooses the 
most and least attractive attribute within a presented profile (e.g. Günther et al., 2010). The 
closest to the traditional DCE, is the multi-profile case where a respondent needs to choose 
the most and least attractive profiles from the set based on the profile attribute levels 
(Louviere et al., 2008). However, best-worst scaling method has not found many applications 
in the health care field so far, though it is actively promoted in the theoretical literature 
mentioned above. 
Empirical strategies for modeling DCE data require an application of the models for discrete 
outcome measures, and the exact choice depends on the number of choice options. In a binary 
response specification, the choice is limited to either logit models (e.g. Sadique et al., 2013; 
Mattsson et al., 2013; Lynn et al., 2013; Regier et al., 2012; Naik-Panvelkar et al., 2012; 
Kjaer et al., 2012) or probit ones (e.g. Prosser et al., 2013; Moia et al., 2013). The latter is 
believed to be better as it does not suffer from the IIA (independence of irrelevant 
alternatives) assumption (Hanley et al., 2003). However, it is applied more rarely, probably 
due to the higher computational and interpretational complexity. In case of more than two 
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choice alternatives, regression analysis extends to multinomial (ususally logit) specification 
(e.g. Regier et al., 2012; Kjaer et al., 2012). Alternatively, nested (usually logit) specifications 
are sometimes considered when the opt-out option is present and the decision process is 
treated as nested (e.g. Marti, 2012). In any of these cases, a model should account for the 
hierarchical structure of the data as several responses are obtained from one respondent. This 
is mostly done by extending the model to a fixed/random effect or random parameter 
specification.  
A relatively new promising approach, which is believed to better capture the heterogeneity of 
the preferences by splitting observed relations into several classes, is latent class modeling 
(Louviere, 2006). Its applications in DCE studies are growing in number (e.g. Whitty et al., 
2013; Carroll et al., 2013). However, to our knowledge none of these applications in health 
care have accounted simultaneously for hierarchical data structure. Nonetheless, there are 
advances in the estimation procedures that allow estimating latent class models with random 
parameters (e.g. Erichsen and Brockhoff, 2004).  
1.2.6. Application of the contingent valuation design 
In a CV study, one of the major design decisions is the choice between elicitation formats, 
which can be open-ended, via payment cards, one bound discrete choice questions 
(referendum question yes-or-no), double bound discrete choice, or bidding game. Each of 
these formats has its own shortcomings. The open-ended format is believed to suffer from 
strategic and hypothetical bias. The payment card format is subject to a range bias, while the 
bidding game – to a starting point bias. The discrete choice format is argued to be the best 
option which overcomes the mentioned biases, and is also theoretically sounder, as it closely 
resembles choices in real markets, and avoids erratic answers to impact the overall WTP 
value. This is largely due to the seminal publication in environmental economics by NOAA 
panel (Arrow and Solow, 1993). On the other hand, the discrete choice format might suffer 
from “yea-saying” (Blamey et al., 1999) which implies that respondents respond positively to 
a bid which is higher than their true WTP. 
Smith and Sach (2010) showed that in earlier applications, open-ended and payment card 
formats were most frequent, and with the development of the method to 2005 the number of 
other formats has risen substantially gradually superseding the use of open-ended format. By 
this review, in 2000-2005, the payment card and dichotomous choice were the most applied 
formats. In recent years, this tendency seems to be remaining. A lot of emphasis is now on the 
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bidding games and double-bounded dichotomous choice (e.g. Whitty et al., 2013; Shafie & 
Hassali, 2013; Hansen et al., 2013; Havet et al., 2012; Ethier et al., 2012; Corso et al., 2013; 
Loh & Shapiro, 2013; Lang et al., 2012; Wang & Hong, 2012). Simple dichotomous choice is 
applied rarer than the double-bound one (e.g. Asgary, 2012; Gyrd-Hansen & Kjaer, 2012). 
Still a lot of applications rely upon payment cards (e.g. Bobinac et al., 2012b; Brandt et al., 
2012; Dixon et al., 2012; Gyrd-Hansen & Kjaer, 2012). The purely open-ended elicitation 
technique is mostly applied now as a complement to other formats in order to either retrieve 
more precise estimates after the answer has been framed or for comparison reasons (e.g. 
Bobinac et al., 2012b; Loh & Shapiro, 2013). In this dissertation, we apply an open-ended 
format with payment-cards to obtain conservative WTP estimates from the CV. Conservative 
WTP estimates are preferred because of our focus on policy assessment. 
Empirical strategies for modeling WTP obtained from CV data are various due to different 
elicitation formats. Nonetheless, linear regression with log transformation of WTP for the 
open-ended, payment card, or bidding format remains one of the most popular approaches 
(e.g. Bobinac et al., 2012b; Brandt et al., 2012; Dixon et al., 2012; Hansen et al., 2013; Shafie 
& Hassali, 2013). It requires that an exact WTP measure is retrieved from the CV task. If 
WTP is treated as an ordered outcome, another popular approach is to use an interval 
regression (e.g. Corso et al., 2013; Ethier et al., 2012; Lang et al., 2012). For the choice 
format CV, i.e. dichotomous, double bound, a logistic specification is applied (e.g. Asgary, 
2012; Gyrd-Hansen & Kjaer, 2012; Loh & Shapiro, 2013).  
The necessity to deal adequately with zero answers (Strazzera et al., 2003) arises from the fact 
that often there are spikes at zero and the decision whether to pay and how much to pay may 
be driven by different factors. The simple approach which may be combined with the 
empirical strategies described above is excluding zeros from the analysis (e.g. Brandt et al., 
2012; Shafie & Hassali, 2013). Alternatively, the independence of the decisions about paying 
and choosing the level of WTP is presumed by modeling them separately (Donaldson et al., 
1998). Another approach is the application of the family of tobit regressions, i.e. regressions 
for the censored outcomes. Type I tobit models do not account for the predictors of the 
decision whether to pay, but model the level of positive WTP conditional on non-zero 
answering. Type II tobit models, including heckman type models, in contrast, seek to find the 
predictors of both decision stages (e.g. Havet et al., 2012). Double hurdle models have a 
similar logic, but also allow for distinguishing between true and protest answers in the first 
stage decision (Dalmau-Matarrodona, 2001). 
General introduction and background 
 25 
Survival analysis is applied relatively rarely to CV data in health care (e.g. Wang & Hong, 
2012; Mataria et al., 2007), though it has been extensively used in environmental economics 
(Carson et al, 2003; Carson et al., 1994; Hanemann et al., 1991). In this approach, ‘survival’ 
in relation to the WTP level instead of time is estimated, thus, enabling calculations of the 
proportions of people who are willing to pay certain amounts with respect to their 
characteristics. This approach basically provides information on the demand shape and 
shifters if stated WTP is assumed to represent real WTP. In this dissertation, survival analysis 
of the WTP estimates is presented. 
1.2.7. Other aspects of SP studies 
Recently there has been some work done in the direction of joint data analysis, i.e. SP and RP 
(Adamowicz et al., 1994), and CV together with DCE (e.g. Mogas et al., 2009; Adamowicz et 
al., 1998). As the focus of this dissertation is on SP, we touch the question of the latter 
combination. The main motivation of combining the two is not to lose information specific to 
each of the methods. As Mogas et al. (2009) states, CV cannot provide information on each 
and every possible combination of the attributes of the benefit, but only for a certain limited 
number. Therefore, they offered using CV values as an indication of basic WTP and adjust for 
changes of the attributes by using results of DCE. This approach to our knowledge has not 
been applied in health care. Another way is to make a joint estimation on combined DCE and 
CV data applying a scale parameter representing difference in elicitation methods 
(Adamowicz et al., 1998). This requires that data in both elicitation methods have the same 
discrete choice format.  
Most of the applications of SP in health care focus on a benefit in a certain country, or even 
settlement area. Some studies compare cross-country contexts. In many cases, the comparison 
is made for similar countries in the similar level of development (e.g. Hodgkins et al., 2012) 
or from the same macro-region (e.g. Glenngard et al., 2012). Few studies, however, have 
attempted to compare countries which are substantially different in terms of culture and 
economy (e.g. Corso et al., 2013). This evidence suggests that values are not transferrable 
across different cultural and economic contexts, though might be rather similar for the 
countries with similar contexts (Glenngard et al., 2012). This study focuses on the CEE 
countries, which had similar socio-economic and political context in the 80th of the previous 
century and has had different development trajectories ever since. Therefore, CEE countries 
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represent a suitable basis for cross-country comparisons of WTP for health care services. 
Country context is presented in the Section 1.3. 
Concluding, the application of SP in health care has taken various patterns and is growing in 
number in recent years. Researchers have to make decisions on a number of aspects in the 
study design, i.e. elicitation technique, elicitation format including choice or non-choice 
based, the perspective of the study and whose values to be assessed, scope of the study etc. 
Within each technique, specific choices have to be made with regards to the benefit 
representation and further data analysis. Despite growth in use, the majority of the 
applications still are very cautious about the interpretation of the obtained WTP values. They 
are very rarely addressed in the framework of demand modeling, i.e. pricing decisions or 
consumption effects. Most probably, this is due to the lack of trust in WTP obtained from the 
hypothetical tasks. In this dissertation, we attempt an application of stated WTP to the task of 
the assessment of patient charges for services in the basic package. 
 
1.3 Patient payments in Europe and country context 
1.3.1. Patient payments in Europe and CEE 
The official cost-sharing arrangements and informal flow circulation in a country depend on 
the features of the health care system, but also on the socio-economic and political context 
(Tambor et al., 2011; Stepurko et al., 2013). European countries differ substantially in their 
reliance upon public and private funds in the system. In general, more prosperous economies 
that also spend more on health care per capita afford a higher proportion of health 
expenditures to be done through public funds (OECD, 2011). In less developed countries, 
patients bear a higher burden by paying out-of-pocket both formally and informally. 
However, this balance also highly depends on the institutional and political context. 
According to the WHO National Health Accounts data (WHO, 2013), Western European 
countries are rather homogenous in the mix of private and public funds. The highest reliance 
on public funds, i.e. more than 80% of the total health expenditure is financed through public 
funds, is observed in most of the Nordic countries, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the UK, and 
Monaco. France, Germany, Belgium, and Finland where social health insurance is in effect, 
and Austria, Italy and Spain with universal tax-based systems, cover around 75% to 80% 
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through public funds. A higher financial burden is shifted to patients in Ireland, Switzerland 
and Portugal. 
CEE countries are very diverse in the structure of their health care finance according to the 
WHO statistics (WHO, 2013). Most of these countries have had a common socialistic past 
with universal health care systems offering free services at the point of purchase. In the late 
80th, all those systems, which were rather inefficient and isolated, faced the necessity of 
profound organizational and financial reforms (Rechel & McKee, 2009). However, due to 
differences in political, social and cultural backgrounds, and economic capacity, the direction 
and depth of the reforms varied considerably. Such discordant transitions have led to a variety 
of health systems in CEE with different financing structure. Therefore, the reliance on public 
funds observed in CEE in 2011 varies from only about 45% in Albania and Moldova to more 
than 80% in Romania (80.2%), Czech Republic (83.5%), and Croatia (84.7%) (WHO, 2013).  
The economic situation in most CEE countries was rather hard at the beginning of the 
transition which provoked a reduction in the public financing, the unique source of health 
financing at that time (Rechel & McKee, 2009). This had to be substituted by private sources, 
primarily by out-of-pocket expenditure. In the lack of a legislative background for official 
fees and public resistance to market-oriented changes, informal markets immediately spread 
in most of these health systems (Lewis, 2007). Attempts to formalize or implement official 
charges were met with a severe resistance in many of the states among public and medical 
staff (Lewis, 2002).  
Nonetheless, due to the lack of public resources in CEE countries, patient cost-sharing for 
pharmaceuticals has been established in most CEE countries (Espin and Rovira, 2007). In 
former Soviet countries, Russia and Ukraine, pharmaceuticals in most cases are purchased 
out-of-pocket (Popovich et al., 2011; Lekhan et al., 2010a). However, patient charges for 
health care services in the basic health care package are less common, and they are not 
observed in countries such as Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and the former 
Soviet republics, i.e. Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia (Tambor et 
al., 2011). 
Implementation of official charges for public health care services in CEE, but also in some 
countries of the Western Europe, is very controversial and usually unpopular in policy-
making (Tambor et al., 2011). Few CEE countries, where patient co-payments for basic health 
care services were not abolished after the recent implementation are Croatia (in 2008) 
(Vončina et al., 2012), Czech Republic (in 2008) (Bryndová et al., 2009), Albania (in 2008) 
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(Tomini et al., 2012), and Estonia (in 2010) (Thomson et al., 2010). For longer periods they 
existed in Bulgaria (since 2000) (Atanasova et al, 2011), Macedonia (since 1992) (Gjorgjev et 
al., 2008), and Slovenia (since 1993) (Albreht et al., 2009). In Hungary and Slovak Republic, 
co-payments were introduced in the late 2006, but after a year of existence, they were 
abolished due to hot public debates without consideration of their economic effects (Baji et 
al., 2011). In Romania, the legislative base is ready to host cost-sharing since 2006 (Vladescu 
et al., 2008) but the government did not press the issue until 2013 when flat co-payments were 
introduced for one year (Lever, 2013). 
Official patient charges are a controversial issue in Western Europe as well. They are not 
implemented in countries such as Denmark, Malta, Spain, UK, and Greece (Tambor et al., 
2011). Similarly to Hungary and Slovak Republic, co-payments for hospital services in 
Portugal existed since 2007 and were abolished in 2009 due to the lack of economic effect 
(Barros et al., 2011). Germany has implemented flat co-payments for all types of care starting 
in 2004, but in 2013 patient charges for physician services were discontinued due to a surplus 
in the statutory insurance funds. There has been a lot of research producing conflicting 
evidence about the presence or absence of the effect of patient charges on consumption and 
revenues in Germany (e.g. Augurzky et al., 2006, Rückert et al., 2008), which only proves 
that this is highly controversial and political issue. 
Official patient charges in CEE take different forms (Tambor et al., 2011). Co-insurance 
schemes are implemented in Croatia (Vončina et al., 2012), Macedonia (Gjorgjev et al., 
2008), and Slovenia (Albreht et al., 2009). In Latvia, co-insurance is implemented in 
combination with flat rates per visit or admission (Mitenbergs et al., 2012). Flat rate co-
payments are applied in Bulgaria (Atanasova et al., 2011), and Czech Republic (Bryndová et 
al., 2009), and were also tried out Hungary and Slovak Republic (Baji et al., 2011). Most of 
the CEE countries also have a ‘ceiling’ for annual expenditures to protect patients from 
overspending. Most often, formal patient charges are levied for both the out- and inpatient 
services (Tambor et al., 2011), like in Bulgaria (Atanasova et al., 2011), Croatia (Vončina et 
al., 2012), Macedonia (Gjorgjev et al., 2008), Czech Republic (Bryndová et al., 2009), and 
Slovenia (Albreht et al., 2009). Less often, only outpatient services are subject to cost-sharing, 
like e.g. in Albania (Tomini et al., 2012b). No case where only inpatient care is charged to the 
patients is known in CEE. 
Despite the official arrangements in CEE countries or, probably, due to their opacity, informal 
payments continue to represent a substantial part of health care expenditure with the exception 
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of the Czech Republic (Tambor et al., 2011; Lewis, 2007; Lewis, 2002). These payments are 
especially prevalent in the poorest post-Soviet countries (Rechel & McKee, 2009), though 
they are common for most CEE countries. In many of these countries, formal and informal 
charges coexist (Tambor et al., 2011) causing a double burden for patients. In the former 
Soviet Republics, a new form – quasi-formal payments has developed (Pavlova et al., 2011; 
Balbanova et al., 2004; Litvak et al., 2001). It implies that the facilities officially charge 
patients for the services (usually for better quality services), although government regulations 
are either lacking or forbid this. Informal and quasi-formal charges represent a substantial 
threat to the sustainability of health systems as they are not accounted for. Moreover, they are 
shown to be rather regressive as they impair access to lower-income groups of the population 
(Atanasova et al., 2012; Baji et al., 2012b; Szende and Culyer, 2006; Murauskiene et al., 
2012; Danyliv et al., 2012b; Lewis, 2000). 
In this dissertation, we focus on assessing the effects of the patient payments for physician 
services in CEE countries. From a policy perspective the interest is on the potential effects of 
official payments. However, given the extent of informal payments in CEE, it is also 
important to understand the preferences between paying formally and informally. The six 
countries that enter the study are Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and 
Ukraine. At the time of data collection, official patient charges for physician services existed 
only in Bulgaria, were already abolished in Hungary, were about to be implemented in 
Romania, and were never implemented in the other countries. However, the SP framework 
applied in this dissertation, allows specification of the hypothetical scenarios of formal 
charges and makes a cross-country comparison possible. Below, we present the country 
context in terms of the economic development, general organization of health care financing, 
and patient payment patterns in these countries. 
1.3.2. Health care funding in the six CEE countries 
The six CEE countries included in the study for this dissertation, well represent the 
heterogeneity in the region as they greatly differ in the level of economic development and 
health expenditure (see Figure 1.1panel a), and social and political background. According to 
the World Bank (2013) data, the lowest income per capita and, consequently, lowest 
expenditure on health care is observed in Ukraine in 2010. Lithuania has a similar post-Soviet 
historical background but is a much more developed country with a substantial per capita 
income and health expenditure approaching Poland. Romania and Bulgaria represent post-
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socialistic countries with a moderate development level and are very close in the level of per 
capita income and per capita total health expenditure. Poland and Hungary are the relatively 
highly developed CEE countries with the highest income and health expenditure among the 
six countries in the study (the World Bank, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Gross national income per capita and total health expenditure per capita in the six countries 
in 2010, PPP USD (The World Bank, 2013) 
 
However, the burden laid on patients in terms of health expenditure does not fully correspond 
to the level of the country development. If we consider out-of-pocket expenditures only (see 
Figure 1.1 panel b) based on the World Bank (2013) statistics, Bulgaria has the highest 
expenditure per capita of about 453 USD in 2010. Ukraine, where people on average spend 
213 USD per year out-of-pocket, also shifts substantially upwards taking over Romania where 
the level of income is much higher but people spend only about 169 USD out-of-pocket per 
year. Poland, Lithuania, and Hungary as the most developed countries in the study, have 
substantial out-of-pocket expenditure per capita (304 USD, 339 USD, and 419 USD 
respectively). 
Table 1.1 shows the structure of financial sources for the total health expenditure in the six 
countries in this study. All of these countries, except Ukraine, implemented social health 
insurance. However, all of these systems do not rely solely on the social security funds and 
can be called mixed systems. According to WHO data (WHO,2012), Romania provides most 
of the health care through public funds with 64% being covered through the social health 
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insurance and the smallest share of private and out-of-pocket expenditure. A high reliance on 
social insurance funds is also observed in Poland (64%), Lithuania (61%), and also in 
Hungary (54%). In these countries, patients cover moderate parts of health expenditure from 
their own pocket (22%, 26.4%, and 26.16% respectively). In Hungary, also much emphasis is 
laid on private health insurance, which already covers 2.5% of total health expenditure. In 
Bulgaria, only 38% of total health expenditure is covered by social health insurance. This is 
the country with the highest reliance on out-of-pocket expenditure (almost 43%). In all these 
five countries, the government covers a small part of health expenditure: from 10% in Poland 
to 17.5% in Bulgaria. Ukraine is different in a way that here the Soviet universal system is 
preserved. Hence, the government spends around 56% of the total health expenditure from the 
funds collected through general taxation. However, a substantial share is covered by the 
patients out-of-pocket (around 40.5%). 
 
Table 1.1 Structure of the financial sources for total health expenditure, % of total health expenditure 
(WHO, 2012) 
 Public expenditure Private expenditure Other 
expenditure 
Country General government 
Social 
Security 
Fund 
Total Out-of-Pocket 
Private 
insurance 
Other 
private Total 
Bulgaria 17.57 38.11 55.69 42.88 0.46 0.97 44.31 0.00 
Hungary 10.69 54.08 64.77 26.16 2.47 6.60 35.23 0.00 
Lithuania 11.97 60.93 72.90 26.40 0.65 0.06 27.10 0.00 
Poland 9.89 61.79 71.68 22.07 0.67 5.05 27.79 0.53 
Romania 16.15 64.20 80.35 19.21 0.00 0.36 19.57 0.08 
Ukraine 56.63 0.00 56.63 40.50 0.88 1.99 43.37 0.00 
 
1.3.3. Patient payment arrangements in the six CEE countries 
The Bulgarian health care system (see Georgieva et al., 2007, Pavlova et al, 2000, Atanasova 
et al, 2011) started a transition from the Soviet model of centralized health care provision in 
1990. Health care facilities were transferred to local and municipal authorities and many of 
them were privatized. Nowadays, GPs are paid through a capitation system, outpatient 
specialists through a fee-for-service system, and hospitals are financed according to clinical 
pathways with the target to establish a DRG system (Atanasova et al, 2011). A National 
Health Insurance Fund with 28 decentralized regional departments was established in 2000. 
The funds are collected via payroll contributions which are 8% of the monthly wage divided 
in a 60:40 ratio between employer and employee. Health care for low-income and socially 
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disadvantaged people is covered by the state and local budgets. Social health insurance covers 
a basic package, which is periodically reduced due to the lack of sufficient resources 
(Atanasova et al, 2011). There is concern about the high share of uninsured people consisting 
mostly of low-income individuals and the Roma population (Rechel & McKee, 2009). The 
services outside the package require either additional insurance or direct payments. The use of 
services without a referral requires a full compensation from the patients. In 2000, with the 
purpose to contain resources and due to the introduction of social health insurance, several 
measures were introduced, among which were quotas for specialists’ referrals and the 
introduction of the co-payments. Patients pay 1% of the minimum monthly salary (around 
€ 1.2 at present) for an outpatient visit and 2% (around € 2.4) for a day of hospitalization. 
However, a broad list is in effect exempting many categories of Bulgarians, i.e. unemployed, 
children, people with special illnesses, disabled, veterans, imprisoned, low-income people, 
and medical personnel from paying these charges. Informal payments are also widely spread 
in Bulgaria amounting to about 3.6% of public health expenditure (Atanasova et al, 2011; van 
Mosseveld et al., 2008) which is about 2% of total health care expenditure. Patients pay 
informally to reduce waiting time, for direct referral to specialists, and for services of better 
quality. 
Hungary started a transition from the tax-financed system to social health insurance 
(Bismarck model) in 1989. Still, most of the health care facilities are owned by municipalities 
or the state (Baji et al., 2012b). Family doctor services are paid through capitation, outpatient 
specialist care is paid through a fee-for-service point system, acute inpatient services is paid 
through a payment system based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and chronic care 
through per diem rates (Gaál et al., 2011). The National Health Insurance Fund covers the 
recurrent cost of services, while capital expenditure through local and central government 
funds (Baji et al., 2012b). The coverage of the population should be comprehensive; however, 
the insurance status of around 4% of the population is not clear. Instead of a basic package, 
positive and negative lists are used, with the former being non-exhaustive, but rather broad. A 
considerable share of out-of-pocket expenditure is attributed to co-payments and co-insurance 
for pharmaceuticals, but also to widely spread informal payments (Gaál et al., 2011). Patients 
are obliged to co-pay for pharmaceuticals, medical aids, prostheses, balneotherapy and 
medical recreation, dental care, long-term chronic care, hospital services; but also cost-
sharing is required in case of a visit to a specialist without referral or if patients choose other 
providers than they were referred to or other services than they were prescribed. In 2006-
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2007, flat co-payments for outpatient visits and a per diem rate for inpatient care were 
introduced which allowed collecting an additional 0.7% of total health expenditure in 2007 
(Gaál et al., 2011). But due to fierce political debates, these co-payments were abolished at a 
national referendum (Baji et al., 2011). Informal payments in Hungary are tolerated by the 
general public and authorities and according to different estimates they may constitute from 
1.5 to 4.6% of total health expenditure (€ 64.8M – € 203.6M in 2001) (Gaál et al., 2006).  
Lithuania has started a transition of the health care system in 1996 and a Statutory Health 
Insurance Fund was introduced a year later (see Murauskiene et al., 2013; Murauskiene et al., 
2012). The Health Insurance Fund at the beginning was co-financed from payroll 
contributions and transfers from the government with the latter being the major source of 
funding. However, gradually the Health Insurance Fund gained stability, though its deficit is 
still financed from the state budget. Co-payments are charged for pharmaceuticals, sanatoria 
stay, and dental services. For outpatient and inpatient services, the option of co-payments was 
discussed but never introduced. The national legislation declares free of charge health care in 
the public facilities to all citizens, though a small negative list of services which are fully 
charged is established (Murauskiene et al., 2010). On the other hand, the regulations are very 
controversial and public facilities often charge patients for the services outside the negative 
list and there is debate whether these charges are legal or illegal. These user charges may be 
considered as quasi-formal and represent a substantial share of health expenditure in 
Lithuania (Murauskiene et al., 2012). Informal payments also exist in Lithuania. However, 
estimates of their scope are lacking. 
The Polish health system (see Sagan et al., 2011) also started an early transition in 1989 from 
the centralized system funded through general taxation to a system with prevailing social 
health insurance. The two Health insurance funds, general and agricultural, pool the funds and 
transfer them to the central National Health Fund, who is the principal payer in the system. 
Primary care providers are paid based on a capitation principle and inpatient care is paid 
based on DRGs. The system stimulates competition between providers at the regional level 
for contracts with local branches of the National Insurance Fund. Social health insurance 
covers about 98% of the population and the benefit package (positive list) is very 
comprehensive, at least on paper (Golinowska and Tambor, 2012). The contributions are 
collected via a payroll tax paid by the employee entirely. Cost-sharing is only applied to 
medicines, medical products, auxiliary medical devices, heath resort treatments, and certain 
dental services. Informal payments were widespread in the Polish health system at the 
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beginning of the transition (Lewis, 2002) but were substantially reduced by the anticorruption 
measures implemented in 2005 and are now less spread in comparison to other CEE countries 
(Stepurko et al., 2011; Golinowska, 2010). Informal payments are primarily done in public 
hospitals, though are present in outpatient services as well. In 2009, they were estimated to 
account for around 1.5% of the out-of-pocket payments or 0.33% of the total health 
expenditure (Sagan et al., 2011; Golinowska, 2010).  
The transition in Romania started in 1989 and in 1998 social health insurance was introduced 
(see Vladescu et al., 2008). The National Insurance Fund has 42 District Funds and the 
process of collection and contracting local providers is decentralized. Employees pay 6.5% in 
payroll tax, and the employer pays another 7%. The basic benefit package includes health care 
services, medicines, and medical devices. Patients have a free provider choice. Patients are 
entitled to co-payments for some pharmaceuticals (10% and 50% groups) and medical goods. 
Reference pricing is implemented and, thus, patients cover the cost of drugs over the 
reference price. In 2004, co-payments for pharmaceuticals were reduced and the list of fully 
reimbursed drugs was substantially extended. As mentioned earlier, there were also debates 
about the introduction of co-payments for health care services and inpatient admissions. The 
latter were recently implemented (Lever, 2013). Informal payments in Romania are a cultural 
issue. According to the World Bank (Belli, 2003), they account to over 40% of out-of-pocket 
payments, or about 7-8% of the total health expenditure. 
The Ukrainian health care system has never gone through a transition and remains practically 
unchanged from the Soviet times (see Gryga et al., 2010; Lekhan et al., 2010a). Thus, it 
proclaims free-of-charge medical care for every citizen in public and communal facilities. 
Most of the facilities stay publicly or communally owned and are financed from the state and 
local budgets on a strict line-item budget principle. This is an input-based financing system, 
highly centralized and bureaucratic, with no sensitiveness to the real needs of the population. 
Private sector as well as private insurance are underdeveloped and cover less than 2% of the 
population mainly from high-income groups. Officially, public sector facilities may not 
charge patients except for a limited list of auxiliary and paramedical services. However, 
“charitable donations” are often required. The practice of informal payments to medical staff 
(under-the-table payments, bribes, gratitude) is widespread. Practically all pharmaceuticals 
and consumables are purchased out-of-pocket by patients. Informal payments are especially 
high in inpatient care. By WHO estimates, informal payments accounted for 8 to 10% of total 
health expenditure in 2003-2005 (Gotsadze et al., 2006). However, the true number might be 
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higher as facilities often require formal charges for better services, which is illegal in 
principle, but tolerated by the authorities. 
Thus, official patient payments have had different levels of success in European countries. In 
CEE countries they are a relatively new and uncommon phenomenon. In the six countries that 
are included in this study, the experience with official charges for outpatient health care 
services has been limited. That is the official charges existed very shortly in Hungary and 
Romania (since 2013), level of charges did not vary substantially in Bulgaria, and they were 
never implemented in Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. Instead, facilities find their way to 
charge quasi-formal payments which are especially substantial in Lithuania, Romania and 
Ukraine. Informal payments are most widespread in Ukraine and Romania, to a lesser extent 
in Lithuania and Hungary, and in Bulgaria and Poland least of all (Stepurko et al., 2013). 
Thus, patients in these countries are familiar with patient charges for physician services, 
though evidence on the effects of such charges is absent due to mostly limited experience with 
them. 
 
1.4 Aims and objectives of the dissertation 
The research presented in this dissertation is motivated by the lack of evidence on the 
potential consumption effects of patient payments for physician services in CEE countries (as 
outlined above). Given the absence of data on actual behavior under different payment 
regimes in these countries, this dissertation adopts the SP approach. The application of SP to 
payment policy assessment is rarely reported in the literature and this dissertation tackles the 
methodology concerns regarding this application. Thus, the dissertation has both methodology 
and application aspects. 
1.4.1. Aim 
The overall aim of this dissertation is to apply stated preferences techniques to study the 
willingness to pay for physician services in six Central and Eastern European countries 
(Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine), and to analyze to what extent 
WTP estimates can be used in the assessment of patient charges for physician services. 
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1.4.2. Objectives 
To address the main aim of this dissertation, the following objectives are defined: 
1. To investigate aspects of the value added of physician services by determining the 
marginal willingness to pay for service quality and access characteristics using a 
discrete choice experiment technique. 
2. To study the socio-economic and demographic drivers of the willingness to pay and 
level of the willingness to pay for physician services using a contingent valuation 
technique. 
3. To compare the willingness to pay estimates from the two main stated preference 
techniques, i.e. discrete choice experiment and contingent valuation, in terms of their 
consistency. 
4. To use the stated willingness to pay values to define the potential demand pools at 
different levels of patient charges for physician services. 
5. To assess the possible overestimation of the willingness to pay by respondents using 
calibration techniques. 
6. To compare willingness to pay estimates with service cost and actual payments. 
7. To discuss the implications of the willingness to pay estimates for determining feasible 
levels of patient charges for physician services and for the overall assessment of 
patient payment policies. 
1.4.3. General methodology 
The analyses in this dissertation are based on two datasets with a similar structure: a small-
scale but representative survey from Ukraine, and a large-scale representative survey from six 
CEE countries, namely Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. The 
objectives 1 through 3 are dealt with in chapters 2 through 4 respectively, and the analyses are 
based on the data from the small scale survey in Ukraine. The fourth and fifth objectives are 
the main research questions in chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation respectively. To tackle 
these objectives at a cross-country level, we use the WTP estimates from the CV tasks in a 
large-scale survey held in the six CEE countries. 
The first dataset, the small-scale survey in Ukraine, was held in December 2009, and contains 
responses from 303 respondents, representative of the adult Ukrainian population. The 
questionnaire contains information on SP for outpatient physician services, but also about the 
past utilization of these services, characteristics of the respondents and their households. A 
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multi-stage area probability sampling strategy is used with 110 settlements as primary units 
and 270 voting precincts as secondary units. For logistic reasons, the data collection was 
performed within a larger household survey. A waiver from a full ethical review was obtained 
prior to the survey. A more detailed report on the sampling and data collection issues may be 
found in the Appendix A. 
The second dataset contains information from the survey from six CEE countries, around 
1000 respondents representing the adult population in each country, 6052 respondents in total. 
It was held in July-August 2010. This survey contains questions similar to the small-scale 
survey, as well as additional questions, which are not analyzed in this dissertation. No ethical 
approval is needed in the six studied countries for such type of study. A more detailed report 
on the sampling and data collection issues may be found in the Appendix B. 
 
1.5 Outline of the dissertation 
The dissertation is divided into seven chapters (including this first introductory chapter), 
gradually addressing the objectives set in this chapter. The outline and summary of each 
chapter is presented below. 
Chapter 2 provides evidence on the preferences of Ukrainian consumers for health care 
improvements, which can help to design reforms that reflect societal priorities. In particular, 
chapter 2 aims to elicit and to place monetary values on public preferences for outpatient 
physician services in Ukraine. The DCE data from a small-scale survey from Ukraine are 
analyzed using a random effect logit model with interactions. Respondents passed 16 choice 
tasks between two physician profiles represented through seven quality and access 
characteristics (specialization of a physician, state of the medical equipment, maintenance of 
the office, attitude of the medical staff, travel time, waiting time, and formal vs informal type 
of payment), and a cost attribute. The marginal WTP for quality and access improvements is 
assessed. 
In Chapter 3 we analyze the potential and feasibility of official patient charges for public 
health care services in Ukraine by studying the patterns of fee acceptability, ability and WTP 
for public health care across population groups. We use CV data collected in the small-scale 
survey in Ukraine. The respondents were asked to value four profiles of a physician by stating 
their maximum WTP for a visit to such physician. The profiles varied so that two separate 
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effects could be estimated: specialization of a physician, and the joint effect of improvement 
in the state of the medical equipment, maintenance, and waiting time. First the payment cards 
were presented, followed by an open-ended question about the exact amount. If a respondent 
reported being unwilling to pay a reason was elicited. Three decision points were separated: 
objection to pay, inability to pay, and level of positive non-zero WTP. These decisions were 
studied for relations with quality profiles of the services, and socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondents and their households.  
As explained above as well as in Chapter 4, DCE and CV are often applied to value health 
care benefits. However, whether the two techniques yield converging WTP estimates is not 
studied well. Thus, chapter 4 aims to compare at a disaggregated level the WTP estimates for 
physician services obtained from a DCE and from a CV study applied in the small-scale 
survey in Ukraine (the two studies presented in chapter 2 and 3). We study the consistency 
between the estimates and whether there are systematic differences between the two types of 
estimates.  
As outlined above and in Chapter 5, patient charges for health care services are implemented 
in high-income countries to reduce unnecessary service use. However, evidence on their 
potential effects in Central and Eastern Europe is lacking. Thus, in chapter 5, we provide 
evidence on the potential impact of patient charges on the consumption of specialized 
physician services in the six CEE countries included in this dissertation: Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. We apply a semi-parametric survival analysis to 
the stated WATP in order to identify potential demand pools, i.e. shares of population willing 
and able to pay a certain fee in case they need a service, and we also calculate price, income 
and age semi-elasticities. Data are collected through national surveys held in 2010 among 
representative samples of about 1000 respondents in each country.  
Chapter 6 is devoted to the assessment of proper levels of WATP for specialized physician 
services which accounts for possible hypothetical bias. The analysis is based on the same data 
as in Chapter 5, i.e. CV data from six CEE countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, and Ukraine. The WATP level is modeled with a stochastic frontier regression. 
Two possible bias directions are tested: over- (positive inefficiency term) and understatement 
(negative inefficiency term). The WATP level is then calibrated based on individual 
predictions of the inefficiency scores. The raw and calibrated WATP levels are compared to 
actual expenditure by annual predictions for expenditure if respondents were actually paying 
amounts equal to their WATP.  
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Chapter 7 presents the discussion of the key findings outlined in previous chapters and 
relates them to the objectives of the dissertation. We discuss the main methodological 
implications for the application of SP to valuing health benefits, especially in terms of 
deriving policy recommendations. Policy implications relating to future patient payment 
policies in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine are also discussed. 
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Abstract 
Background: Structural, organizational, and financial reforms of the health care system are 
major questions on the policy agenda of the Ukrainian government today. Therefore, it is 
important to know the social preferences regarding health care provision, in order to design 
reforms that reflect societal priorities. 
Objective: To elicit and to place a monetary value on the public preferences for outpatient 
physician services in Ukraine. 
Methods: a DCE technique is applied to a sample of 303 respondents, planned as being 
representative of the Ukrainian population but containing a slight over-presentation of certain 
age-gender groups. Each respondent answered 16 binary choice questions. Out of four 
empirical models estimated the one with best statistical fit, the mixed effect logit with 
interaction terms, was chosen for interpretation. The importance of the quality and access 
attributes was assessed by calculating the marginal WTP. 
Results: At the sample level, no preference is found for paying formally or informally, 
neither for visiting GP or medical specialist. However, people with a higher education 
demonstrate a preference for visiting a medical specialist, while disabled people prefer a GP. 
The preference for paying formally is rather strong for people with a medical background. 
The most important quality factor is the attitude of medical staff followed by the state of 
medical equipment, maintenance of the physician’s office, travelling and waiting time. 
Marginal WTP for each of these factors is rather high. 
Conclusions: In investment decisions, priority should be given to interpersonal aspects of 
outpatient care, followed by clinical quality. Social quality and access are important as well, 
but their improvement brings fewer social gains. Measures should be taken to formalize the 
informal payment channels and to strengthen the gate-keeping role of primary care. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The reform of the health care system is a major question on the policy agenda of the 
Ukrainian government. Low service quality, unsustainable budget financing (Vynogradov, 
2007; Karamyshev et al., 2006), informal patient payments (Balabanova et al., 2004; Lekhan 
et al., 2004; Litvak et al., 2001), and an underdeveloped primary care system (Barmina, 2009) 
are some of the most pressing problems in the Ukrainian health care sector. Nevertheless, 
since obtaining independence in 1991 (after the collapse of the Soviet Union), all attempts of 
health care reforms have failed. So far, the efforts to introduce social health insurance and 
formal patient payment schemes have been rejected in the Parliament due to a lack of political 
will under the pretext of a violation of the Constitution of Ukraine (Ukraïna, 1996, pt. 2, art. 
XLIX), which guarantees ‘free-of-charge’ medical care to every citizen. Thus, an adequate 
market mechanism in the Ukrainian health care sector is still absent. The introduction of 
general practitioners in the primary care in 2006 was imposed offhandedly by means of a 
short training of questionable quality for medical specialists. Still, the number of general 
practitioners is insufficient. 
To cope with the health care problems however, substantial organizational, structural and 
financial reforms in the health care sector are required. The current comprehensive medical 
reform was planned to be implemented in 2011-2014 and is piloted in four large regions of 
Ukraine (Committee on Economic Reforms, 2010; MOH, 2010; Law of Ukraine, 2011). 
Briefly, it implies a clear division of the levels of care (primary, secondary, tertiary, and 
emergency), strengthening primary care networks, and a reorganization of health care 
facilities in accordance with the needs of the population. Health care needs, however, will 
continue to be defined by the local health authorities. There is also the intention to separate 
payers and providers by transferring ownership of facilities from the state to the communal 
level and setting a fixed amount for reimbursement through an annual contract between 
providers and local health authorities. 
Thus, despite the fact that the obsolete centralized mechanisms of health care planning and 
funding will be retained, there is a clear intention to reorganize health care provision so that it 
is better able to meet public needs. Moreover, a system of quality indicators is to be 
introduced in the process of the facility performance assessment which provides an 
opportunity to introduce clinical indicators together with public preferences and satisfaction. 
From this perspective, it is important to know the social preferences for improvements in 
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health care provision, in order to design reforms that respond best to these societal priorities. 
The task of eliciting public preferences and placing a monetary value on them is especially 
valuable in a context of limited public budgets (Ryan, 2004c; Telser and Zweifel, 2002). The 
literature, however, does not offer any evidence on public preferences for health care services 
in Ukraine.  
The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the policy discussions on health care reforms in 
Ukraine by providing evidence on the preferences of health care consumers. In particular, we 
aim to elicit public preferences for outpatient physician services (including primary care 
providers and medical specialists) and to estimate the relative monetary value that consumers 
place on quality and access improvements of these services. An additional contribution of the 
study is that we analyze preferences for paying formally or informally and for a first contact 
with a general practitioner or medical specialist. 
We use data from a small-scale household survey among a representative sample of the 
population carried out in 2009 in Ukraine (see Appendix A for sampling details). In one part 
of the survey, respondents were presented with hypothetical physicians’ profiles (close to 
‘real-life’ profiles) and were asked to make choices among these profiles given a hypothetical 
scenario about the symptoms they experience. Thus, we apply a SP method known as DCE. 
Although the method is still being developed, it is firmly rooted in decision theory (Zweifel et 
al., 2006), which allows for a meaningful interpretation of the results.  
 
2.2 Research background 
In the absence of an adequate market mechanism, which is the case with physician services in 
Ukraine and other countries (Louviere and Lancsar, 2009), SP methods are needed to elicit 
public or patient preferences for a good or service. As discussed in Chapter 1, SP techniques 
allow modeling hypothetical behavior in other than the existing institutional context (Brau 
and Bruni, 2008). This is an advantage for the evaluation of the potential for health care 
reforms. Although most of the previous studies on preferences for physician services are 
based on RP techniques (Skriabikova et al., 2010), some recent studies use a SP approach, 
namely self-explicated attribute rating or ranking (e.g. Pavlova et al., 2003), rating or ranking 
conjoint analysis (e.g. Pavlova et al., 2004), CV methods (e.g. Mataria et al., 2007), or the 
DCE method (e.g. Cheraghi-Sohi et al., 2008; Hjelmgren and Anell, 2007; Neuman and 
Neuman, 2008; Vick and Scott, 1998). A review of current applications of SP techniques in 
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health care is provided in section 1.2. There we also discuss their advantages and limitations. 
In this chapter, we apply the DCE method because it is specifically designed to estimate 
trade-offs between service characteristics (incl. ‘non-marketed’ or ‘non-traded’ 
characteristics) (Hanley et al., 2003; Louviere and Lancsar, 2009; Telser and Zweifel, 2007), 
which is its distinctive strength when compared to other SP approaches. From a health policy 
perspective, the analysis of trade-offs is important because it could help to ration health care 
resources and set priorities for health care service improvements, in this case the improvement 
of physicians services in Ukraine. 
An important contribution of this study is the investigation of the effect of informal patient 
payments on consumer choice, which has not been addressed so far for any type of care, 
including physician services (see Skriabikova et al., 2010). Informal payments for health care 
services are reported in many countries around the world (for a review see Stepurko et al., 
2010). As discussed in Chapter 1, informal payments are widely spread in the Ukrainian 
health care system and represent a substantial share of total health expenditure (Balabanova et 
al., 2004; Gotsadze, 2006; Lekhan et al., 2004; Litvak et al., 2001). The existence of informal 
patient payments negatively affects the efficiency and equity of health care provision (Ensor, 
2004; Lewis, 2002; Szende and Cuyler, 2006; Thompson and Witter, 2000). Therefore, the 
mechanisms for dealing with these payments are an important policy challenge. There is a 
concern that the introduction of formal patient payments will not eradicate informal ones, and 
could result in a double financial burden on patients (Baschieri and Falkingham, 2006; Ensor 
and Savelyeva, 1998; Lewis, 2000). Information on whether health care consumers accept 
informal payments could yield relevant policy solutions. Therefore, our article highlights how 
Ukrainian consumers value the trade-off between formal and informal patient payments if the 
former were introduced. 
Strengthening the gate-keeping role of primary care is a crucial question in the health care 
reforms in Ukraine because this role is believed to have positive effects in terms of cost-
containment (González, 2010) and efficient resource allocation (Zielinski et al., 2008), though 
the current literature contains ambiguous evidence on this (e.g. Brekke et al., 2007; Escarce et 
al., 2001; Ferris et al., 2001; Linden et al., 2003). In the context of outpatient care in Ukraine, 
there are various types of physicians that act as general practitioners, namely district 
physicians, district therapeutists, and family physicians. In Ukraine, it is also possible to have 
direct access to a medical specialist. There is empirical evidence that strict gate-keeping that 
prevents direct access might lead to lower patient satisfaction, especially when there is 
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distrust and little confidence in the knowledge and skills of primary care physicians (Kerr et 
al., 1999; Grumbach et al., 1999). Direct access to a medical specialist might be especially 
desirable for people with a chronic illness (Rogers et al., 2004). At the same time, services of 
general practitioners are often characterized by better continuity and comprehensiveness of 
care (Starfield, 1992), compared to medical specialists. This is because the general 
practitioner follows the patient through various health problems and has more complete 
information on the general health status of the patient. Thus, some groups of patients might 
prefer consulting a general practitioner first before visiting a specialist (Rogers et al., 2004; 
Grumbach et al., 1999). Therefore, in this study, we also keep the focus on the public 
preferences towards the general practitioner or direct referral to a medical specialist at the 
initial contact. 
Although the literature contains a wide range of studies on public preferences for health care 
services, studies focused on the analysis of preferences especially for physician services using 
a DCE method, are rare. We identified four DCE studies focused on physician services held in 
four different settings (Cheraghi-Sohi et al., 2008; Hjelmgren and Anell, 2007; Neuman and 
Neuman, 2008; Vick and Scott, 1998). In three of these studies, a distinction is made between 
interpersonal aspects and quality aspects of care (Cheraghi-Sohi et al., 2008; Neuman and 
Neuman, 2008; Vick and Scott, 1998). However, conclusions about the prioritization differ. 
Hjelmgren and Anell (2007) added the attributes of consumer’s choice and control over the 
care received, and found these attributes to be the most important for patients. Recent 
literature reviews (including reviews of studies that do not use the DCE method) offer 
numerous attributes of physician services that might impact patients’ priorities (for a 
systematic review see Cheraghi-Sohi et al., 2006; Wensing et al., 1998). Again, authors 
mostly stress the distinction and trade-off between technical and interpersonal aspects of 
quality of care. Although, there is no conclusive evidence on which aspect is more important 
to the patients, we use these studies to set up our DCE. 
 
2.3 Methods 
As explained in Chapter 1, the DCE method is increasingly used in health service research 
and there is a growing body of literature on the methodology of DCE (for an overview see e.g. 
Lancsar and Louviere, 2008; Mele, 2008; Ryan, 1999; Ryan and Farrar, 2000). The design of 
a DCE study follows several basic steps explained in section 1.2, which we specify below. 
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2.3.1. Selection of attributes and attribute levels 
Despite the numerous relevant attributes (described in the previous section), the number of 
attributes and attribute levels in a DCE study should be kept at a minimum to allow for a 
manageable number of profiles. Even though there are methods for drawing a meaningful 
sub-set of profiles for DCE and still obtaining relevant results (see Street et al., 2005), the 
number of profiles that should be included, increases considerably with every attribute or 
attribute level added. In our DCE the physician profiles were described through eight quality, 
access, and price attributes. The attributes and their levels are presented in Table 2.1. 
‘Physician’s specialization’ refers to a general practitioner or a medical specialist. We assume 
that this attribute represents not only the provider’s knowledge and skills but also other 
aspects of clinical performance that are not captured by the other attributes, such as 
continuity, comprehensiveness and appropriateness of care. This attribute was preferred to 
other indicators of clinical quality or treatment success for several reasons. In SP studies, real 
life choices should be mimicked to obtain valid estimates. As outlined in section 1.2, health 
care consumers practically never deal with such kind of information in real life, while the 
outcomes of these services are rather complex and can hardly be captured by a single 
attribute. The pre-test of the DCE questionnaire also confirmed that respondents are confused 
with the indicators of treatment success. Moreover, the inclusion of ‘physician’s 
specialization’ attribute into DCE allows exploring if a specific preference for bypassing 
primary contact with a GP exists in Ukraine which is of high policy relevance (see section 
2.2). 
The next quality-related attribute ‘state of medical equipment’ reflects the technology aspects 
of clinical quality irrespectively of physicians’ abilities and skills. We assume that this is a 
multi-aspect characteristic that indicates jointly the effectiveness and promptness of the 
treatment, as well as comfort to the patient and physician. Although the probability of success 
of treatment could be another relevant indicator of clinical quality, we do not include this 
attribute because: (1) it depends on both physicians’ abilities and technological aspects of 
care, and thus, it does not allow studying their separate effects, (2) our pre-tests showed that 
such information is not readily available to health care consumers in Eastern European 
countries, such as Ukraine, and they are not used in decisions and (3) some individuals may 
have difficulties in understanding its meaning. 
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Table 2.1 Attributes of physician services and their levels in DCE 
Attributes 
Levels of attributes 
Basic 
profile 
Alternative profiles from orthogonal array 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Physician’s specialization 
1 = Medical specialist 
0 = General practitioner 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
State of the medical equipment 
1 = Modern 
0 = Outdated 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Maintenance of the office 
1 = Renovated 
0 = Old-looking 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Attitude of medical staff 
1 = Polite 
0 = Arrogant 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Travel time to the office 
60 min 
15 min 
15 15 15 15 60 60 60 15 60 60 60 15 15 15 15 60 60 
Waiting time in front of the 
office 
45 min 
10 min 
45 10 10 45 10 10 45 45 45 45 10 45 10 10 45 45 10 
Size of patient payment a 
100 UAH 
60 UAH  
20 UAH 
20 20 100 20 20 20 60 20 20 20 100 60 20 60 100 100 60 
Form of patient payment 
1 = Formal 
0 = Informal 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
a Average daily exchange rate during the period of data collection is 11.5424 UAH / € 
 
In addition to clinical quality, we also include the social quality of physician services, which 
is not directly related to treatment outcomes but might affect consumer choices. This is done 
by including the attribute ‘maintenance of the physician’s office’, which reflects the state of 
the facility. 
The three access-related aspects, namely psychological, spatial and temporal access, are 
represented by three distinctive attributes that are independent of each other, namely ‘attitude 
of medical staff’, ‘traveling time’ and ‘waiting time’ respectively. The attribute ‘attitude of 
medical staff’ also indicates the interpersonal aspects of care, as well as the possibility to 
receive personal attention during the treatment.  
In addition to quality and access, we introduce a third dimension relevant to the consumer 
choice of a physician, namely the price of service. For this purpose, we include ‘size of 
patient payment’ as an attribute in our DCE. As discussed at the outset of our article, we also 
investigate preferences for paying formally or informally and, therefore, we introduce a 
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separate attribute ‘form of payment’ with two levels: formal and informal. The form of 
payment and the size of payment represent the price dimension in our DCE study. 
All attributes, except the size of patient payment, have two levels. The size of patient payment 
is represented by three levels because during the pre-test these levels were found to be 
meaningful for respondents. We choose quantitative attribute levels for travelling and waiting 
time, and for the size of patient payments. The other attributes, are represented by two 
qualitative attribute levels representing mutually exclusive contrasting end-states. 
2.3.2. Specification of the DCE design 
In order to reduce the number of profiles (i.e. the full factorial of attribute levels is 384) to a 
manageable number, an orthogonal main-effect fractional factorial design was drawn 
(Orthoplan, SPSS software), which resulted in 16 scenarios. Orthogonal main-effect fractional 
factorial designs provide the minimal number of profiles still allowing estimation of the main 
effects under the assumption that interactions between attributes are absent or negligible. The 
design was checked for overlap, orthogonality and level balance (for definitions see Huber 
and Zwerina, 1996). 
Due to the fact that the price attribute has 3 levels while all the other attributes have only 2, 
the level balance was not fully reached. The 16 profiles from the orthogonal design were 
matched to one fixed profile, different from those 16 profiles that represented a realistic 
profile for Ukraine. In this way the differences in profiles for each choice task still represent 
an orthogonal array. Obviously dominant choices were not excluded in order to maintain 
factor orthogonality. Thus, the respondents were presented with 16 choice tasks each 
containing the fixed profile and one alternative profile from the orthogonal design. 
2.3.3. The preference elicitation  
An example choice task is presented in Appendix C. Following the framework used by Vick 
and Scott (1998), the choice tasks are preceded by a scenario, where a respondent is asked to 
imagine that he/she experiences major or severe health symptoms. Major or severe symptoms 
were defined as unfamiliar symptoms, that make a person concerned whether they would pass 
by themselves or enhance over time, that may cause discomfort or pain up to severe pain, and 
may prevent a person from everyday activities. Such a scenario was invented due to the fact 
that during the pre-test, respondents required specification of the health problem to be able to 
make a choice. At the same time, during the pre-test, respondents stated that having some 
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minor symptoms would not be a reason for them to visit a physician and the choice tasks 
would not be meaningful to them.  
Therefore, the current study is limited to cases where patients experience symptoms that can 
be described as major symptoms of an unfamiliar health problem (see Appendix C). The 
scenario implies that the symptoms are severe enough to force the patient to consult with a 
physician (i.e. the patient has already decided to visit a physician). Since the health problem 
described in the scenario is unfamiliar to the patient, he/she has no clear indication of which 
medical specialist is needed. Thus, visiting a general practitioner would be a rational option. 
Also, we have chosen for unfamiliar symptoms rather than a specific disease known to the 
respondent, because we aim to provide evidence for the improvement of physician services in 
Ukraine in general, and not for the improvement of physician services used by a specific 
group of patients. The pre-test indicated that the scenario is well understood and imaginable 
for the respondents. However, if the focus is on physician services provided to a specific 
group of patients, more concrete symptoms and diseases should be presented in the scenario. 
2.3.4. Data collection procedure  
At the development stage, the questionnaire was pre-tested on 55 respondents (a convenience 
sample). Data were collected in December 2009. Due to logistic reasons, the data collection 
was performed within a larger household survey carried out by the subcontractor (Kiev 
International Institute of Sociology). Therefore, we have no information about the non-
response rate and, consequently, about the characteristics of non-respondents. For the 
sampling details, see Appendix A. The sample in our study included 303 respondents who 
agreed to participate in face-to-face structured interviews conducted by professional 
interviewers. 
The sample was based on a three-stage random sampling procedure. First, 110 primary 
sampling units were randomly selected from the Ukrainian settlements (villages, towns, cities) 
with a probability proportional to the size of the settlement. Second, within those primary 
units, 207 voting precincts were randomly selected proportionally to the number of dwellings 
in the primary units. The voting precincts selected for the study comprised the secondary 
sampling units. Third, within each secondary sampling unit, 1-2 respondents were selected 
following a three-step procedure: 1) randomly selecting one dwelling; 2) listing and sorting all 
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adults in this and consecutive dwellings by dwelling number, gender, and age1; 3) in case of 1 
respondent per secondary sampling unit, recruiting the 3rd adult in the sorting list, whilst in 
case of 2 interviews per secondary sampling unit, recruiting the 3rd and 6th adults in the list. 
The sample was intended to be representative for the adult population of Ukraine (aged 18 
and older). 
The questionnaire also included questions about socio-demographic characteristics such as 
age, gender, education, place of residence, current activities, health status, marital status, 
medical insurance, household income and composition. According to findings of Neuman and 
Neuman (2008), it was assumed that medical workers or people with medical education might 
express significantly different preferences due to their knowledge, background or professional 
belonging. Therefore, data on medical education were also collected to be able to test for the 
relevance of this characteristic. 
2.3.5. Statistical analysis 
A logistic regression was applied to analyze the choice of a physician. The underlying linear 
predictor of a choice was expressed as a function of the difference in utility ( B AiU −∆ ) that is 
expected to be obtained by a respondent i when choosing physician B (alternative profile) 
over physician A (basic profile). This difference was expected to depend on differences in 
characteristics between physicians in a choice task ( B AjX
−∆ ) and the interactions of these 
attribute differences with socio-demographic characteristics ( nS ). 
B A B A B A
i j j jn j n
j jn
U X X Sβ γ− − −∆ = ∆ + ∆∑ ∑   (1) 
The regression was tested for inclusion of random parameters and random intercept – both 
with a Gausian distribution. The model with the best statistical fit was used for further 
analysis. 
The regression estimates were used to calculate the benefit (in monetary terms) gained by 
society with improvements of the characteristics, also called the “implicit price” or “part 
worth” of an attribute in monetary terms (Hanley et al., 2003; Lancsar et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 
2001a), or marginal WTP for a marginal variation in an attribute. It was calculated as the 
                                               
1 Before selecting ‘potential respondents’, an interviewer enumerated and listed adult household members (i.e., 
18 and older) living in a consecutive run of apartments (i.e., from lower to higher appartment numbers) until he 
or she had a list of occupants sorted by appartment, gender, and age. 
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marginal rate of substitution between improvement in the attribute and the increase in price 
which holds the utility level unchanged. In models with main effects only, this equation 
reduces to the ratio of the coefficient of a non-price attribute β1 to the coefficient of the price 
attribute βP. However, as discussed by Lancsar et al. (2007), inclusion of interactions will also 
imply the presence of socio-demographic characteristics Sn that had significant interactions γ 
with attributes under consideration in the partial derivatives. This was expressed as: 
∑
∑
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+
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  (2) 
For marginal WTP calculations we held socio-demographic characteristics at their average 
sample level. Marginal WTP calculations should not be used as a presentation of potential 
fare levels, but only represent potential relative benefit gains/losses at the societal level. 
 
2.4 Results 
The descriptive statistics of socio-demographic characteristics that were included in the 
analysis are presented in Table A.1 in Appendix A. An overrepresentation of certain groups 
occurs, namely women aged between 30 and 69 and men between 50 and 59. In general men 
are underrepresented, especially in the age group between 60 and 69 years old. Also, the 
sample contains a large proportion of people with low income. About 72% of the respondents 
have a monthly income per person which is not higher than 1000 UAH (approximately € 85 
per person at the survey time, with mean monthly income of approximately € 73 per person). 
However, in DCE, socio-demographic features are included in the analysis through the 
interactions and thus, overrepresentations are accounted for. It is also to be noted that 6.6% of 
the respondents reported having a medical education (higher or secondary), even though not 
all of these respondents might work in the health care sector. Nevertheless, this group is large 
enough to include medical education as a variable in the analysis.  
The results of the reduced regression model with the best fit are presented in Table 2.2. The 
model was checked for inclusion of interactions by likelihood ratio tests, and for inclusion of 
random intercept and random parameters by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (for a 
definition see Schwarz, 1978). The mixed-effect (random parameter) logit model with 
interaction terms shows the best fit for the data.  
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Table 2.2 Results of DCE: reduced mixed effect logit model with significanta main effects and 
interactions 
Effects Mean parameter estimate 
Random parameter 
variation 
 Coeff. (S.E.) Var (S.E.) 
Physician’s specialization 
From GP to medical specialist n.s.    
State of the medical equipment 
From outdated to modern 2.205*** (0.192) 0.886 (0.172) 
Maintenance of the office 
From old-looking to renovated 0.672*** (0.172) 0.319 (0.318) 
Attitude of medical staff 
From arrogant to polite 3.210*** (0.230) 0.933 (0.175) 
Travel time to the office 
1 min additional -0.025*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.006) 
Waiting time in front of the office 
1 min additional -0.023*** (0.004) 0.000 (0.010) 
Size of patient payment a 
1 UAH a -0.031*** (0.003) 0.026 (0.003) 
Form of patient payment 
From informal to formal n.s.    
Constant term n.s.  0.910 (0.118) 
Physician’s specialization by:     
younger than 20 1.236** (0.557)   
assigned to any disability category -0.871* (0.476)   
missed more than 14 days due to illness 0.620** (0.300)   
high income: > 1000UAH per person 0.552*** (0.185)   
residing in Kyiv 0.939** (0.412)   
State of medical equipment by:     
male -0.654*** (0.249)   
no or primary education -0.608* (0.323)   
poor or very poor health -0.830** (0.344)   
residing in small cities and towns 0.885*** (0.326)   
residing in Kyiv -1.277** (0.503)   
Maintenance of the office by:     
higher or doctoral education 0.600*** (0.229)   
1 or 2 children in family 0.463* (0.239)   
residing in rural areas 0.716*** (0.218)   
30-80% of family members do not work -0.681*** (0.233)   
Attitude of medical staff by:     
older than 60 1.137** (0.515)   
no or primary education -0.825** (0.366)   
poor or very poor health -0.660* (0.367)   
residing in Kyiv -1.037** (0.514)   
30-80% of family members do not work -0.583** (0.251)   
Travel time to the office by:     
missed more than 14 days due to illness 0.014** (0.007)   
Waiting time in front of the office by:     
not working 0.017** (0.007)   
missed more than 14 days due to illness 0.026*** (0.009)   
residing in middle cities -0.011* (0.006)   
Size of patient payment by:     
older than 60 -0.023** (0.009)   
very good or perfect health 0.019** (0.008)   
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; ref. – reference group;  (continued on the next page) 
a All presented factors are significant at p-value<0.1   
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Table 2.2 (continued) Results of DCE: reduced mixed effect logit model with significanta main 
effects and interactions 
Effects Mean parameter estimate 
Random parameter 
variation 
 Coeff. (S.E.) Var (S.E.) 
Form of payment by:     
younger than 20 -1.107* (0.582)   
no missed days due to illness 0.605*** (0.170)   
high income: > 1000UAH per person -0.385** (0.189)   
residing in rural areas -0.439** (0.214)   
residing in small cities and towns -0.612** (0.269)   
Model statistics     
Number of observations 3189    
Number of groups 220    
Likelihood ratio test (chi2) 301.42 ***   
Wald test (chi2) 436.97 ***   
Log-likelihood   -1440.99    
AIC 2967.99    
BIC 3228.89    
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; ref. – reference group 
a All presented factors are significant at p-value<0.1 
 
For all models, including the interim estimations that are not presented, the constant term is 
highly insignificant, which indicates that respondents did not have any specific preference for 
the profiles per se and made choices based on the levels of attributes presented in the profiles. 
This is a positive fact because profiles in this study were designed so that they varied between 
choices and covered all meaningful alternatives. 
Six attributes signifying the ‘state of medical equipment’, ‘maintenance of a physician’s 
office’, ‘treatment of medical staff’, ‘travel time’, ‘waiting time’ and ‘patient payment’ have 
statistically significant main effects with theoretically valid directions of relations (the signs 
of the coefficients). Attributes describing ‘physician’s specialization’ and ‘type of payment’ 
have significant effects on the preferences in certain socio-demographic groups only. 
Specialization of a physician does not significantly affect choices at the sample level. 
However, belonging to any disability category shifts preferences towards general practitioner. 
Capital residence and higher income are found to shift preferences towards medical specialist, 
and these two characteristics are associated (odds ratio 4.27, SE 2.51). Hence, it can be 
concluded that a higher socio-economic status represented by a higher income, and residence 
in the capital Kyiv is associated with a preference for a medical specialist over a general 
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practitioner. Also people younger than 20 and those who missed more than 14 days due to 
illness in the past year are more likely to prefer a medical specialist. 
The results indicate an overall significant preference (at the sample level) for modern 
equipment and renovated premises. As for the group differences for the state of medical 
equipment attribute it is observed that among men, people with no or primary education only, 
poor and very poor health, and residing in capital this preference diminishes, while for people 
residing in small cities or towns it increases. Well maintained premises is a more important 
choice factor for people with higher or doctoral education, having 1 or 2 children in a 
household, residing in rural areas, and it is less important for respondents from households 
with 30-80% of members not working. 
The attribute ‘attitude of medical staff’ being the most valued factor at the sample level, is of 
higher importance to older people, and of less importance to low educated people, those with 
poor or very poor health, residing in Kyiv, and living in households with 30-80% of members 
not working. 
The attributes ‘travel time’ and ‘waiting time’ have the expected negative coefficients. This 
indicates that respondents prefer a shorter travel and waiting time. Regression coefficients 
indicate that travel and waiting time are less important for people that missed many days due 
to illness in the past year. People who are not working (but are not retired) value waiting time 
less, while people residing in middle sized cities place more value on waiting time reduction. 
 
Table 2.3 Marginal WTP for a total change in quality and access attributes 
Attribute Total attribute change Marginal WTP, 
UAH a per visit 
Physician’s specialization From GP to medical specialist 8.93 
State of the medical equipment From outdated to modern 57.43 
Maintenance of the office From old-looking to modern 27.26 
Attitude of the medical staff From arrogant to polite 86.68 
Travel time to the office From 60 min to 15 min 32.91 
Waiting time in front of the 
office From 45 min to 10 min 22.80 
Form of payment From informal to formal 1.68 
a Average daily exchange rate during the period of data collection is 11.5424 UAH / € 
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The price attribute, i.e. ‘size of patient payment’ has a negative main effect as expected, 
which means that patients prefer paying less to paying more. The model shows that elderly 
people are even more sensitive to a price increase. On the other hand, people with good or 
perfect health are less sensitive to the price attribute.  
Though ‘form of payment’ did not demonstrate a significant impact as a main effect, its 
effects appear significant in some groups. The preference for paying formally is found for 
those who have no missing days due to illness in the past year. Groups that rather prefer 
paying informally are younger people, the high income group, residing in rural areas and in 
small cities or towns. 
Table 2.3 represents the estimates of the marginal WTP for the total variation change in the 
main attributes of the physician services calculated as the MRS. These values cannot be 
considered as a notion of possible levels of patient payments, but they only show the 
monetary value that Ukrainian consumers place on the quality and access attributes, namely 
their change from the worst to the best state presented in choice tasks. 
As indicated in Table 2.3, respondents place a value of 57.43 UAH for each visit to a 
physician where modern medical equipment is available instead of outdated equipment. The 
value of the change from fully old-looking to renovated premises is 27.26 UAH per visit. The 
monetary value of the change in attitude of medical staff is the highest: 86.68 UAH per visit 
to a physician. For travel and waiting time, the monetary value of a reduction of 45 minutes 
travel time and 35 minutes waiting time is 32.91 UAH and 22.80 UAH per visit respectively. 
Changes in physician’s specialization and form of payment have a very low overall monetary 
value (8.93 UAH and 1.68 UAH respectively) as they appear to be significant predictors of 
choice only in some groups, indicating the minor importance attached to these attributes by 
respondents. 
 
2.5 Discussion and conclusion 
To make our DCE feasible, we limited the number of attributes and attribute levels. We 
recognize that the inclusion of other attributes and more levels could provide further detail on 
the preferences of Ukrainian consumers for physician services. Nevertheless, our results 
provide information about the relative importance of the attributes in our study, which is still 
relevant to policy-making. Our analysis is also limited to the scenario of major or severe 
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symptoms that are unfamiliar to the patient. Therefore, our results may not hold for the case 
of minor and familiar symptoms or a detailed specification of a health problem. However, the 
impact of a certain health problem on preferences is beyond the scope of this article which 
aims to study preferences in general. We also analyze only binary choices between two 
profiles (fixed and alternative) without the possibility to opt out. Therefore, the WTP 
estimates might be inflated. Including an opt-out alternative may give more valid estimates 
because in reality patients may forgo visiting a physician despite the severe symptoms, e.g. 
due to an unaffordable service price. Finally, there is a slight overrepresentation of certain age 
and gender groups in our sample. However, the impact of these and other socio-demographic 
factors was controlled by their inclusion in the models with interaction. A model with 
interaction is used to present and discuss the main findings of the study. 
2.5.1. Comparison of the findings with similar studies  
Our results for the marginal WTP should not be interpreted as the actual amount of patient 
fees but as a relative monetary value of a benefit. Unfortunately, there are no published results 
from previous research on WTP for physician services in Ukraine. Thus, we can only 
compare with the results of studies carried out in other countries. The comparison of the 
magnitude of the economic values across studies from different countries due to contextual 
differences can be done only in relative terms, i.e. in relation to average household income. 
The most valued attribute in our study: the change in attitude from arrogant to polite, amounts 
to 3.69% of the average household income (about 2347.32 UAH per household). This is, 
however, slightly higher than, but comparable to other DCE studies from the UK (Cheraghi-
Sohi et al., 2008), Sweden (Hjelmgren and Anell, 2007) (for national statistics on income see 
SCB Statistics Sweden, 2010), where the most important attributes are valued at 3% and 2.5% 
of household income respectively. This implies that, first of all, the monetary benefit 
estimates are plausible, and, secondly, that organizational reforms should take place as the 
Ukrainian population highly values the proposed quality improvements. 
The structure of preferences implied by our findings differs from the studies mentioned 
above, which might be due to the different design of DCE, the attribute choice and 
construction of attribute levels. Our results are, however, consistent with those from other 
studies where the importance of interpersonal aspects of care (e.g. Vick and Scott, 1998; 
Coulter, 2005; Leon, 2003) is shown. In the systematic literature review by Wensing et al. 
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(1998), interpersonal aspects of care were ranked higher than technical aspects by the 
percentage of studies reporting their importance. 
It should be noted that the difference in preference structures in our study and in previous 
research could be also due to contextual differences since these studies are carried out in 
Western European countries, where health care systems and socio-economic context are 
rather different than those in Ukraine. A study from Bulgaria (Pavlova et al., 2004) based on 
rating conjoint method, analyzes a similar set of physician services attributes but without 
interpersonal aspects. In general, the structure of preferences is similar to what is found in our 
study: clinical quality represented by professional reputation and medical equipment is 
followed by facility maintenance and time costs for the visit. 
2.5.2. The preference for quality and access related attributes in Ukraine 
Thus, among the quality and access characteristics which define the choice of the physician, 
attitude of the staff is the most important to Ukrainian consumers. This is, however, a broader 
concept which also includes the attention devoted to the patient, level of information, and 
involvement in care. It is important to further operationalize and study preferences for these 
different aspects of health care in Ukraine. The second most important attribute is the state of 
medical equipment, which represents the clinical efficiency and safety of care in a scenario of 
major or severe symptoms. Improvements in waiting and traveling time, as well as in the 
maintenance of the physician office are still important, though they would bring much less 
benefit than the improvements in the interpersonal aspects and clinical quality. 
Taking into account the structure of preferences, the general recommendation is that in 
primary care, the priority should be placed on the development of the skills of medical 
personnel. This especially relates to the training of the interpersonal aspects of care, such as 
communication with the patient, which is now frequently unsatisfactory. The development of 
an infrastructure (a network of facilities) is a secondary task with a much lower priority.  
Elderly people value the attitude of the medical staff higher than others. This also indicates 
that they lack it the most. In general, the Ukrainian system is ill adapted to meet the needs of 
elderly people, and least of all in the rural areas (Bezrukov, 2003). Care for elderly is only 
regarded within the framework of geriatrics which is not separated from the medical system, 
whilst long-term care is absent as a category in Ukraine. Special attention should be placed on 
the needs of elderly and training of medical staff in addressing those needs. 
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Place of residence also affects the preference for quality characteristics of physician services 
included in our study. In particular, dwellers of the capital city place less importance on the 
attitude of the medical staff and the state of medical equipment, while rural and small town 
dwellers value higher medical equipment and maintenance of the office. Nevertheless, the 
relative importance of the characteristics in these groups does not differ from those in the 
general population. Such patterns might be explained by substantial territorial disparities in 
the quality of the health care (state of the facilities, access to care), rural areas being much 
worse-off, especially compared to the capital (Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, 
2012). This calls for measures to improve the situation in those areas to bring it up to 
standards. 
People with a lower social (education), economic (earning members of the family) or health 
status appear to value the quality characteristics slightly less (i.e. excluding time costs). 
However, the overall preference structure in these groups does not differ dramatically from 
that of the general population. Our results suggest that people, who are likely to use health 
care services, i.e. have poor health status and elderly, place higher importance on the price 
levels in their choice of a physician than healthier and younger individuals. For people with 
poor health, this also implies paying less attention to the quality and access characteristics. 
Naturally, the welfare of people, who have to use these services more often, is more affected 
by the price of these services, compared to healthy individuals. Hence, we may expect then 
unhealthy people to attach more weight to the price of service. Therefore, the observed 
heterogeneity of the price weight can be interpreted as a sign of the theoretical validity of the 
DCE. It also highlights the importance of protecting frequent users, such as elderly and people 
with chronic conditions, from overspending on health care. Currently, Ukrainian patients 
spend rather substantial amounts out-of-pocket via informal and quasi-formal payments which 
represent a financial burden to the households, especially to low-income and socially-
disadvantaged groups (Gryga et al., 2010).  
2.5.3. Trade-off between formal and informal payments 
Our results demonstrate that non-frequent users (healthier individuals), who are rarely 
confronted with the health care system, prefer formal ways of payment. However, those who 
have to use health services frequently (unhealthier individuals) are more tolerant towards 
informal payments. This is expressed by their indifference towards this form of payment. 
Thus, tolerance of informal payments seems to be the result of the interaction between patient 
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and provider due to shortcomings in the Ukrainian health system rather than a part of patients’ 
preferences. 
The risk groups who might explicitly prefer paying informally are people from rural areas and 
small towns, higher income groups and youth (under 20 years). In rural areas, this might be 
related to the substantial lack of medical personnel (Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, 
2012) which impedes access to services by making patients pay for the physician’s attention. 
Higher income group and youth might prefer informal payments for the sake of quicker 
access and personalized treatment. These preferences indirectly indicate a failure to provide 
access to the services of a satisfactory quality level, especially in rural areas. 
Thus, our results suggest that Ukrainian patients do not intrinsically prefer informal payment 
channels but make use of them due to barriers to access and/or the absence of formal charges. 
Given the adverse effects of informal payments on equity in the health care system and its 
sustainability, measures for their eradication are necessary. General anticorruption measures 
in combination with public campaigns have proved to be effective in some Eastern European 
countries, for example Poland (Stepurko et al, 2013; Golinowska, 2010). In addition to this, 
some Asian countries report successful cases of formalization of informal payments 
(Baschieri and Falkingham, 2006; Barber et al., 2004). The choice of specific measures 
should match the broader policy aims. 
2.5.4. Role of gate-keeping 
In our study, we find no clear preference for the type of physician (general practitioner or 
specialist). This could have both positive and negative consequences for policy making. The 
positive aspect is that there is no motivation to avoid primary level contact and to go directly 
to higher and more costly levels of health care. The negative side is a potential for resistance 
among the part of the population that prefers direct referral. From this perspective it is 
important to design interventions that facilitate primary physician contacts and prevent direct 
access to costly specialized services, thus, strengthening a gate-keeping role of general 
practitioners. This can include introducing penalizing fees for direct referrals. 
Potentially the group preferring direct referral consists of people with a higher socio-
economic status, which may be due to their life style, higher level of knowledge, and higher 
value of time. It also includes younger people and “experienced” – those who missed a lot of 
days due illness. In the study by González (2010), it is suggested that patients with symptoms 
that are chronic, inherited, recurrent or easily recognizable possess more accurate information 
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about their health problem and should be given free choice of medical provider. In any case, 
caution should be taken in recognizing whether patient self-awareness is correct as most 
patients do not have medical knowledge. On the other hand, people assigned to any disability 
category already demonstrate a preference for visiting a general practitioner. 
2.5.5. Overall policy implications and conclusions 
In our study, we have aimed to contribute to the policy discussion about the design of health 
care reforms in Ukraine by providing evidence on consumer preferences for physician 
services. We conclude that patients place a high value on quality and access improvements. 
Priority should be given to the improvements in interpersonal aspects of care followed by 
medical safety and quality. This may be achieved by improving the training of medical staff 
with a special focus on communication with the patient. Investments in facilities and their 
networks are of lower priority, though still important.  
Measures to improve quality of care for all population groups and residential areas are 
necessary. Especially, rural areas and small towns lack good quality services (MOH, 2010). 
Higher quality standards and greater equality may also be seen as a tool to diminish the 
widely spread informal payments. 
The intention of some population groups to bypass the general practitioner is slight and, thus 
could be efficiently overridden by the introduction of price disincentives for direct access to a 
medical specialist. The policies of tackling informal payments might meet obstacles in the 
form of inertial involvement into them. Special attention should be paid to risk groups that 
explicitly prefer paying informally, i.e. people living in rural areas or small towns, people 
with higher income and youth. 
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Abstract 
Background: The existence of quasi-formal and informal payments in the Ukrainian health 
care system jeopardizes equity and creates barriers to access to proper care. Patient payment 
policies that better match patient preferences are necessary.  
Objective: We analyze the potential and feasibility of official patient charges for public 
health care services in Ukraine by studying the patterns of fee acceptability, ability and WTP 
for public health care among population groups.  
Methods: We used CV data collected in a small-scale survey of 303 respondents 
representative of the adult Ukrainian population. Three decision points were separated: 
objection to pay, inability to pay, and level of positive non-zero WTP. These decisions were 
studied for relations with quality profiles of the services, and socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondents and their households.  
Results: The likelihood to object to pay is mostly determined by the quality characteristics of 
the services. Objection to pay is not related to corresponding behavior in real life. The 
likelihood of being unable to pay is associated with older age, lower income, and a larger 
share of household members with now income. The level of positive WTP is positively 
related to income (+7% per 1000 UAH increase in income) and is lower for people who 
visited a doctor but did not pay (-22%).  
Conclusions: Rather substantial WTP levels (between 0.9% and 1.9% of household income) 
for one visit to physician indicate a potential for official patient charges in Ukraine. User fees 
may cover a substantial share of personnel cost in the outpatient sector. The patterns of 
inability to pay support well designed exemption criteria based on age, income, and other 
aspects of economic status. The WTP patterns highlight the necessity for payments that are 
proportional to income. Other methodological and policy implications are discussed. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The Constitution of Ukraine guarantees free of charge provision of medical aid in public 
facilities for every citizen (Ukraïna, 1996). Thus, it practically bans all patient charges in the 
public sector. However, there is a mismatch between regulation and reality. This is caused by 
the quasi-formal charges (providers’ requests to pay official charitable contributions to the 
health care organization which should be voluntary in nature). There are also informal (under-
the-table) charges in the form of cash or in-kind gifts paid to health care providers for better 
services. Such unregulated charges have distortive effects on health care provision and 
consumption (Gryga et al., 2010; State Statistical Service of Ukraine, 2010b; Lekhan et al., 
2004). Most important, they jeopardize equity in health care and create barriers to access even 
in the absence of official patient charges. 
This ‘status quo’ inherited from the Semashko system established in Ukraine during the 
Soviet Union period, seems to currently satisfy only policy-makers who, as suggested by 
anecdotal evidence, receive health care abroad or in the best public facilities (TSN, 2011). 
The political establishment guards zealously the tax-funded free-of-charge principle of public 
health care provision for the sake of retaining electoral support. However, this policy 
conservatism is at odds with the inefficiency of resource allocation and the high level of 
patient dissatisfaction with the health care system (Gorshenin Institute, 2011). Ukrainian 
patients suffer from a lack of access to proper care (especially in rural areas) (Ministry of 
Health of Ukraine, 2010), long waiting lines, the reluctance of unmotivated medical staff to 
offer adequate care (Gryga et al., 2010), and obsolete and inefficient treatment methods 
(Committee on Economic Reforms, 2010). They are left with the option to seek better access 
and quality by means of quasi-formal and informal payments, unless they can use their 
personal connections to obtain the services they desire (Gryga et al., 2010 ; Pavlova et al., 
2011). 
The data suggest that patients in Ukraine cover a substantial part of health care expenditure 
out of pocket. WHO data indicate that private out-of-pocket expenditure in Ukraine amounts 
to around 40.5% of total health expenditures (WHO, 2012) with a very small part being 
administered in the private sector (State Statistical Service of Ukraine, 2010b) although the 
exact size of out-of-pocket payments in the private sector is unknown. This is one of the 
largest shares of out-of-pocket payments in Europe which contradicts the official ‘free-of-
charge’ policy in Ukraine. 
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Most of the out-of-pocket spending is for medical goods. These should be provided to patients 
for free in public health care settings, but frequently patients have to purchase them outside 
the setting due to the absence of these medical goods in these facilities (see data at WHO, 
2012). In addition to this, evidence suggests that the share of unofficial patient charges (i.e. 
quasi-formal and informal charges) at public health care settings is substantial (Pavlova et al., 
2011; Balbanova et al., 2004; Litvak et al., 2001). Unregulated patient charges create a 
considerable financial burden on households and provoke reduced and unequal access to 
public health care services in Ukraine (Gryga et al., 2010). This problem is recognized at the 
national level (e.g. Ministry of Health of Ukraine, 2010; Committee on Economic Reforms, 
2010). In view of this, it is not surprising that about 50% of the Ukrainian patients state that 
they either have to borrow money to pay for health care or to forgo services due to patient 
charges (Pavlova et al., 2011).  
Obviously, there is a need for a more efficient patient payment policy. Together with other 
anticorruption measures, official patient charges may to a certain extent reduce the need to 
pay unofficial charges. They may provide extra revenues for health care providers, reduce 
inefficient health care provision and excess demand for health care (Pavlova et al., 2010). 
However, the implementation of official patient charges is not straightforward. Apart from the 
need to establish a legal base for the implementation of such charges, the exact patient 
payment mechanism should be carefully designed and account for the population’s needs and 
ability to pay. 
In this study, we analyze the potential and feasibility of official patient charges for public 
health care services in Ukraine. We address this issue by studying the patterns of fee 
acceptability, ability and WTP for public health care across population groups. The analysis is 
based on CV data from a household survey among a small representative sample of the 
Ukrainian population. CV is a SP method that is widely applied in health services research to 
study individual WTP for a health care good (for a review see e.g. Diener et al., 1998; Klose, 
1999; Smith and Sach, 2010). 
We focus on fees for physician services provided to patients with major health problems. We 
relate acceptability, ability and WTP stated by the respondents to the specialization of the 
physician and to the quality/access profile of the physician. This is relevant for policy making 
because the role of primary care is still neglected in Ukraine as primary care providers are 
often bypassed by patients and the number of general practitioners (GPs) is still insufficient. 
At the same time, the quality of and access to care is reported to be unsatisfactory (Gorshenin 
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Institute, 2011), which is frequently explained by the severe under-financing of the system 
(Karamyshev et al., 2006; Vynogradov, 2007). The unregulated patient payments are known 
to fill this financial gap. The question is whether Ukrainian patients are willing and able to 
pay officially for quality and access improvements. Our study can be a useful starting point 
for policy discussions in Ukraine as well as in other countries that face similar problems 
(especially other former socialist countries). 
 
3.2 Methods 
In this chapter, we used CV data from the same small-scale survey from Ukraine as in 
Chapter 2. The sample consisted of 303 respondents who agreed to participate in face-to-face 
interviews conducted in December 2009. It was representative of the adult Ukrainian (aged 18 
and older) population. Respondents were asked to state if they would be willing to pay for a 
visit to a physician with quality and access characteristics expressed by four profiles. The 
scenario of major symptoms was selected as during the pre-test it was found that the 
respondents required some specification of the health condition to be able to say something 
about their willingness to pay for treatment. On the other hand, this scenario allowed keeping 
the broad focus on physician services without narrowing down to a specific disease. 
In case a respondent was willing to pay for a given physician profile, a combination of 
payment cards and open-ended questions was applied. First, the respondent selected a 
payment interval from the card, then, an exact amount within the interval (open-ended 
question). Payment cards enabled framing respondents’ answers (preventing overstatement), 
while exact values elicited by the open-ended questions served as a more precise indication of 
the maximum WTP level. As discussed in section 1.2, open-ended valuation, apart from 
providing more precise information, is also expected to provide more conservative estimates 
which we prefer in the policy analysis of patient charges. If a respondent was not willing to 
pay, s/he was asked to state the reason. The exact wording of the CV tasks is presented in 
Appendix C.  
The four valuation profiles were designed in a way to estimate two separate effects on WTP 
for physician services: (i) the effect of a physician’s specialization (general practitioner or 
medical specialist), and (ii) the effect of quality/access improvements (namely the joint effect 
of improvements in the state of medical equipment, maintenance of the physician office, and 
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the reduction in waiting time in front of the physician’s office from 45 to 10 minutes). The 
four valuation tasks and the effects on WTP studied are summarized in Table 3.1. 
The socio-demographic and household characteristics are summarized in Table A.1 in 
Appendix A. The sample does not differ substantially from the entire Ukrainian population 
except for a slight over-presentation of women and some specific age groups. To account for 
this slight overrepresentation, we included these and other socio-demographic characteristics 
in the analysis. 
 
Table 3.1 Physician profiles included in the CV tasks and the effects on WTP studied 
Attributes a 
Physician profiles included in the CV tasks 
Effects  
on WTP GP  
basic profile 
GP  
improved 
profile 
Specialist  
basic profile 
Specialist  
improved 
profile 
Physician’s  
specialization 
0 =  
GP 
0 =  
GP 
1 =  
Specialist 
1 =  
Specialist Specialization 
State of the medical  
equipment 
0 =  
Outdated 
1 =  
Modern 
0 =  
Outdated 
1 =  
Modern 
Quality/access 
improvements 
Maintenance of  
the physician’s office 
0 =  
Old-looking 
1 =  
Renovated 
0 =  
Old-looking 
1 =  
Renovated 
Waiting time in front  
of the  office 45 min 10 min 45 min 10 min 
a Two attributes remained constant in all profiles: attitude of the medical staff = polite, and travel 
time to the physician’s office = 15 min. 
 
We calculated the proportion of respondents who were willing and unwilling to pay for 
physician services (with a specified reason for their unwillingness to pay – object to pay 
and/or inability to pay). We also estimated the mean WTP amount. For the purpose of 
comparison, we looked at three measures of mean WTP: (i) including all answers (both 
positive and zero WTP answers), (ii) excluding protest answers (i.e. statements of 
unwillingness to pay due to an objection to pay fees), and (iii) including only positive WTP 
values. From a methodology point of view, protest answers should be excluded from the 
analysis since those who just object to pay may not really place a zero value on the services 
under valuation and would be willing to pay in a real market (Boyle, 2003). It should be noted 
however that this issue is still debated.  
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We used a three-phase modeling approach because the WTP data had been obtained using a 
sequence of three main questions (see Figure 3.1): first whether the respondent is willing to 
pay (positive or zero WTP), and second, given a positive WTP, what is the maximum WTP 
level, or given a zero WTP, what is the reason for the unwillingness to pay. Three main 
categories were used to structure the reasons for the unwillingness to pay: objection to pay, 
inability to pay or both. Hence, respondents who selected the last category were assigned as 
being both unable and objecting to pay. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Decision sequence in the CV tasks and resulting modeling points 
 
Thus, as presented in Figure 3.1, three decisions were separated: objection to pay, inability to 
pay, and the level of positive non-zero WTP. For the first model (objection to pay), the cases 
(y=1) include those who stated that they “object to pay”, “object to pay for this kind of 
service”, or “both unable and object to pay”. They were compared to those who do not object 
(y=0), i.e. stated a zero WTP due to the inability to pay only, or a positive WTP. The second 
model (inability to pay) included those who stated that they either are “unable to pay” or 
“both unable and object” as cases (y=1). They were compared to those who are not unable to 
pay (y=0), i.e. stated a zero WTP due to objection only or a positive WTP. These two models 
have binary response variables; hence, we use random effect logistic regression (considering 
that one respondent evaluates four profiles). Denote the probability of a positive response 
(object to pay in the first model or being unable to pay in the second) for a respondent i 
valuing profile j as 1, =yijP . Then, the log odds can be described as a linear combination of the 
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socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent and characteristics of the physician 
profile under valuation: 
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where jX  is a set of profile j specific characteristics, iSDC are socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondent i, ijε  is a stochastic error term and iν  is a respondent 
specific random element. In this specification exponential coefficients represent the odds 
ratios for the change in characteristics. 
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The third model (level of WTP) included only positive WTP levels. However, the positive 
WTP distribution was found to be skewed compared to the normal distribution. Therefore, in 
the analysis, we used a logarithmic transformation of positive WTP, which better resembled a 
normal distribution. The logarithm of respondent’s i WTP for a visit to a physician with 
profile j can be specified as random effect linear regression (considering that one respondent 
evaluated 4 profiles): 
( ) iijiSDCjXij SDCXWTP νεβββ +++⋅+= 0log .  (3) 
In this specification, coefficients represent percentage changes in WTP in response to a unit 
change in the characteristics: 
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A set of socio-demographic characteristics (see Table A.1 in Appendix A) was included in the 
three models, as well as an indicator of the physician’s specialization and an indicator of 
service improvement. The models were also checked for the inclusion of interactions between 
service characteristics and socio-demographic characteristics but this did not add to the model 
fit (hence, it reduced the model performance in terms of the Bayesian Information Criterion 
and degrees of freedom). Therefore, interactions were not included in the final models. The 
models were reduced to only statistically significant variables in order to see which factors 
had a stable effect. Both full and reduced versions are presented and discussed. 
 
Willingness to pay for physician services in Ukraine 
 71 
3.3 Results 
As displayed in Figure 3.2, a substantial part of the sample is willing to pay official fees for 
physician services. The share of respondents willing to pay is considerably higher (about three 
times higher) for physician profiles that indicate quality/access improvements than for the 
corresponding basic profiles. Specialization itself does not seem to have a large effect on the 
proportions of those who are willing or unwilling to pay. For profiles with less attractive 
quality/access characteristics, the dominant reason for being unwilling to pay is that people 
object to pay for such services. In contrast, profiles with better quality/access characteristics 
practically do not state this as a reason for their unwillingness to pay. Other reasons for 
unwillingness to pay (i.e. cannot afford, object to pay for medical services, and both) are 
stated relatively infrequently. However, 11-20 % of the respondents say that they are unable 
to pay (unable or both unable and object). 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Proportion of respondents willing/unwilling to pay for physician services 
 
Table 3.2 presents the three estimates of the mean WTP for physician services: (i) when all 
answers are considered (both positive and zero WTP answers), (ii) when only non-protest 
answers (excluding those who object to pay) are considered, and (iii) when only positive WTP 
answers are considered. Regardless of the type of estimate, the mean WTP is significantly 
higher for both a GP and a medical specialist with better characteristics than for physicians 
with less attractive characteristics. Due to the large number of protest zeros for the less 
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attractive profiles, the differences between the two mean estimates that include zero WTP 
answers (with and without protest answers) is substantial: 9.36 versus 20.39 UAH per visit for 
a GP (around € 0.81 and € 1.80 respectively), and 8.91 versus 22.10 UAH per visit for a 
medical specialist (around € 0.77 and € 1.91 respectively). However, for the profiles with 
more attractive characteristics the difference between these two means is not so large (around 
5 UAH for both specialization modes). Specialization itself appears to have a minor impact on 
mean WTP although in most cases, WTP for a medical specialist is higher than that for GP 
services. 
 
Table 3.2 Mean WTP for physician services 
 Willingness to pay, UAHa 
Profile All answers  included 
Objection answers 
excluded 
Only positive  
WTP included 
 Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N 
GP basic profile 9.36 (23.47) 302 20.79 (31.44) 136 37.21 (34.06) 76 
GP improved profile  32.59 (45.12) 297 37.37 (46.43) 259 44.81 (47.46) 216 
Specialist basic profile 8.91 (23.13) 300 22.10 (32.23) 121 38.20 (34.39) 70 
Specialist improved profile 40.50 (48.92) 301 45.14 (49.58) 270 51.87 (49.75) 235 
a Average daily exchange rate during the period of data collection is 11.5424 UAH / € 
 
Table 3.3 presents the results of the three modeling processes (as described in the previous 
section): objection to pay, inability to pay, and level of positive WTP. Each of the modeling 
stages contains two versions of the model: a full model with all predictors, and a reduced 
model with only significant predictors. Further, we only discuss conclusions about predictors 
that are insensitive to the specification of the model, i.e. significant in both the full and 
reduced models. 
Objection to pay for physician services is found to be strongly related to the quality/access 
characteristics of the profile. As can be seen from the significant negative coefficients, 
profiles with better quality/access characteristics have lower odds (80-100 lower chances) to 
object to pay. This is in line with the finding above that those who object to pay for physician 
services with less attractive quality/access characteristics constitute the larger share of the 
respondents who are unwilling to pay.  
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Table 3.3 Results of modeling WTP: objection to pay, inability to pay, and level of positive WTP 
 Objection to pay Inability to pay  WTP level Random effect logit Random effect logit Random effect linear 
Effect Full model Reduced model Full model 
Reduced 
model 
Full 
model 
Reduced 
model 
Specialization of a physician: 
0 = GP   1 = Specialist 
0.185  -0.689** -0.727** 0.143*** 0.138*** 
(0.212)  (0.301) (0.286) (0.034) (0.033) 
Quality/access characteristics: 
0 = Basic characteristics 
1 = Improved characteristics 
-4.411*** -4.681*** -1.210 *** -1.120 *** 0.366*** 0.362*** 
(0.360) (0.359) (0.316) (0.296) (0.045) (0.045) 
      
Age        
 aged 18-34 -0.086  -0.584 -0.319 0.132  
  (0.560)  (1.082) (0.912) (0.134)  
 aged 35-54 ref.  ref. ref. ref.  
 aged 55+ -0.223  2.082** 1.633** -0.156  
  (0.591)  (1.032) (0.731) (0.143)  
Sex        
 female ref.  ref.  ref.  
 male -0.506  -1.06  0.051  
  (0.459)  (0.831)  (0.109)  
Place of residence       
 village ref.  ref.  ref.  
 town /small city (to 500 
thsd. inhabitants) 
-0.894*  0.165  0.068  
 (0.476)  (0.771)  (0.114)  
 big city (500+ thsd. 
inhabitants) and capital 
-0.528  1.406  0.001  
 (0.581)  (0.993)  (0.141)  
Education level       
 primary or no education -0.281  0.354  -0.089 -0.198 
  (0.579)  (0.838)  (0.145) (0.132) 
 secondary education ref.  ref.  ref. ref. 
 higher education or 
scientific degree 
-0.117  0.378  0.186 0.220* 
 (0.537)  (0.928)  (0.126) (0.118) 
Health status       
 absolutely sick to bad 0.278  0.964  0.135  
  (0.643)  (0.897)  (0.157)  
 fair ref.  ref.  ref.  
 good to perfect 0.318  -0.989  -0.139  
  (0.532)  (0.927)  (0.128)  
Voluntary insurance policy       
 no ref.  ref.  ref. ref. 
 insured -0.751  -33.337  0.535** 0.448** 
  (0.975)  (>3x105)  (0.216) (0.208) 
Size of the house hold       
 1 member (alone) ref.  ref.  ref.  
 2+ members  0.663  0.193  -0.147  
  (0.690)  (1.021)  (0.168)  
Number of children in the household       
 No children ref.  ref.  ref.  
 1+ children  0.616  1.713*  -0.044  
  (0.491)  (0.956)  (0.116)  
Share of household members who 
do not earn       
 half or less ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.  
 more than half  -1.102** -1.039** 1.748** 2.561*** -0.016  
  (0.488) (0.425) (0.800) (0.685) (0.115)  
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; ref. – reference group;   (continued on the next page)  
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Table 3.3 (continued) Results of modeling WTP: objection to pay, inability to pay, and level of positive 
WTP 
 Objection to pay Inability to pay  WTP level Random effect logit Random effect logit Random effect linear 
Effect Full model Reduced model Full model 
Reduced 
model 
Full 
model 
Reduced 
model 
Income (descriptive)       
 not sufficient ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.  
 meets the need -0.521 -0.695 -2.402*** -2.505 *** 0.115  
  (0.493) (0.468) (0.827) (0.697) (0.123)  
 allows saving -0.979 -1.633*** -4.925*** -5.334 *** 0.059  
  (0.652) (0.579) (1.408) (1.293) (0.151)  
Experience in visiting and paying        
 did not visit -0.263  0.684 0.393 0.032 0.009 
  (0.569)  (1.005) (0.881) (0.135) (0.123) 
 visited did not pay -0.055  0.886 1.537** -0.208* -0.219** 
  (0.472)  (0.752) (0.701) (0.114) (0.110) 
 visited and paid ref.  ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Level of income, per thsd.UAH 0.134  0.287  0.071** 0.067** 
  (0.142)  (0.313)  (0.032) (0.026) 
Constant term 2.405*** 2.545*** -3.931*** -4.331 *** 3.001*** 2.945*** 
  (0.893) (0.462) (1.397) (0.812) (0.217) (0.115) 
Model statistics        
Number of observations 989 1150 989 1133 499 513 
Number of groups 256 293 256 293 209 218 
Wald test (chi2) 150.73*** 170.43*** 43.73*** 49**** 117.3*** 115.9*** 
Likelihood ratio test (chi2)  144.68*** 194.77*** 178.92*** 214.92***   
R2 within     0.229 0.232 
 between     0.145 0.119 
 overall     0.146 0.123 
 Log-likelihood -449.9 -518.8 -260.4 -295.5   
 AIC  943.87 1049.7 564.8 612.9   
 BIC  1051.6 1080 672.5 668.3   
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; ref. – reference group 
 
The indicators of economic status also significantly impact the probability of objecting to pay for 
physician services. Respondents living in households where most members (or respondents 
themselves) do not earn an income are less likely to object to pay. On the other hand, a high 
perceived household income (one that allows savings) might also reduce the inclination to object, 
though this effect is significant only in the reduced version of the model. An unstable effect, which 
disappears when the model is reduced to significant factors only, is found for the place of residence 
with town or small city residents being less likely to object. Other socio-demographic factors 
demonstrate no effect on the likelihood of objecting to pay. 
 
Willingness to pay for physician services in Ukraine 
 75 
Inability to pay is related not only to the profile characteristics, but also to the specialization 
of a physician. The effect of the quality/access improvements is smaller compared to the 
model of objection to pay, but still highly significant, with more attractive profiles having 3 – 
3.3 times lower odds to yield an inability-to-pay response. A similar effect is observed for the 
specialization of the physician but with a slightly lower magnitude: a medical specialist has a 
twice lower chance of yielding zero WTP due to inability to pay. 
Akin to objection to pay, inability to pay is significantly reduced by the increase in the share 
of household members who earn an income and by the perceived income. However, unlike 
the objection to pay, respondents from households with more nonearning members are more 
likely to report that they are unable to pay. Perceived income is also a very strong predictor of 
inability to pay irrespective of the model specification, with higher income levels being 
associated with lower chances to report inability to pay. It is also notable that people aged 55 
or more are much more likely to report being unable to pay (odds are 5 to 8 times higher than 
for the middle-aged). Also, people who visited a physician during the last 6 months but did 
not pay for this are more likely to report being unable to pay, though this effect is not stable. 
The level of positive (nonzero) WTP, akin to ability to pay, is strongly and significantly 
related to both profile characteristics and specialization of the physician. Respondents report a 
higher WTP for a medical specialist (around 14% more than for a GP) and for more attractive 
quality/access profiles (around 36% higher). A strong and stable significant positive effect on 
WTP is observed for respondents with voluntary health insurance which is associated with a 
45-53% higher WTP. The WTP level is related to the monetary income level but not to the 
perceived one. Each 1 000 UAH (approximately € 87) increase in household income is 
associated with around 7% increase in the WTP level. Finally, experience in paying and 
visiting a physician has a significant and rather stable effect similar to the one for inability to 
pay. Respondents who visited a physician during the last 6 months and did not pay for this 
report a 20-22% lower WTP than those who paid. 
 
3.4 Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter, we have analyzed the potential and feasibility of official patient charges for 
public health care services in Ukraine. We addressed this issue by studying the patterns of fee 
acceptability, ability and WTP for physician services across population groups. The 
interpretation of the results should be done with some caution due to the limitations of the 
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study. The results might be affected to some extent by the small sample size. Therefore, we 
focus our conclusions on strong main relations that are not sensitive to the model 
specification. Estimations based on bigger samples might show more detailed variations of 
acceptability, ability and WTP for physician services across population groups.  
Another limitation relates to the methodology. CV is known to be subject to hypothetical bias 
(Loomis, 2011). That is respondents might not behave in the real world in the same way as 
they stated in a hypothetical experiment. However, some empirical studies have shown that 
open-ended CV (such as that used in our study) produces effect sizes that are rather 
comparable to real world WTP values (e.g. Ryan and Watson, 2009). Nevertheless, we are not 
inclined to interpret the mean WTP as an indication of the possible service fee because this 
requires detailed analysis of demand behavior under different payment regimes. Our results 
should be interpreted in terms of the mere existence of the potential for patient co-payments 
and the main value drivers for the patients. They may also serve as an indication of the 
societal benefits obtained through consumption of services of a given quality. 
In the CV task respondents were presented with the scenario of an official fee. Therefore, 
their WTP statements might be affected by their attitudes towards formal and informal 
payment practices. Not all Ukrainians are positive about paying formally (Gryga et al., 2010). 
Formal charges are not part of the personal communication between patient and physician. 
Thus, they do not necessarily add to the coverage of personnel cost (i.e. physician’s income) 
and do not assure better quality (i.e. quality and access desired by the patient). Besides, they 
may be charged on top of the informal charges causing a double burden for the patient. 
Moreover, Ukrainians are well aware of the fact that the official salary rate in the health care 
sector (1 555 UAH in December 2009 or around € 135) is one of the lowest compared to other 
sectors of the Ukrainian economy (State Statistical Service of Ukraine, 2010a). Patients in 
many cases may perceive informal payments as an act of solidarity and a necessary 
supplement to the miserable official salary of physicians (Stepurko et al., 2012). Taking these 
perceptions into account we might expect that on average the true WTP level of the 
respondents is higher than the ones stated in the presented CV task due to lack of trust in 
official financing channels.  
Our results demonstrate that official patient charges have potential in Ukraine. Even when 
faced with less attractive characteristics, Ukrainians express a rather substantial level of WTP, 
although less than a quarter of them are willing to pay. However, for physician services with 
improved quality/access characteristics, the share of those willing to pay is more than 70% 
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with an average WTP of 44.8 UAH for a visit to GP (€ 3.9) and 51.9 UAH for a medical 
specialist (€ 4.5). There are no reliable estimates of the cost of health care services in Ukraine 
due to the existence of the public funding system where facilities are financed on a line-item 
budget principle regardless of the number of services provided. These stated WTP levels, 
however, are rather substantial in comparison to the average monthly salary in the health care 
sector. Taking into account that primary care specialists are among the low-income medical 
workers, the stated WTP on average appear comparable or even higher than the official 
personnel costs. Thus, co-payments in primary care in Ukraine can be regarded as a policy 
tool for raising additional income, especially in light of the necessary quality improvements. 
The introduction of co-payments in the public health sector may have various effects both in 
terms of consumption patterns and the official cost of the services. The effects on 
consumption should be subject of demand modeling studies. From the system and provider’s 
perspective, co-payments generate additional funds that could be redistributed to achieve 
different goals. Our results suggest that Ukrainians place high economic value on quality and 
access improvements. Thus, patient charges can only be implemented together with effective 
investment policies targeted at improving quality and access. The probability to object to pay 
for these services is mostly explained by low quality/access characteristics. Additionally, the 
likelihood of the ability to pay and the level of positive WTP are positively and strongly 
related to the quality/ access profile. 
Combined with the evidence that Ukrainians in general are not satisfied with the quality of 
care they receive (Gorshenin Institute, 2011) these findings underline the necessity of 
quality/access improvements in health care. A rough and conservative estimation (the 
difference of the mean WTP in Table 3.2, objection answers excluded) suggests that the social 
benefit gained from simple improvements in the state of medical equipment, maintenance of 
the physician office, and reduction of waiting time is 16.5 UAH per visit to a GP and 
23.0 UAH per visit to a medical specialist (in December 2009 prices). In light of the planned 
health care reforms, this can be regarded as an indication of the investment potential, although 
more robust estimates based on larger samples may provide more precise indicators. In 
Ukraine, increasing quality and access can not only be realized through investments in 
training, capital, and organizational changes, but is also tightly related to personnel 
remuneration. Failure to satisfy physicians’ needs may provoke both resistance to official 
charges and double charges: formal on top of informal. 
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Our results demonstrate that among the zero WTP answers, protesters (the objection motive) 
are not driven by economic or social barriers. The negative relation with the share of 
nonworking members in the household only supports this idea: it indicates that the more 
members depend on one’s alimony and, the more responsibility one has for else’s health and 
life. This might increase the value of health care service and, consequently, decrease the 
likelihood of objection to pay despite the (in)ability to pay. Moreover, reporting objection to 
pay does not necessarily lead to similar behavior in real life as it is not related to the payment 
experience in the year before the survey (i.e. chances of paying in real life are similar for 
those who object to pay and for those who do not object). Thus, both from a methodological 
and a policy perspective it is rational not to account for the preferences of pure ‘protesters’. 
As for the ability/inability to pay and the level of WTP, objective socio-economic barriers, 
such as age and economic status, apply. The relations with household income also support the 
theoretical validity of the construction of the models. It is notable however that inability to 
pay is related to the perceived income level, while the level of WTP is related to monetary 
income. This shows that inability is an issue of perception depending on the evaluation of 
one’s own income level, while the level of WTP is defined by real monetary budgetary 
constraints. This suggests that different mechanisms underlie the two stages of the decision 
about WTP for the physician services and this should be accounted for in the WTP modeling. 
The substantial share of the population that is unable to pay for physician services (at least 
11.5% for the medical specialist with attractive characteristics) is concerning. This is in line 
with the extensive discussions in the literature (e.g. Tambor et al., 2011; Sepehri and 
Chernomas, 2001) that patient charges should be implemented together with exemption 
criteria related to age and income. To relate co-payment levels to the level of income might 
also help to reduce financial barriers to access although this is difficult to achieve in practice. 
A successful example is Bulgaria where patient charges are anchored on the minimum income 
in the country (Atanasova et al., 2011) although this does not eliminate barriers to access. 
It is also worth mentioning that we observe a slight preference among Ukrainians for a direct 
referral to medical specialist and bypassing a GP. This is expressed through the higher 
likelihood of reporting inability to pay and the lower WTP level for the latter. However, this 
preference is practically non-existent for services with less favorable characteristics although 
a bit more explicated for services with more attractive quality/access characteristics. In the 
latter case, people are willing to sacrifice only around 7 – 8 UAH to bypass primary contact. 
This indicates that price signals (such as penalizing fees for direct referral to a specialist) 
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might still be necessary to discourage bypass practices if official patient charges are 
introduced. However, the variation of this preference across population groups should be 
studied in more detail in order to design an effective threshold for discouraging direct visits to 
a specialist without a referral. 
To our knowledge WTP for physician services in Ukraine has never been studied before. 
Thus, testing the external validity using other studies may only be done in relative terms. In 
our study, WTP estimates range from 0.9% to 1.9% of household income when protest 
answers are excluded and from 1.6% to 2.2% when only positive values are considered. This 
is rather consistent for example with the results from Spain where WTP for physician 
outpatient services represent 2% of household income (Martín-Fernández et al., 2010b).  
 
Thus, the results of this chapter have implications for both the methodology of CV and for 
patient payment policies. From the methodological perspective, our findings suggest that that 
acceptability/objection to pay is mostly related to quality/access characteristics of the services 
and is not to socio-economic characteristics. Hence, the protesters do not seem to attach an 
intrinsic ‘zero value’ to the services, and should be excluded from the estimations of WTP. At 
the same time, the inability to pay and the level of WTP are related to socio-economic factors.  
Our results demonstrate that the potential of patient charges for physician services is 
promising as the level of WTP for physician services is substantial despite the quality/access 
profile of the services. However, if patient charges are implemented, the lower ability and 
WTP among vulnerable groups should be addressed by well-designed exemption criteria 
based on age and income and by anchoring co-payment levels on income. 
Importantly, patient charges cannot be implemented without quality/access improvements in 
Ukraine. The social benefits that can be gained from quality improvements in medical 
equipment, maintenance and a reduction in waiting time (expressed through an increase in 
mean WTP) are rather substantial. Additionally, we find a rather weak (around 7 UAH per 
visit) monetary preference for direct referral. Thus, in the context of strengthening the role of 
primary care, differential patient charges for different service levels may be called for. 
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Abstract 
Background: DCE and CV are often applied to value health care benefits. However, whether 
the two techniques yield converging WTP estimates is not studied well.  
Objective: This study aims to compare at a disaggregated level WTP estimates for physician 
services obtained from DCE and CV estimates. We study the consistency between the 
estimates and whether there are systematic differences between the two.  
Methods: The analysis was based on data from a small-scale household survey in Ukraine, 
the same as in Chapter 2 and 3 of the dissertation. The sample included 303 respondents and 
was taken to be representative of the Ukrainian population. The respondents participated in 
both DCE (16 choice tasks) and CV (4 valuation scenarios) in a form of payment scale 
followed by open-ended questions about the exact maximum WTP.  
Results: We find that DCE produces higher WTP estimates than CV does, and the estimates 
are not consistent across the two techniques. A difference between the WTP estimates from 
DCE over those derived from the CV technique is found (i) for respondents who do not 
discriminate well between the profiles, and (ii) for an increase in the presented attribute level 
changes.  
Conclusions: A better convergence between the WTP estimates from two techniques may be 
achieved if the measures are taken to increase the relevance of the valuation tasks to the 
respondents, but also if certain design and empirical strategies are applied. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In estimating the economic value of health care goods and services or their attributes, two SP 
techniques, namely CV and DCE, play an increasingly important role. In Chapter 1, 
section 1.2, recent applications of those methods in health care were reviewed (for an 
overview see also Hanley et al., 2003; Ryan et al., 2001b). Empirical studies comparing both 
techniques using the same data are scarce (Bijlenga et al., 2011; Boxall et al., 1996; Hanley et 
al., 1998; Ryan, 2004a; Ryan and Watson, 2009; Taylor and Armour 2002; van der Pol et al., 
2008). These comparative studies mostly agree that WTP estimates from DCE technique are 
higher than those from open-ended CV formats, and close to those from close-ended CV 
formats. However, most of these studies compare aggregate WTP estimates. It is therefore 
unclear whether the WTP estimates from the two techniques differ systematically and what 
factors contribute to the discrepancy (Boxall et al., 1996; Hanley et al., 1998; Ryan, 2004a; 
Ryan and Watson, 2009; Taylor and Armour, 2002; van der Pol et al., 2008). Moreover, these 
aggregate comparisons show a different extent of discrepancy. 
The question of a systematic difference or even convergence of the WTP estimates from CV 
and DCE methods is important because if convergence can be achieved the choice of the 
appropriate technique would be only in convenience and design. In contrast, the absence of a 
systematic difference or even divergence of these techniques raises the question of which one 
is more valid and should be used in decision-making. As far as there is no agreement in the 
literature on the superiority of one of the techniques, there is still much to be done in 
investigating and improving their convergence. There is evidence in the literature that the 
DCE design and model issues such as ‘opt-out’ option (Ryan and Skåtun, 2004), non-linear 
function (Hanson et al., 2005), and price levels (Slothuus Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen, 2003) 
affect the difference between aggregate WTP estimates from DCE and CV techniques. The 
discrepancy may also arise from the respondents’ behavior. This has not been addressed 
empirically yet. 
In this chapter, we aim to study empirically which factors at the disaggregate level contribute 
to the difference in WTP estimates for physician services obtained from DCE and CV 
techniques. Based on this we discuss what design aspects may improve consistency between 
the estimates from two techniques. The analysis is based on data from 303 respondents 
representing the Ukrainian population. All respondents participated in both DCE (16 choice 
tasks) and CV (4 valuation scenarios). 
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4.2 Background 
There are few empirical comparisons of WTP estimates from DCE and CV. Seven such 
studies were identified by a literature search (Bijlenga et al., 2011; Boxall et al., 1996; Hanley 
et al., 1998; Ryan, 2004a; Ryan and Watson, 2009; Taylor and Armour, 2002; van der Pol et 
al., 2008). We do not consider comparisons within the CV technique, e.g. between the 
discrete choice format (referendum question) and other formats of direct statements of which 
there are many. Also, we do not consider comparisons within the DCE technique. Five of the 
studies belong to the health economics field while the others come from environmental 
economics.  
Generally, two main aspects of convergence between the WTP estimates from DCE and CV 
techniques are considered in these publications: (i) systematic excess, i.e. the WTP values 
from one technique are systematically higher than those from the other technique, at least at 
the range under study; and (ii) consistency, i.e. those who state higher WTP in CV are 
assigned higher WTP values based on DCE modeling, and vice-versa. 
As for the first aspect of convergence, systematic excess, the literature suggests that WTP 
estimates derived from DCE would be close to those from CV in discrete choice or close-
ended (referendum) format (Hanley et al., 1998; Ryan, 2004a), but would be overall 
substantially and significantly higher than those from CV in open-ended or payment cards 
format (Bijlenga et al., 2011; Ryan and Watson, 2009; van der Pol et al., 2008). Only one 
study from environmental economics (Boxall et al., 1996) reports higher WTP estimates from 
CV in discrete choice format, compared to WTP from DCE, but the magnitude of the 
discrepancy was biased by the design of choice tasks.  
The potential causes for the excess in DCE estimates of WTP are not well studied. It appears 
that in DCE linear specification of the utility function (Hanley et al., 1998) and absence of 
substitutes (Boxall et al., 1996) (e.g. ‘opt-out’ option) may increase and, consequently, 
enhance overestimation of the actual WTP mentioned above. On the other hand, the excess 
could be also linked to the levels of the price attribute presented in DCE, though there is a 
controversy in the literature if this effect takes place. For example, Ryan and Wordsworth 
(2000) find no evidence that the levels of the price attribute have an impact on the magnitude 
of WTP in DCE, while the study by Slothuus Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen (2003) proves the 
opposite. In any case, the potential effect of price levels should be accounted for in 
comparative studies such as ours. 
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The second aspect of convergence between the WTP estimates from DCE and CV techniques, 
consistency, has been studied in few papers so far (Bijlenga et al., 2011; van der Pol et al., 
2008). This can be partially explained by the fact that it requires disaggregate comparisons, 
where both WTP estimates are available for each respondent. We identified two studies that 
apply open-ended format to CV and compare it to DCE (Bijlenga et al., 2011; van der Pol et 
al., 2008). Both studies find a high level of consistency between WTPs from DCE and CV. 
Van der Pol et al. (2008) derive this conclusion based on the observation that residuals from 
the CV model are positively interacted with the price attribute in the DCE model, while 
Bijlenga et al. (2011) simply find a strong positive linear relationship between the predicted 
WTP from DCE and the stated WTP from CV, and good concordance between coefficients in 
CV and DCE models. It should be noted that while the latter study applies a heavy CV design 
maximally matching the DCE questions, the former is based on one CV task only revealing 
WTP for an ‘ideal package’. Nevertheless, these findings would make us expect that there is 
an adequate consistency between the WTP estimates from the two techniques – CV and DCE. 
Another aspect of convergence between the WTP estimates from DCE and CV techniques, 
which has been studied only sporadically yet, is related to the determinants of systematic 
differences between these WTP estimates, i.e. which factors define the discrepancy between 
the estimates. However, we consider this to be a key aspect because knowledge of the sources 
of the discrepancies may indicate the direction of potential improvements in the validity of 
both methods. From this, we may assume that a more realistic framing such as the 
introduction of a non-linear utility function, introduction of the ‘opt-out’ option, and 
meaningful price levels (and other attributes) may bring WTP estimates from DCE closer to 
WTP estimates from open-ended CV formats, and possibly, to the actual WTP levels (Lancsar 
and Louvierre, 2008; Lancsar et al., 2007). However, discrepancy can also emerge from 
strategic behavior of respondents rather than from the technical design of the tasks. This 
source of discrepancy can be captured by socio-demographic characteristics of the 
respondents to check if discrepancy occurs in a specific socio-demographic group, but it could 
also be independent of socio-demographic features e.g. due to a specific perception of the 
presented tasks. In this chapter, we offer a way to approach the latter issue. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, closed-ended choice-based formats of the CV study are seen as 
theoretically valid (e.g. Carson, 2000). In contrast, empirical studies, as was already 
discussed, reveal that the open-ended format of CV provides WTP estimates that better 
reproduce the actual maximum WTP in a real market (e.g. Frew et al., 2003; Ryan and 
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Watson, 2009). Close-ended (binary choice) and bidding format WTP estimates are higher 
(Frew et al., 2003; Whynes et al., 2005) but closer to those from DCE. Such patterns are 
explained by different incentives for preference revelation in open- and close-ended formats, 
while in choice-based CV and DCE, these incentives are similar. Thus, it can be assumed that 
choice-based CV and DCE provide inflated results compared to actual choices. Therefore, in 
this chapter we are particularly concerned with what defines the difference in WTP estimates 
from techniques with incompatible incentives: open-ended CV and DCE. 
 
4.3 Methods 
In previous chapters, i.e. Chapter 2 and 3 DCE and CV data from a small-scale household 
survey were analyzed. In this chapter we exploited the same data from 303 respondents 
representing adult Ukrainian population. Details about sampling strategy are presented in the 
Appendix A. Sixteen DCE tasks preceded four CV questions in the questionnaire. For both 
techniques, physician profiles were created based on six quality and access attributes, 
described in Chapter 2 in detail. Specialization of the physician and state of medical 
equipment represented some aspects of perceived clinical quality which patients may know or 
have some expectations about before making the real choice. Social quality was represented 
by maintenance of the physician office and attitude of the medical staff. Finally travel and 
waiting time were the two aspects of access (or cost of time). The DCE task additionally 
included two attributes of cost: size and type of payment (formal or informal), while the CV 
task required direct statement of WTP for a visit to a physician represented through other six 
attributes. 
The DCE design was described in Chapter 2 in detail. In brief, it implied that each respondent 
should pass 16 choice tasks. The example of the DCE task may be found in Appendix C. The 
question of a maximum plausible number of choice tasks is disputable. As discussed in 
Chapter 1,  some recent studies apply as much as 32 choice tasks (e.g. Bijlenga et al., 2011), 
while others argue that lower numbers, i.e. 12 or 16 are only manageable (e.g. Van der Pol et 
al., 2008; Ryan et al., 2001). Due to the fact that the price attribute has 3 levels while all the 
other attributes have only 2, the level balance was not fully reached. 
CV contained four valuation tasks asking for a direct statement of WTP for four physician 
profiles: a general practitioner with some basic characteristics (basic GP profile), a general 
practitioner with the best possible characteristics (best GP profile), a medical specialist with 
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some basic characteristics (basic specialist profile), and a medical specialist with the best 
possible characteristics (best specialist profile) (see Table 4.1). The detailed description of the 
CV design may be found in Chapter 3 and the example of the task – in Appendix C. 
We keep to the view that results of DCE modeling in our study allows estimating WTP for 
joint or separate changes in physician’s attribute. Therefore, in order to become comparable to 
WTP estimates from DCE, we transformed the direct WTP statements from the CV task for 
the four profiles into three differences in stated WTP (henceforth designated as CVWTP∆ ), For 
this purpose, the basic GP profile was chosen as a basis and WTP for this profile stated by a 
respondent was compared to WTP stated by the same respondents for: (1) the best GP profile, 
(2) the basic specialist profile, (3) the best specialist profile. The transformations described 
above are presented in Table 4.1. Such transformations allowed estimating separately two 
effects. First, the effect of the change in the specialization of a physician could be estimated, 
and second, the effect of the joint change in three quality factors: from outdated to modern 
equipment, from bad to good maintenance of the physician’s office, and from long (45 
minutes) to short (10 minutes) waiting time. Two other factors – attitude of the medical staff 
and travel time, did not vary in the CV task. 
 
Table 4.1 Attributes of physician services for CV and the attribute differences for changes in profile 
Attribute 
Possible levels of 
attributes (from 
DCE) 
CV profiles Differences for  empirical modeling 
GP 
basic 
GP 
best 
MS 
basic 
MS 
best 
GP0-
GP1 
GP0-
MS0 
GP0-
MS1 
Physician’s 
specialization 
1 = Medical specialist 
0 = General 
practitioner 
0 0 1 1 0 +1 +1 
State of the medical 
equipment 
1 = Modern 
0 = Outdated 0 1 0 1 +1 0 +1 
Maintenance of the 
physician’s office 
1 = Renovated 
0 = Old-looking 0 1 0 1 +1 0 +1 
Attitude of the 
medical staff 
1 = Polite 
0 = Arrogant 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Travel time to the 
physician’s office 
60 min 
15 min 15 15 15 15 0 0 0 
Waiting time in front 
of the physician’s 
office 
45 min 
10 min 45 10 45 10 -35 0 -35 
 
The respondent’s CVWTP∆ for changes in physician profiles are compared to the marginal WTP 
for the same profile changes predicted for that respondent based on the results of DCE 
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modeling (henceforth designated as DCEWTP∆ ). Results of the DCE modeling used for the 
estimation of DCEWTP∆ , were presented above in the Chapter 2 (see Table 2.2). By using a 
random parameter logit specification, we address unobserved heterogeneity of tastes by 
including random coefficients. The observed taste heterogeneity was addressed by the 
inclusion of interactions between attributes and socio-demographic characteristics. Predictions 
were done for each observation based on the formula for marginal WTP which accounted for 
changes in service attributes and for socio-demographic characteristics of a respondent as well 
(Lancsar et al., 2007). Our analysis was carried out at a disaggregate level. 
The question of the systematic excess of the WTP estimate from one technique over the other 
was approached by the comparison of stated CVWTP∆  and predicted DCEWTP∆  based on a paired 
t-test. In addition to this, consistency between them was assessed by applying Pearson’s 
correlations and linear regression. A significantly positive relation indicates that techniques 
produce consistent WTP estimates. Eventually, determinants of systematic difference between 
CVWTP
∆  and DCEWTP∆  estimates (designated as WTP
∆∆  = DCEWTP∆  - CVWTP∆  ) were analyzed 
by regressing this difference on three groups of factors, representing potential sources of 
discrepancy: socio-demographic features of respondents, the changes in the attribute levels 
appearing in the profile changes under valuation, and the difference in the stated CVWTP∆ .  
Socio-demographic characteristics indicated if there were certain population characteristics 
that affected the difference in the WTP measures. Level changes in the attributes were 
introduced to indicate if the discrepancy was related to the design of the profiles. Finally, the 
introduction of the difference CVWTP∆  was motivated by the assumption that irrelevant or zero 
value changes in the profiles, presented by zero or low values of this factor, should result in 
less consistent behavior of respondents in DCE tasks with no possibility to opt out. 
 
4.4 Results 
The comparison of WTP estimates from the two techniques (i.e. between individual CVWTP∆  
and DCEWTP∆  for all three changes in profile: from basic GP to best GP, basic specialist and 
best specialist profile respectively) with paired t-test shows that DCE produces overall higher 
estimates than CV. The correlation between these two estimates is positive but low and rises 
dramatically when outliers (7% of cases where DCEWTP∆  is higher than 200 UAH) are 
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excluded. In particular, the correlation coefficient increases from 0.196 to 0.416. However, if 
we estimate the correlation coefficient of each change in profile separately, this relation 
disappears as the three new correlation coefficients are very low (Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients are between 0.024 and 0.076). Therefore, the evidence of consistency between the 
two estimates is rather weak. Hence, DCE in our case produces systematically higher WTP 
estimates than CV does; however, these estimates are not consistent between each other. 
Graphically it was noticed that there is a relation - very close to linear - between the excess 
WTP∆∆  and the difference CVWTP∆ , which becomes rather strong when the three changes in 
the profiles are considered separately and outliers are excluded (Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient ranges from -0,489 to -0,784). The analysis of the determinants of the systematic 
differences (in this case excess) of DCEWTP∆  and CVWTP∆  estimates (i.e. WTP
∆∆ ) is 
summarized in Table 4.2. As can be seen in Table 4.2, the regression analysis included 
indicators for the profile change (change in specialization and quality improvements), socio-
demographic characteristics, and interactions of CVWTP∆  with these characteristics. After 
testing the model for inclusion of different groups of factors, it is concluded that most of the 
variation in the excess of DCEWTP∆  over CVWTP∆  can be explained by the joint effect of the 
change in CVWTP∆ , the change of the specialization of the physician and quality improvements 
in the profile (model 1: R2=0.721). Attribute changes only, such as change of the 
specialization of the physician and quality improvements in the profile, explain substantially 
less of WTP∆∆ variation (model 2: R2=0.419). Further adding socio-demographics and 
interactions of CVWTP∆  with all the other factors, improves slightly the model fit (model 3: 
R2=0.886). 
From the results in Table 4.2, it can be concluded that 1 UAH increase in the CVWTP∆  reduces 
the discrepancy in WTP estimates between the two techniques approximately by the same 
value (coefficient is around -1). A change in specialization from GP to medical specialist 
increases this discrepancy by around 10 UAH, while the presence of a joint improvement in 
the 3 quality attributes, namely medical equipment, maintenance of the office and reduced 
waiting time, increases this discrepancy by 105.85 - 107.67 UAH.   
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Table 4.2 Regression of the discrepancies of WTP estimates over quality changes and  
effects of socio-demographic characteristics. 
Effect 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Only 3 
factors 
Only 
WTPDcv 
Only 
attribute 
changes 
Model full-
reduced 
WTPDcv -0.993*** -0.282***  -1.010*** 
  (0.043)  (0.071)   (0.084) 
Attribute changes:     
dx1 (GP to MS) 10.311***  - 10.359*** 
  (3.083)    (2.061) 
dx2 (3 attributes improvement) 105.858***  69.475*** 107.670*** 
  (3.351)   (3.704)  (2.310) 
Constant term -0.797 61.526*** 11.670*** 0.096** 
  (3.720)  (2.628)  (2.973)  (4.420) 
Socio-demographic characteristics     
age (younger than 20)    25.374*** 
     (4.987) 
sex (male)    -13.884*** 
     (2.231) 
education (higher or doctoral)    9.284*** 
     (2.464) 
activity (not working)    -6.053** 
     (2.994) 
activity (retired)    6.076* 
     (3.342) 
health (very good or perfect)    -25.393*** 
     (3.509) 
health (poor and very poor)    -11.428*** 
     (3.205) 
disabled    -43.517*** 
     (5.459) 
private insurance    22.064*** 
     (4.812) 
1-2 children    10.047*** 
     (2.368) 
higher income (>1000UAH)    15.221*** 
     (2.264) 
residing in rural area    13.157*** 
     (3.026) 
residing in small city    14.227*** 
     (3.465) 
residing in middle city    9.094*** 
     (2.721) 
residing in capital (Kyiv)    16.363*** 
     (4.825) 
30-80% of household not working    -17.886*** 
     (2.565) 
80-100% of household not working    -14.273*** 
     (3.566) 
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; ref. – reference group;  (continued on the next page)  
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Table 4.2 (continued) Regression of the discrepancies of WTP estimates over quality changes and  
effects of socio-demographic characteristics. 
Effect 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Only 3 
factors 
Only 
WTPDcv 
Only 
attribute 
changes 
Model full-
reduced 
Interactions     
WTPDcv by     
activity (retired)    -0.263** 
     (0.125) 
missed more than 14 days due to ill.    -0.349*** 
     (0.093) 
residing in capital (Kyiv)    -0.481*** 
     (0.091) 
very good or perfect    -0.419*** 
     (0.111) 
activity (not working)    -0.335*** 
     (0.080) 
80-100% of household not working    0.512*** 
     (0.115) 
no missing days due to illness    0.152** 
     (0.069) 
residing in small city    0.378*** 
     (0.107) 
residing in middle city    0.188*** 
     (0.072) 
residing in rural area    0.800*** 
     (0.260) 
having private insurance    -0.284** 
     (0.121) 
male    -0.131** 
     (0.066) 
no or primary education    -0.600*** 
     (0.120) 
higher or doctoral education    0.279*** 
     (0.064) 
poor or very poor health    -0.537*** 
     (0.140) 
Model statistics     
Number of observations 489 489 489 489 
F test 417.04*** 15.69*** 351.82*** 100.36*** 
R-squared 0.7206 0.0312 0.4194 0.8858 
Adj R-squared 0.7189 0.0292 0.4182 0.8769 
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; ref. – reference group 
 
Since the additional socio-demographic characteristics do not contribute considerably to the 
explanatory power of the model, we do not consider these factors in detail. Moreover, a small 
sample size may have caused many sporadic effects in small socio-demographic groups. 
Although the introduction of socio-demographic effects and interactions improves the model 
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fit, it does not change much the magnitude of the coefficients, and does not impact the 
direction or significance of the other three factors, which suggests that our results are not 
specific to a certain group.  
4.5 Discussion and conclusion 
The question of the comparison of WTP estimates derived from DCE and CV has been 
empirically studied insufficiently so far. It should be noted that there is no single view on 
whether WTP estimates from DCE and CV are comparable, neither there is a single vision of 
the correct methods of deriving and interpreting them (e.g. Lancsar and Savage, 2004). 
However, this study implies a technical comparison despite the nature of these estimates.  
Our observation that WTP estimated from DCE is higher than the one produced by CV in 
payment card format is in concordance with most comparative studies (Bijlenga et al., 2011; 
Ryan and Watson, 2009; van der Pol et al., 2008). As was discussed in the background 
section, the overall excess in DCEWTP∆  estimates over the stated CVWTP∆  values can to some 
extent be explained by the absence of the opt-out option in the DCE tasks and linear utility 
specification. Therefore, the impact of these design aspects on the convergence of WTP 
values from the two techniques should be further considered. 
The evidence for consistency between WTP estimates from CV and DCE techniques in our 
study is rather weak. This is in discordance with the other studies that found very high levels 
of consistency (Bijlenga et al., 2011; van der Pol et al., 2008). Bijlenga et al. (2011) used a 
CV design very similar to DCE tasks with 32 evaluated profiles, while in our study CV tasks 
were kept to minimum to estimate two separate effects. Van der Pol et al. (2008), in contrast 
to our study, used non-linear utility specification. Thus, it appears that non-linearity may also 
impact the consistency between WTP estimates. 
Our observation that the discrepancy between predicted DCEWTP∆  and stated CVWTP∆  for the 
same change reduces with the increase of stated CVWTP∆  may be attributed to certain pattern in 
respondents’ behavior. This implies that people stating low or zero additional WTP for 
improved profiles do not see added value in the changes in the presented attributes and, thus, 
they might either be less confident of their choices or pay less attention to the tasks and, 
consequently, behave less consistently in DCE tasks. This implies that such respondents 
might not discriminate between the profiles presented in the DCE task when attributes that are 
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not relevant to them are varied. Their choices, if they are forced to choose, will be then erratic 
resulting in inconsistent welfare estimates. 
From this perspective in the analysis of data from DCE it might be important to account only 
for those choice tasks from a respondent in which one can really discriminate between the 
presented profiles in terms of gained utility. Basically two strategies might be applied to do 
this: either excluding cases where a respondent does not see the relevance of the presented 
attribute changes, or apply an adaptive choice design. The former strategy would imply the 
introduction of an additional answer option allowing a respondent to state that the attributes 
varying in the task are not relevant to him/her. However, this strategy is problematic because, 
firstly, such answer option might confuse the respondent, and secondly, it might cause many 
drop offs and, hence, high cost of data. The latter strategy, i.e. the adaptive choice design (e.g. 
Johnson et al., 2003), allows incorporating the answers of all respondents into analysis as it 
defines as a first step which attributes are most relevant to the respondent and then builds 
further choice-tasks based on relevant attributes only. This approach is also subjected to 
difficulties with administration as it requires special software and computer dealt 
questionnaires, which may be impossible in many contexts. These two strategies should be 
considered as means of reducing the noise in data coming from respondents who are 
confronted with tasks that are irrelevant to them. 
The discrepancy in WTP estimates from the two techniques can to a large extent be explained 
by the variation in profiles: mostly by quality improvements and less by a change in the 
specialization of a physician. This means that DCE tends to overestimate WTP more for the 
higher variations in attributes and less or not at all at lower levels. From a theoretical 
perspective such divergence might have arisen because of the linear specification of the utility 
function in the DCE model. Introduction of a convex utility function for price and time 
attributes and/or concave for other attributes (see Wassenaar et al., 2005) are expected to 
result in smaller effects for the higher values of positive attributes and larger effects for the 
expenditure (negative) attributes, which is more in line with consumer behavior theory 
(Lancsar et al., 2007). This should result in lower WTPDCE estimates at higher levels of 
attribute changes (that will affect the utility level less) leaving them practically unaffected at 
lower levels of attribute changes. Thus, DCEWTP∆  estimates might become closer in pattern to 
stated CVWTP∆ . However, non-linear utility functions are not conventional in the DCE analysis 
and result in computationally slightly more complex solutions for DCEWTP∆  estimates. Further 
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research on the impact of non-linear utility functions on the convergence of the WTP 
estimates from two valuation techniques is necessary. 
Another possible implication of the effect of attribute levels on the discrepancy between 
WTPs is that marginal changes rather than total variation changes in the levels of attributes 
for the DCE tasks are more relevant for consumer choice. Hence, they should produce 
DCEWTP
∆  values closer to the difference in the directly stated CVWTP∆ . However, it is not 
always possible to express other than extreme levels of the non-quantifiable attributes to the 
respondent (i.e. attitude can be polite or impolite, but not polite to some extent). Additionally, 
it might be difficult to find an average profile as in the actual market to be used as a reference 
and for constructing marginal changes, especially if the health care markets are uneven in 
terms of quality, access and price. 
Finally, we do not find strong evidence for the impact of socio-demographic factors on the 
discrepancy between WTP estimates from DCE and CV. Some of them might affect it, but 
our results demonstrate that they explain not much of the discrepancy in the WTP estimates, 
while direct statement and the level of attribute changes in the task design appear to be the 
strongest predictors. This suggests that in our study, the results are not specific to a certain 
group but apply to the entire sample. 
In conclusion, in this chapter, we did not touch the question of which technique – DCE or CV, 
is more valid. There is evidence in favor of both of these techniques (e.g. Ryan, 2004a; Ryan 
and Watson, 2009; Telser and Zweifel, 2007), though some authors may question the 
theoretical validity of DCE (e.g. Bijlenga et al., 2011; Taylor and Armour, 2002) and show its 
sensitivity to functional form (e.g. Hanley et al., 1998). Here, we aimed to study the 
discrepancy in WTP from the two techniques. Systematic differences would eliminate the 
necessity to choose which method is more valid. So far, our conclusions are: (i) DCE 
produces systematically higher WTP estimates than people state in CV task; (ii) there is 
practically no evidence for the consistency between the two estimates; (iii) the difference in 
WTP estimates from the two techniques mostly results from incertitude in behavior of 
respondents who place low value on the presented changes, and rises with the increase in the 
attribute changes under valuation. These conclusions are not specific to any socio-
demographic group and hold for the entire sample.  
From the methodological perspective, assuming open-ended/payment card CV to be a 
reference due to its closeness to actual choices (Frew et al., 2003; Ryan and Watson, 2009), 
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measures in DCE design reducing this discrepancy should be considered. These measures 
might include but do not need to be restricted to: non-linear utility function specifications, 
introduction of an opt-out option in discrete choice tasks, introducing marginal changes rather 
than total variation change in those tasks where possible, and introduction of a price attribute 
with plausible levels. In any case, the specific effects of these measures on the convergence in 
DCEWTP
∆  estimates to directly stated CVWTP∆  should be further investigated. The part of 
discrepancy that is brought up by respondents’ incertitude in decision making can be 
addressed by discrimination between choice tasks for respondents by the relevance of the 
presented attributes to them. Two possible strategies discussed in this chapter are: the 
indifferent choice option and adaptive choice designs in DCE. 
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Abstract 
Background: Patient charges for health care services are implemented in high-income 
countries to reduce unnecessary service use and to involve consumers in health care funding. 
Although service use in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is high, patient charges for 
services are not common. Moreover, there is no evidence on the potential consumption effects 
of service charges in these countries. 
Objective: In this chapter, we provide evidence on the potential impact of patient charges on 
the consumption of specialized physician services in six CEE countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. 
Methods: We apply a semi-parametric survival analysis to the stated WATP in order to 
identify potential demand pools, i.e. the shares of population willing and able to pay a certain 
fee in case they need a service. Subsequently, we calculate price, income and age semi-
elasticities. Data are collected through a survey held in 2010 among representative samples of 
about 1000 respondents in each country. 
Results: Our results suggest that median WATP in the studied countries ranges from € 5.15 to 
€ 12.2 and the country ranking by WATP follows exactly the country ranking by income 
level. Low service charges, up to € 2.5 in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania and Romania, and up 
to € 5 in Poland do not appear to drop many people out of the demand pool. 
Conclusions: Low patient payments are an acceptable policy tool in case adequate exemption 
criteria are effectively applied. The lower payment interval should be studied in more detail 
for Ukraine, however. Conducting demand analysis based on SP data can provide useful 
information to design patient payment policies. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The implementation of patient charges for publicly-funded health care services has been often 
recommended to reduce unnecessary service use and thus, to enhance the efficiency of health 
care resource utilization (Ros et al., 2000; Rovira et al., 1998). Theoretical and empirical 
research suggests such charges may bring certain welfare gains but if accompanied by 
efficient administration and sufficient quality improvements (McPake, 1993; Pavlova et al., 
2010). In Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, where patients often pay for 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices, as well as informally to providers (Balabanova and 
McKee, 2002; Belli et al., 2004; Ensor, 2004; Gaál et al., 2010; Gaál and McKee, 2005; 
Szende and Culyer, 2006; Thompson and Witter, 2000), formal charges for health care 
services are not very common. This can be explained by the post-socialistic context and the 
political inability to implement these commonly unpopular measures (Tambor et al., 2011), 
rather than by real evidence on their potential effects. In fact, evidence on the potential impact 
of patient charges on the consumption of health care services in CEE countries is lacking. 
This chapter focuses on the potential consumption effects of the official patient charges for 
specialized physician services in six CEE countries, namely Poland and Hungary (developed 
CEE countries), Bulgaria and Romania (less developed CEE countries), and Lithuania and 
Ukraine (post-Soviet countries, Ukraine being far less economically developed). The country 
context is explained in detail in Chapter 1. All of these countries, except for Ukraine, have 
implemented social health insurance systems. Ukraine has maintained the tax-based 
Semashko system which claimed universal coverage, where official patient charges are 
practically illegal except for some specific services. 
Bulgaria is the only country in this group, where patient charges for outpatient services (1% 
of country minimum wage per visit) effectively exist since 2000 (Atanasova et al., 2011). In 
the other countries, i.e. Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, patient charges are 
applicable to services outside the packages covered by the social insurance. Hungary 
introduced official co-payments in 2007 (around € 1 for a visit to a physician) (Baji et al., 
2012a), but they were abolished after a national referendum less than 1 year after they were 
implemented. Outside the official cost-sharing arrangements, all six countries suffer from 
quasi-formal and informal payments (also in outpatient care). Quasi-formal charges are 
official charges set up by the health care establishments without clear government regulations. 
In the context of health care underfunding, these charges allow patients to obtain services with 
Chapter 5 
100 
quicker access and higher quality, although this is not fully legal (Gaál et al., 2010; Gotsadze 
and Gaál, 2010; Murauskiene et al., 2010). Informal (under-the-table) patient payments for 
physician services are also widespread, especially in Ukraine and Romania, but also in the 
other countries (Stepurko et al., 2011). Thus, patients in all six countries are confronted with 
various charges when using physician services (Pavlova et al., 2012), but official fees exist 
only in Bulgaria. 
Given the absence of official patient charges for physician services in four of the studied 
countries, their rather short lifetime in Hungary, and the rather uniform payments in Bulgaria, 
we base our analysis on SP. CV data from the six CEE countries was collected via national 
representative surveys in 2010. We analyzed and compare stated WATP for specialized 
physician services of high quality and quick access. Rather few studies rely upon SP to 
quantify the potential effects of user fees on health care demand (Skriabikova et al., 2010). 
We applied a survival analysis, similar to Mataria et al., (2007), to derive the underlying 
demand pool functions and, consequently, the price and other factor elasticity. In contrast to 
Mataria et al. (2007), we applied a semi-parametric modeling approach which better fits the 
data (as it allows for a non-regular shape of the hazard functions). We also make cross-
country comparisons, which has not been done in previous research. 
 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1. Data collection 
We exploited data from national representative household surveys held in July-August 2010 
in the six CEE countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. The 
target samples consisted of about 1000 respondents in each country. The sampling strategy 
was based on a multi-stage random probability method and is described in Appendix B in 
detail. The standardized questionnaire contained 6 main blocks, including questions about 
WATP and socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent and the respondent’s 
household. The design of the contingent valuation task was similar to that in the small scale 
survey in Ukraine, described in Chapter 3. The main difference was that in this survey, 
respondents were presented with one valuation task only. In this task, respondents were 
presented with the scenario of major health symptoms and were asked if they would be 
willing and able to pay for the visit to a medical specialist provided that the services were of 
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good quality and quick access, which was specified in a show card. The exact wording of the 
task is presented in Appendix D. Those, who were willing to pay, were first asked to choose 
one of the payment intervals shown on the card to frame the answer and prevent respondents 
from overstating their preferences. Then, respondents were asked to specify an exact amount 
within the interval chosen. If a respondent was not able to state the amount exactly, but could 
define the interval, the midpoint was filled in by the interviewer. The payment card format, as 
opposed to dichotomous choice, is generally known to produce more conservative estimates 
(closer to real WTP) and not subject to mid-point bias (Ryan et al., 2004). Exact statement 
(open-ended format) was added to obtain more complete information from the respondents.  
5.2.2. Model specification 
For the purpose of modeling, we assumed that the WATP level stated by a respondent 
reflected his/her real WATP. That meant that if a fee for a visit was lower than a person’s 
WATP the person would stay in what we defined as a potential demand pool, while if the fee 
exceeded the WATP level, a person would drop out of the potential demand pool. The 
potential demand pool refers to the share of the population which is potentially willing and 
able to purchase a service in case a certain health problem occurs. Thus, this is demand 
conditional on having health problems. WATP in our analysis was the counterpart of the time 
to death variable in a classical survival analysis, and the fee level was analogous to time 
(further fee is denoted as t). The empirical problem was to model the hazard of dropping out 
of the potential demand pool at a certain fee level using information about the respondents’ 
WATP and socio-demographic characteristics.  
First, we assumed that the underlying continuous hazard function satisfied the proportional 
hazard properties. That is, the hazard rate θ for a person i to drop out at certain fee level t* 
from the potential demand pool was proportional to certain basic hazard θ0 for this level, with 
a multiplicative factor depending on personal characteristics Xi:  
( ) ( ) ( )iioi XtWATPXt βθθ exp*, ==   (1), 
where β is a vector of parameter coefficients. 
Hazards derived from raw data behaved rather unevenly and differently across countries. 
Therefore, in order to better fit the data, we applied a semi-parametric specification of the 
empirical hazard function. For this purpose we split fee levels into a number of intervals tj , 
Chapter 5 
102 
where j=1,2,…J. The continuous hazard may be transformed to obtain the function for the 
interval specific hazard hj (e.g. Hosmer et al., 2008) in a form: 
( ) ( ) ( )








−−= ∫
∈ jtt
j dttXXh 0expexp1 θβ   (2), 
where the integral represents the cumulated baseline hazard in the interval j. Denote the 
logarithm of this amount as γj. Then, the empirical problem may be transformed into fitting a 
complementary log-logit model of the interval hazard: 
( )[ ]( ) jj XXh γβ +=−− 1loglog    (3)2 
5.2.3. Two-stage approach and intervals 
In this analysis, we did not distinguish between the true zero answers and so called free-riders. 
However, we admitted that different drivers might underlie the decision of stating a zero or 
non-zero WTP and the decision about the actual level of the WTP. Therefore, we applied a 
two-stage modeling approach3. That is, independence of the two decision stages was assumed 
and we parameterized equation 3 two times for each country. The first stage equation included 
one constant representing the log of the baseline hazard of dropping out of the demand pool if 
any fee is introduced. The second stage equation contained constants specific for each of the 
positive payment intervals. 
We used the midpoints and the ends of the intervals presented in the payment cards (that 
helped exact framing of the WATP statement) for the break-down of the fee scale. This 
determined the step of € 2.5 for the fee scale intervals. However, in different countries spikes 
in the response frequency appeared just below and above these values, which correspond to 
the round numbers in local currencies. Thus, all these values should logically be assigned to 
one interval. Therefore we used slightly shifted bounds in order to incorporate round values 
around initial bound into the lower interval. Thus we obtained intervals of: € (0-2.6), [2.6-6), 
[6-7.6), [7.6-11), [11-12.7), [12.7-25], (25 and more]. The last interval is unbounded and, 
                                               
2 In this specification γj is an interval specific constant, which does not have simple direct interpretation. Observe that 
( ) ( )[ ]j
a
a
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
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−
θγ , which means that this constant represent logarithmic transformation of cumulated 
baseline continuous hazard in the interval, or inverse complementary log-logistic transformation of interval (discrete) 
baseline hazard. 
3 We also tested for continuous decision process specification by estimating joint models with zero fee included as a separate 
interval. The results differed to some extent in magnitude, but were fully consistent in relative magnitudes and directions of 
change, leading to similar conclusions. As the continuous specification accounts for questionable zero answers it may 
understate survival rates. Therefore, we present here the results of a two-stage approach application. 
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hence, hazard rates are infinite in it (everyone, who stays in the pool till the fee € 25, drops 
out of it anyway). Therefore, it was plausible to treat respondents expressing WATP in the 
last interval as censored. Consequently, there are no constants corresponding to the last 
interval in the models and no predictions were done based on it4. 
5.2.4. Predictions 
The derivation of the survival functions (potential demand pool functions) for each country in 
the study was further done based on the predicted interval hazards. The prediction of the 
hazard rates was done using the parameterization of equation 3. For this purpose, socio-
demographic characteristics were held at average sample levels within each country. Thus, the 
survival rate for interval j was calculated as: 
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5.2.5. Price elasticity 
The price elasticity (i.e. with regards to fee level t) in the semi-parametric specification does 
not make much sense in its full form, because the baseline hazard is actually a non-continuous 
step function consisting only of the combination of interval specific constants. The percentage 
change in the survival rate moving from interval to interval is of interest. This can be 
interpreted as semi-elasticity with regard to a one interval change in price (user fee). 
Thus, the semi-elasticity across intervals (moving from one interval to the next one) were 
written as: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]jttjj XXaSt
XtS j
j
γβ expexp,log,log
1
−=∂=∂
∂
−
  (5)5 
It is notable that the price semi-elasticity depends on population characteristics. We applied 
the same approach as for predicting survival functions, i.e. we used average sample 
predictions Ecountry( Xβ ) for further calculations, thereby relating estimates to the current 
country context. For presentation purposes, we only calculated the price semi-elasticity of 
                                               
4 Intuitively, predictions for the last interval are obvious: interval hazard should be equal to 1, and survival rate to 0%. 
5 Given properties of the survival function we obtain: 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑∫∫ −=−=−=
jjj t
j
t
o
t
j XdttXdtXtXtS
000
expexpexp,,log γβθβθ  
Substituting for difference in logarithms of survival function in equation 5 gives the presented result. 
Chapter 5 
104 
survival when moving between neighboring intervals. Estimations between more distant 
intervals would not be precise. 
5.2.6. Elasticity by covariates 
We applied the same framework with regards to covariates, and estimate a semi-elasticity for 
them, which represents the percent change in the survival function in response to a unit 
change in the covariate of interest x. It is calculated as: 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑∫
=
−=−=∂
∂ j
k
kx
t
ox
j XdttXx
XtS j
00
expexpexp,log γββθββ   (6)6 
Note that the survival (potential demand pool) elasticity with regards to x-s depends on the 
price interval, or cumulative hazard in it, as well as on the level of x. Additionally, it depends 
on the level of all other characteristics, which we set to average sample levels Ecountry( Xβ ). 
Thus, for each characteristic we may obtain a different elasticity per interval. 
 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1. Descriptive statistics of the data 
Descriptive statistics of the samples in the study are presented in Table B.2 in Appendix B. 
Their age and gender composition is reasonably close to that of the adult population in the 
studied countries according to national statistics. The proportion of respondents, who express 
a positive WATP for specialized physician services provided that they are of high quality and 
quick access, is rather high in all six countries. The most positive about paying for the 
services are Romanians and Lithuanians (81.43% and 80.90%), followed by Bulgarians 
(75.96%). Substantially lower shares of Ukrainian and Polish respondents (73.47% and 
72.96%) state a positive WTP. The lowest share is in Hungary (66.54%). 
Even if zero answers are accounted for, the level of the mean and median WATP in all six 
countries are rather substantial. Accounting for only positive values does not change the 
                                               
6 Semi-elasticity with regards to exponential of linear combination of characteristics X can be written as: 
( )[ ]
( ) ( )∫−=∂
∂ j
a
jo
j dttX
XaS
0
exp
,log θβ
 
However, ( )Xβexp∂  can be rewritten as ( ) xXx ∂ββ exp  in order to relate it to change is characteristic x. Substituting in the 
previous equation we obtain equation 6. 
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pattern much. In Poland, the level of WATP is the highest, while Ukraine is the very last by 
this indicator. Hungary and Lithuania share the second place in the chart of WATP levels. 
However, in Hungary this level becomes substantially higher if only positive values are 
considered, which is due to a large number of zero answers. In Romania, the mean WATP 
level is higher than in Bulgaria but, they are close in median levels. Country ranking by mean 
and median positive WATP level follows perfectly their ranking by income, and still closely 
if zeros are considered (except for Hungary). 
5.3.2. WATP modeling 
The results of the two-stage modeling of the hazard rates of dropping out from the potential 
demand pool based on the stated WATP are presented in Table 5.1. For each country, the first 
column represents the hazard model conditional on having a positive WATP (second stage 
decision), while the second column is the hazard rate (probability) of having a zero WATP 
(first stage decision). The models have theoretically valid coefficients, i.e. elderly and people 
with lower income are expected to express lower WATP. However, the hazard function at 
positive fee levels for Ukraine does not pass the likelihood-ratio test against the constant only 
model and, hence, covariates in the model have rather imprecise or no effect on the WATP 
level. Baseline hazards follow a common pattern for all six countries. They are the lowest at 
the interval corresponding to the fee level of € 0-2.5. Then, they gradually but unevenly 
increase. It is very common that hazards behave unstable at the higher levels of WATP due to 
fewer observations at those levels. 
For those who state a positive WATP, age is not associated with WATP changes except for 
Ukraine, where the association is small in magnitude and bordering on statistical significance. 
Age plays a more important role for increased hazards of stating zero WATP in Romania and 
Ukraine, but also for Poland and Lithuania. 
In Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania, income is a significant factor at both decision 
stages. However, in Hungary, the magnitude of its effect is similar at both decision stages, 
while in the other three countries the effect on the hazard rate of stating a zero WATP is much 
higher than for the WATP level. In Poland, income defines only hazards at the first decision 
point (zero/positive WATP) while in Ukraine, it is not significant at any stage. Household size 
was introduced in order to weight the effect of total household income, and it turns out to be 
significant only in Poland and Hungary. 
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Table 5.1 Two-stage hazard models based on stated WATP 
  Bulgaria Hungary Lithuania 
Effect At pos.  fee 
At zero  
fee 
At pos.  
fee 
At zero  
fee 
At pos. 
 fee 
At zero  
fee 
Age years 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.013** 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
Income € thds. -0.416** -2.238*** -0.526*** -0.508** -0.370*** -1.502*** 
  (0.199) (0.574) (0.178) (0.230) (0.104) (0.338) 
Size of the household 0.035 0.035 -0.009 0.029 -0.008 0.053 
  (0.040) (0.067) (0.038) (0.050) (0.036) (0.071) 
Sex male ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
 female 0.150* 0.006 0.203** -0.14 -0.043 -0.551*** 
  (0.087) (0.150) (0.091) (0.115) (0.083) (0.157) 
Residence village 0.262** -0.152 0.202** 0.067 -0.145 0.001 
  (0.103) (0.170) (0.104) (0.135) (0.094) (0.181) 
 small cities ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
 big cities 0.290*** 0.346* 0.843*** 0.392*** 0.285*** 0.445** 
  (0.112) (0.207) (0.127) (0.148) (0.099) (0.195) 
Education no or primary 0.182 0.595*** 0.212** 0.091 -0.026 0.136 
  (0.123) (0.172) (0.106) (0.136) (0.138) (0.222) 
 secondary ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
 tertiary -0.211** -0.707*** 0.182 -0.197 -0.023 -0.241 
  (0.107) (0.269) (0.130) (0.188) (0.087) (0.174) 
Number of family members 
with chronic disease 
-0.012 0.092 0.107 -0.293*** -0.054 -0.072 
(0.070) (0.123) (0.073) (0.101) (0.065) (0.128) 
Chronic 
states 
diabetes 0.18 -0.241 -0.350** 0.257 -0.406* 0.37 
 (0.163) (0.271) (0.163) (0.193) (0.211) (0.282) 
 CVD -0.116 0.123 -0.146 0.166 -0.143 0.265 
  (0.121) (0.201) (0.119) (0.150) (0.107) (0.192) 
 kidney, liver, 
lung 
0.006 0.178 0.305 -0.301 -0.02 0.242 
 (0.154) (0.223) (0.187) (0.288) (0.139) (0.219) 
 other chronic 0.086 0.084 -0.023 0.416*** 0.205** 0.005 
  (0.116) (0.185) (0.127) (0.158) (0.102) (0.190) 
Past use 
experience 
visited 
physician 
-0.278** -0.355 0.143 -0.12 -0.047 -0.078 
(0.138) (0.248) (0.124) (0.143) (0.097) (0.189) 
 paid officially 0.290** 0.125 -0.129 -0.642** -0.220** -0.285 
 (0.116) (0.201) (0.141) (0.282) (0.099) (0.207) 
 paid 
informally 
0.117 -0.564* -0.146 -1.065*** 0.038 0.372* 
 (0.159) (0.334) (0.117) (0.227) (0.117) (0.216) 
Interval 
constant 
€ [0+]  -0.977**  -0.525*  -1.499*** 
 0.000 (0.456) 0.000 (0.283) 0.000 (0.396) 
 € (0-2.5+] -2.282***  -3.112***  -2.883***  
  (0.269)   (0.276)   (0.249)   
 € [2.6-5+] -1.953***  -2.059***  -1.481***  
  (0.266)   (0.248)   (0.214)   
 € [6-7.5+] -1.126***  -1.474***  -1.401***  
  (0.257)   (0.243)   (0.217)   
 € [7.6-10+] -0.346  -1.101***  -0.833***  
  (0.256)   (0.243)   (0.214)   
 € [11-12.5+] -0.520*  -1.776***  -0.694***  
  (0.278)   (0.271)   (0.219)   
 € [12.7-25] 0.663**  -0.315  -0.113  
  (0.299)   (0.245)   (0.222)   
Number of observations 2,061 817 2,326 934 2,974 951 
Log-likelihood -1,055.77 -394.04 -1,092.67 -560.73 -1,424.86 -426.34 
Wald test (chi2) 706.89*** 102.86*** 859.59*** 89.32*** 1069.81*** 75.90*** 
Likelihood ratio test (chi2) 45.87*** 98.16*** 67.53*** 85.82*** 44.24*** 60.4*** 
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; ref. – reference group  (continued on the next page)  
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Table 5.1 (continued) Two-stage hazard models based on stated WATP 
  Poland Romania Ukraine 
Effect At pos.  fee 
At zero  
fee 
At pos.  
fee 
At zero  
fee 
At pos. 
 fee 
At zero  
fee 
Age years 0.002 0.013** 0.001 0.021*** 0.006* 0.013*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
Income € thds. -0.199 -0.820*** -0.361** -1.369** -0.185 -0.626 
  (0.127) (0.231) (0.150) (0.538) (0.275) (0.547) 
Size of the household -0.002 -0.002 0.029 -0.012 0.061 -0.038 
  (0.037) (0.059) (0.035) (0.062) (0.034) (0.058) 
Sex male ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
 female 0.101 -0.041 -0.094 -0.289* -0.078 -0.064 
  (0.091) (0.144) (0.086) (0.167) (0.088) (0.139) 
Residence village -0.112 -0.276 0.024 0.113 -0.032 -0.199 
  (0.105) (0.171) (0.098) (0.195) (0.106) (0.167) 
 small cities ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
 big cities -0.377*** 0.299* -0.056 0.296 -0.112 -0.039 
  (0.119) (0.175) (0.116) (0.256) (0.100) (0.154) 
Education no or primary -0.407*** 0.127 0.111 0.22 0.249 0.520** 
  (0.127) (0.170) (0.123) (0.208) (0.203) (0.205) 
 secondary ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
 tertiary 0.001 -0.445* -0.054 -0.379 -0.027 -0.310* 
  (0.126) (0.253) (0.100) (0.260) (0.090) (0.166) 
Number of family members 
with chronic disease 
0.136* 0.338*** 0.046 -0.037 0.051 0.051 
(0.078) (0.110) (0.076) (0.153) (0.067) (0.106) 
Chronic 
states 
diabetes -0.001 0.329 0.03 -0.225 -0.223 0.495* 
 (0.220) (0.244) (0.171) (0.332) (0.256) (0.274) 
 CVD 0.119 -0.164 -0.284** -0.055 -0.094 0.374** 
  (0.137) (0.205) (0.123) (0.226) (0.124) (0.174) 
 kidney, liver, 
lung 
-0.086 0.263 -0.034 0.086 -0.310** 0.093 
 (0.253) (0.299) (0.135) (0.238) (0.134) (0.177) 
 other chronic 0.094 0 0.1 0.124 -0.05 -0.068 
  (0.134) (0.185) (0.120) (0.223) (0.109) (0.157) 
Past use 
experience 
visited 
physician 
0.175 -0.473*** 0.189* -0.107 0.008 0.06 
(0.115) (0.172) (0.107) (0.203) (0.106) (0.157) 
 paid 
officially 
-0.380*** -1.074*** -0.107 -0.490** -0.015 -0.387** 
 (0.121) (0.306) (0.109) (0.239) (0.114) (0.197) 
 paid 
informally 
-0.561*** -1.476** 0.077 0.223 0.190* -0.404** 
 (0.199) (0.590) (0.117) (0.243) (0.114) (0.202) 
Interval 
constant 
€ [0+]  -0.960***  -2.160***  -1.659*** 
 0.000 (0.365) 0.000 (0.458) 0.000 (0.359) 
 € (0-2.5+] -3.090***  -2.192***  -1.302***  
  (0.294)   (0.255)   (0.221)   
 € [2.6-5+] -2.384***  -1.305***  -0.440**  
  (0.260)   (0.239)   (0.216)   
 € [6-7.5+] -1.469***  -0.767***  -0.501**  
  (0.238)   (0.237)   (0.227)   
 € [7.6-10+] -1.746***  -1.080***  -0.101  
  (0.249)   (0.252)   (0.236)   
 € [11-12.5+] -0.029  0.104  -0.235  
  (0.226)   (0.241)   (0.278)   
 € [12.7-25] 0.530**  0.14  0.104  
  (0.240)   (0.262)   (0.325)   
Number of observations 2,686 822 2,305 804 1,637 902 
Log-likelihood -1,026.69 -421.37 -1,172.86 -361.81 -1,028.75 -487.37 
Wald test (chi2) 1,017.21*** 106.16*** 810.52*** 67.54*** 342.83*** 86.21** 
Likelihood ratio test (chi2) 51.54** 98.94*** 24.48* 43.84*** 20.68 64.07*** 
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; ref. – reference group 
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Place of residence is an important demand pool factor mostly at positive WATP levels, but 
also at the first stage decision, in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, and Poland. Level of 
education demonstrates a differential effect in different countries. It is, however, most 
important for the first stage decision in Bulgaria, less in Ukraine, where a higher education 
level is associated with higher chances of having a positive WATP. 
Chronic diseases affect the valuation of specialized physician services. Having diabetes in 
Lithuania and Hungary, cardio-vascular disease (CVD) in Romania, and kidney, liver, or lung 
problems in Ukraine are associated with higher WATP values and, thus, lower hazards of 
dropping out of the potential demand pool at any fee level. These effects are expected. 
However, having another chronic disease is associated with lower WATP levels in Lithuania, 
and with higher chances of stating zero WATP in Hungary. CVD is also associated with 
higher chances of zero WATP in Ukraine. These effects are not directly expected. However, 
they might be caused by interfering income effects. This implies that people with these 
disease have a lower income and, hence, express lower WATP levels. 
Finally, past use and payment experiences have differential effects throughout the studied 
countries. Those who visited a physician during the past year have a higher chance of stating a 
positive WATP in Poland while in Bulgaria they express a lower WATP. In Romania 
physician visits increase WATP. Past experience in paying either officially or informally 
increases the chances of having zero WATP in Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine. In Poland this 
experience is also associated with a lower WATP and, thus, a higher chance to drop out of the 
demand pool at any fee level. Lithuanians state a higher WATP if they have experience in 
paying officially in the last year, while in Bulgaria the effect is the opposite. Opposite effects 
of informal payment experience are observed in these countries: in Bulgaria, it is associated 
with higher chances of positive WATP while in Lithuania – with lower chances. In Romania, 
official payment experience is associated with higher probability of stating positive WATP. 
Figure 5.1 presents the survival models (potential demand pools) built based on the two-stage 
modeling framework. Panel a) represents potential demand pool functions conditional not 
only on having health problems, but also on being positive about paying, while in panel b) the 
demand pool is unconditional of zero or positive WATP, but is still conditional on having 
health problems that make one go to a medical specialist. The zero fee interval in panel b) 
represents some very small increases in fee levels, i.e. increases close to zero. The survival 
rate at this interval represents the mean predicted proportion of respondents who state they are 
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willing to pay any fee. Both approaches produce survival rates close to the raw proportions 
from the data with a slightly overstated survival rates in the zero interval. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 WATP survival models (potential demand pools) based on two-stage approach to hazard 
modeling. 
 
Because of the high proportion of respondents stating that they are not willing or able to pay 
for specialized physician services, the unconditional potential demand pool in panel b) for 
Poland and Hungary is shifted downward especially at lower fee levels. We find that this 
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underestimates the real demand pool potential in these countries. Therefore, we consider the 
conditional demand pools as the ones that better reflect reality.  
Poland differs from other countries by having the highest potential demand pool function, 
while Ukraine has the lowest. Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania have rather close potential 
demand pool dynamics. Finally, the demand pool in Bulgaria is close to the middle for the six 
countries at the lower fee levels, and is the most elastic between 5 and € 10 fee. After € 10 it 
becomes less elastic and approaches the one in Ukraine after € 12.5 fee. 
5.3.3. Demand pool elasticities 
The calculated values for the price, income and age semi-elasticities of the demand pool are 
presented in Table 5.2. At the lowest fee interval, i.e. between € 0 and € 2.5, the demand pool 
is relatively inelastic in most countries. Most of the drop out at such fee level is in Ukraine 
(27.8%), Bulgaria (14.7%) and Romania (10.3%). The least elastic demand pool at this fee 
interval is observed in Poland and Lithuania, a little bit more in Hungary. The increase to the 
next fee interval, i.e. between € 2.5 and € 5, causes a very large drop from the demand pool in 
Ukraine (65.9%). In Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania, this fee level causes drop-
outs at the level of around 20-25%, which can be already considered as rather substantial. 
Only in Poland a fee increase to this interval does not cause many respondents to drop-out as 
the semi-elasticity for moving to this interval is around -8.3%. Up till € 10, Poland has the 
least elastic demand pool function among the six countries. However, a further fee increase of 
€ 5 makes the demand pools in all countries more elastic and causes substantial drop-outs, 
especially in Ukraine and Bulgaria. 
The income semi-elasticity estimates show that the demand pool is rather weakly affected by 
income at low fee levels for respondents with positive WATP. This is especially true for 
Poland, but also for Lithuania, Hungary and Romania. In Poland, income continues to have 
the weakest effect through all fee levels. For other countries the income elasticity of potential 
demand follows a similar pattern in all fee intervals up to € 7.5. The most responsive to 
income is the survival function in Bulgaria starting from a € 7.5 fee, and in Hungary in the 
interval € 6 – € 10. In Romania, the income elasticity starts to increase rapidly after a € 10 fee. 
In Ukraine and Lithuania, the income elasticity increase remains relatively stable throughout 
all fee intervals which may also be interpreted as the weak impact of income on the WATP 
statement. At the first stage decision (i.e. stating zero or positive WATP), the biggest effect of 
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income is observed in Bulgaria (46.9%), less in Lithuania (25.88%) and Romania (24.4%), 
even less in Hungary (19.78%) and Ukraine (18.08%). 
 
Table 5.2 Price and other factor semi-elasticity of potential demand pools 
  Semi-elasticity 
  Bulgaria Hungary Lithuania Poland Romania Ukraine 
From To       
No fee Small fee -21.0% -38.9% -17.2% -25.0% -17.8% -28.9% 
Small fee € (0-2.5+]  -14.7% -7.0% -5.8% -4.1% -10.3% -27.8% 
€ (0-2.5+]  € [2.6-5+]  -20.4% -20.0% -23.5% -8.3% -24.9% -65.9% 
€ [2.6-5+]  € [6-7.5+]  -46.7% -35.9% -25.5% -20.8% -42.7% -62.0% 
€ [6-7.5+]  € [7.6-10+]  -102.0% -52.2% -45.0% -15.7% -31.2% -92.5% 
€ [7.6-10+]  € [11-12.5+]  -85.7% -26.6% -51.7% -87.6% -101.9% -80.9% 
€ [11-12.5+]  € [12.7-25] -279.7% -114.6% -92.5% -153.2% -105.7% -113.6% 
Income semi-elasticity (by € 1000)  
At: Small fee 46.9% 19.8% 25.9% 20.5% 24.4% 18.1% 
 € (0-2.5+]  6.1% 3.7% 2.1% 0.8% 3.7% 5.2% 
 € [2.6-5+]  14.6% 14.2% 10.9% 2.5% 12.7% 17.3% 
 € [6-7.5+]  34.1% 33.1% 20.3% 6.6% 28.1% 28.8% 
 € [7.6-10+]  76.5% 60.6% 36.9% 9.7% 39.4% 45.9% 
 € [11-12.5+]  112.1% 74.6% 56.1% 27.2% 76.2% 60.9% 
 € [12.7-25] 228.5% 134.8% 90.3% 57.7% 114.3% 81.9% 
AGE semi-elasticity (by 10 years)       
At: Small fee -1.5% -1.9% -2.2% -3.3% -3.7% -3.8% 
 € (0-2.5+]  -0.7% -0.2% -0.3% -0.1% -0.1% -1.7% 
 € [2.6-5+]  -1.8% -0.8% -1.5% -0.2% -0.4% -5.6% 
 € [6-7.5+]  -4.1% -1.9% -2.7% -0.7% -0.8% -9.3% 
 € [7.6-10+]  -9.2% -3.5% -5.0% -1.0% -1.1% -14.9% 
 € [11-12.5+]  -13.5% -4.3% -7.6% -2.7% -2.1% -19.8% 
 € [12.7-25] -27.5% -7.7% -12.2% -5.8% -3.2% -26.6% 
 
Age has a rather limited effect on the demand pool at low fee levels. Table 5.2 provides semi-
elasticities of the demand pool by 10 year changes in age. The magnitude of the estimates is 
rather moderate at all fee levels, except for the highest. The highest effect on the demand pool 
has age in Ukraine, and to a lesser extent in Bulgaria. Overall, at lower fee intervals (up to 
€ 5) age differences do not cause many disparities in health care service consumption in all 
countries under consideration except for Ukraine. 
 
5.4 Discussion and conclusion 
In this study we exploit a stated WATP measure to study the potential impact of the different 
patient payment levels on the consumption ability of specialized physician services in six 
CEE countries. For this purpose a semi-parametric survival analysis was applied. This was 
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suggested in a study by Mataria et al. (2007) who used a more restrictive parametric approach. 
Results of our study apply to the integrated WATP for a visit to a physician, not to separate 
quality and access characteristics as in mentioned study. They are also limited to the 
specialists’ services with high quality and quick access in cases of major symptoms. The 
former focus bridges the idea of revenue collection with necessary investments in quality and 
access of the services. The major symptom scenario only indicates that in case of minor 
symptoms, the consumption might be lower as more people would prefer alternative (no or 
self-treatment).  
We observe rather substantial levels of WATP in the countries which are comparable to the 
cost of the services (although the notion of actual service cost is absent in most of these 
countries). For Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Romania, we use tariffs established in contracts 
between the National Health Insurance Funds and Provider representatives7 for 2012 and 
bring them to the August 2010 values applying consumer price indexes using national 
statistics8. In Bulgaria, patients additionally pay a co-payment of around € 1 (Atanasova et al. 
2011), and thus, the full (time-adjusted) cost for society of an outpatient visit to a specialist 
would be € 9.20 for the 1st visit and € 5.32 for the follow-ups. In Lithuania, the time adjusted 
cost of the similar visit varies between € 10.30 and € 12.63 depending on the specialty. In 
Romania, the basic tariff for examination is around € 7.2, though it varies substantially 
between specialties and types of providers and in private facilities starts from € 14. For 
Hungary, we use 2009 cost estimates by Gulácsi et al. (2012), which is approximately € 6.8 
for a visit to a medical specialist when figures are adjusted to August 20109. For Poland, we 
use informal sources, such as internet forums, which provide information that in 2011 the cost 
of a visit (time-adjusted10) to a medical specialist for uninsured people varied across different 
regions between € 12.25 (50 zloty) and € 17.15 (70 zloty) with € 14.7 (60 zloty) being the 
average. For Ukraine, no data about cost of services are available. 
Comparing the indicators of the actual cost of services to mean and median WATP levels 
(zero answers not considered), it can be said that only in Hungary and Romania, people on 
                                               
7 Data extracted from the official websites of National Insurance Funds of Bulgaria (National Health Insurance 
Fund of Bulgaria, 2011), Lithuania (Vilnius Territorial Insurance Fund, 2012), and Romania (National Health 
Insurance Fund of Romania, 2011). 
8 Consumer Price Index for these countries is obtained from National statistics services of Bulgaria (National 
Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, 2012), Lithuania (Statistics Lithuania, 2012); for Romania we exploit World 
Bank data (The World Bank, 2012)  
9 CPI for Hungary extracted from OECD data (OECD, 2012b) 
10 CPI for Poland extracted from OECD data (OECD, 2012b) 
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average value specialists’ services substantially higher than their cost to society in the public 
system. In Bulgaria, the same applies to follow-up visits, while cost of the 1st visit is slightly 
higher than Bulgarians are willing and able to pay on average for it. In Lithuania and Poland, 
mean WATP levels lie somewhere in the middle of the range of service cost for these 
countries, though median values do not even cover the minimal cost. Given that in this study 
we estimate rough average WATP without service specification, it appears that in these 
countries cost of services is maximally approached to the socially acceptable levels. This 
comparison indicates that there is some potential for the implementation of user fees for 
physician services in the countries. 
The survival analysis describes the patterns of the population shares staying in the potential 
demand pool after a certain fee level and their differences across population groups. In 
general, the location of the demand curves and their elasticity is consistent with theoretical 
expectations: i.e. they follow the country ranking by income rather well (The World Bank, 
2013). The only exception is the Hungarian unconditional demand curve, which is low due to 
the high levels of zero answers. 
An unresolved question in the analysis is whether zero answers represent true opt-outs when 
patient fees are introduced. In principle, a true zero WATP is different from protest answers 
(Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Shackley and Donaldson, 2002). That is if patient payments are 
implemented, those who state zero WATP will not necessarily forgo services. In this study, 
we do not make a distinction between protest and true zero WATP answer. Thus, we include 
all zero answers in the analysis. Hence, unconditional demand curves might be too 
conservative, i.e. overestimate the share of drop-outs at the first stage: introduction of any fee, 
and consequently at all other fee levels. 
If the fee levels are increased to the actual service cost, this will lead to many drop-outs. In 
our models, 70-71% of Bulgarians are willing and able to pay the cost of the follow-up visit, 
and only 15-18% - for the first visit. In Hungary, around 54% of the population will stay in 
the potential demand pool, in Lithuania – only 24%, in Poland – between 5.5% and 25.5%, 
depending on the exact level. Cost-sharing is the more feasible option in this case. For 
example, the current co-payment of € 1 corresponds to 86.5% of individuals being willing and 
able to pay in our model (though the level might be higher as the payment interval € 0-2.5 is 
rather broad). 
It should be noted that the demand curves obtained in our analysis, do not give a direct answer 
to the question of what level of user fees or co-payments is considered to be optimal. This 
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depends not only on the potential demand curves, but also on the marginal cost of the services 
and their quality improvements, as well as on the policy aims. Overall, it is a question of the 
best trade-off between coverage and quality which maximizes welfare gains (McPake, 1993). 
The overall framework for conducting such analysis is lacking. However, our potential 
demand curves provide a good indication of the population groups and shares that will be 
most problematic and will require exemption/reduction mechanisms at each fee level. 
Our results are not fully comparable to the results of other studies due to the semi-parametric 
specification. We were able to estimate semi-elasticities of the survival (potential demand 
pool) functions. Translation of the semi-elasticity into a full elasticity (by dividing them by 
the percentage change in the fee level using the mid-point as a basis) does not provide precise 
point estimates as the fee scale was initially split into discrete intervals. Nonetheless, such 
imprecise calculations show that the price elasticity in the lowest payment interval € 0-2.5 
varies from -0.08 for Poland to -0.57 in Ukraine. In the second payment interval, the estimates 
range from -0.5 for Poland to -3.95 for Ukraine. For other countries, the elasticities are in the 
order of -1.2 to -1.5. In the fee intervals higher than € 5, the price elasticity increases to a 
much higher level. Thus, for low fee levels (up to € 5) our results for the five CEE countries 
(excluding Ukraine) are rather consistent with the previous literature based on cross-sectional 
data and experimental designs in developed countries (Manning et al., 1988; Newhouse and 
Group, 1993). The Ukrainian population is much more responsive to a fee 
introduction/increase in the indicated interval, which is comparable to the demand elasticity 
found in the less developed countries (Ching, 1995; Gertler and van der Gaag, 1990; Mocan et 
al., 2004).  
The socio-demographic differences that we observe are rather consistent with the theoretical 
expectations and with the previous literature. First of all, income has an expected positive 
impact on the demand in five of the studied countries. The only country where income has no 
effect is Ukraine. We explain this by the historical and institutional peculiarities of Ukraine. 
The well-established payment practices (informal and quasi-formal payments) (Gryga et al., 
2010) might eliminate some variation in expressed WATP levels due to common ideas in 
society about a fair price. We explain the tendency among elderly people to report zero 
WATP more often by ideological reasons. Some surveys in post-communist countries reveal 
that nowadays there is a substantial share of people who are nostalgic about the USSR, and 
this is substantially higher among older groups (Survey, 2011). These ideas are explained by 
the conviction that social security for older people was more extensive in the USSR, including 
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free-of-charge health care. On the other hand, the absence of this effect in Bulgaria and 
Hungary might be related to the fact that people in these countries have already had 
experience with official co-payments and found that it turned out not to be harmful. The 
observed demand differences across place of residence which are observed in Hungary, but 
also in Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Poland are in line with the theoretical and empirical literature 
suggesting price discrimination by geographical area (McPake, 1993). However, the level and 
direction of this effect is to be cautiously approached as higher values expressed by dwellers 
of small cities in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Lithuania might actually be related to the relatively 
more difficult access to these services than in urban areas. This is the case in most countries 
despite the level of development (World Health Organization, 2008). Other socio-
demographic factors have differential effects on the potential demand and their explanation 
requires a more detailed analysis of the systems features, which is out of scope of this study. 
In this study we have shown how the stated WATP can be applied to the analysis of user 
charges in the context of a lack of actual experience with user charges. We do not provide a 
tool for the choice of the optimal fee level and we do not touch other normative questions 
regarding patient payments. There are concerns that together with informal payments they 
might impose a double burden on consumers and impair equity (Lewis, 2000). On the other 
hand, official charges together with anticorruption measures prove to be rather efficient in 
suppressing informal practices (Golinowska and Sowa, 2006; Lewis, 2006). We believe that 
an official patient payment policy that accounts for population WATP is likely to reduce the 
burden and inequality imposed by informal practices. 
Although SP are argued to be a sound and valid source of information for price decisions in 
primary health care (Foreit and Fleischman Foreit, 2003; Mataria et al., 2007), they may be 
subject to hypothetical bias, i.e. may significantly overstate the W(A)TP derived from real 
market choices (Liljas and Blumenschein, 2000; Ryan and Watson, 2009). Statistical 
calibration techniques, like stochastic frontier models (e.g. Harder et al., 2006; Hofler and 
List, 2004), have yielded promising results in environmental and agricultural economics. 
Incorporating similar methods into the survival analysis of W(A)TP data on health care 
services might provide better estimates of the potential effects of user fees.  
It should be also mentioned that the generic approach with semi-parametric estimations to 
cross-country data is subject to scale problems. For example, in our data many respondents 
drop out from the demand pool in the very first fee interval in Ukraine, but a rather small 
share does so in Poland. At the same time, in the payment interval from € 10.0 to € 12.5 the 
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situation is the opposite. This means that for the sake of policy-making, it would be more 
efficient to analyze in more detail the lower payment intervals in lower income countries, 
leaving out the higher ones, and doing the opposite for higher income countries. The payment 
cards should be presented to the respondents accordingly. This calls for additional single-
country studies using country-specific measurement scales. 
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Abstract 
Background: WTP/WATP obtained from SP techniques may be subject to hypothetical or 
strategic bias. This may lead to either over- or understatement of the true WTP/WATP. 
Objective: In this study, we applied a stochastic frontier model to data on WATP for 
physician services in six CEE countries in order to test for strategic responses to WATP 
questions.  
Methods: The CV data were collected in nationally representative surveys in Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine in 2010. 
Results: Understatement appears to be present in Bulgaria, where official co-payments are in 
effect. In the four countries, where co-payments for physician services have never been 
implemented, the general pattern suggests overstatement. Finally, in Hungary, where official 
co-payments existed for one year but were abolished afterwards, there is a slight 
overstatement but this is not statistically significant. 
Conclusions: These findings suggest that over- or understatement may be related to the 
probability of a price changes as a consequence of the study.  
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6.1 Introduction 
CV is an increasingly used SP technique for the valuation of health care benefits (Smith and 
Sach, 2010; Klose, 1999; Diener et al., 1998). In a CV study, a specific health state or health 
care intervention is valued by an individual in terms of the stated WTP/WATP for that health 
state or intervention within a hypothetical scenario. Stated preference data have some 
important advantages over actual behavior data. Firstly, SP data can indicate the value that 
consumers attach to non-market goods, which is the case for most public goods. This is also 
the case for health care services that are either covered by collective health insurance policies 
or are publicly funded. Hence, the users of such services either meet no charges or pay 
charges that are lower than actual services costs. Additionally, SP data capture information 
about the value consumers attach to a market good, which can be different than the price that 
they pay for it. It also provides information about the value non-users attach to the use or the 
availability of goods, which cannot be deduced from actual behavior data (i.e. from 
information on the price users pay for the good).  
Nevertheless, the results of CV are rarely applied to policy decisions about patient charges in 
health care. This is, most probably, because of the uncertain predictive validity of the stated 
WATP measures stemming from the hypothetical nature of the valuation tasks as discussed in 
Chapter 1. That is, WATP derived from a CV task is subject to a hypothetical bias, i.e. 
respondents may state WATP which is different from their true WATP if a real commitment 
is to be made (Loomis, 2011; Harrison and Rutström, 2008). Most empirical literature, largely 
from environmental economics, shows that CV produces overstated estimates of the actual 
WATP (Harrison and Rutström, 2008; Loomis, 2011; List and Gallet, 2001; Murphy et al., 
2005). However, there are also indications that people might understate their real WATP (e.g. 
Walraven, 1996). 
Both effects described above are based on theoretical mechanisms which basically arise from 
incentive incompatibility and, consequently, strategic behavior of respondents. On the one 
hand, if a respondent believes that the actual price will be based upon the stated WATP, this 
may create an incentive to understate their true WATP (Lunander, 1998; Samuelson, 1954). 
On the other hand, if respondents think that the higher stated WATP helps to ensure public 
provision of the good (i.e. the stated WATP is used to stress the importance that individual 
attach to a good or service), they may have an incentive to overstate their WATP. Hoehn and 
Randall (1987) argue that in case respondents believe that the information they provide will 
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influence policy decisions overstatement is likely to occur, while if it requires real 
contributions understatement is more likely. In both cases, it is expected that respondents 
believe that the survey results might influence real policies, either the policy of the public 
provision of the good or the policy of the pricing of the good. The causes and mechanisms of 
the hypothetical bias are not sufficiently studied yet (Mitani and Flores, 2010).  
The approaches to deal with hypothetical bias can be distinguished into ex-ante methods, i.e. 
increasing the realism of the CV tasks, and ex-post techniques, where econometric techniques 
are used to correct the gathered data (Loomis, 2011). The latter methods in their early 
attempts implied trivial scaling of stated WATP by a certain ratio. The magnitude of the ratio 
was usually based upon empirical studies that compared the stated WATP to experimental or 
actual behavior (Fox et al, 1998). However, these studies did not provide conclusive evidence. 
For example, a meta-analysis by List and Gallet (2001) suggests a mean calibration ratio of 3, 
while the one by Murphy et al. (2005) suggests 2.6. In both reviews the range of the 
calibration ratios is very high: from less than 1 to more than 10. Moreover, it is not likely that 
the estimates of these ratios are transferrable across studies and across interventions. Another 
approach to the ex-post correction for selection bias in CV studies is to estimate a bias 
function using socio-demographic characteristics (Blackburn et al., 1994; Mansfiled 1998). 
However, this only corrects for differences in stated WATP across individuals with different 
characteristics and does not solve the incentivizing problem. Studies that apply this approach 
also find that bias functions are not transferable across benefits. 
An alternative approach to ex-post calibration is to apply a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
to WATP data (Goldar and Misra, 2001; Hofler and List, 2004). The application of this 
calibration method to CV data has started relatively recently and until now there have been no 
application of SFA to correct for hypothetical bias in WATP estimates in the health 
economics field. In a SFA, the stated WATP is allowed to have an additional disturbance term 
with non-zero expectation. The linear predictor is assumed to represent the true WATP level, 
while the one-sided error term is thought to capture any potential bias. The advantage of this 
method is that it does not require additional data, only those gathered in the CV survey itself. 
The methodological assumption is about the direction of the additional error term: it is either 
positive if people generally overstate or negative if they generally understate their true 
WATP. It is a convention to assume overstatement in most applications; however, as 
discussed above, there are no grounds not to test for potential understatement as well. 
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In this chapter, we apply a stochastic frontier model to data on WATP for physician services 
in six CEE countries in order to test for strategic responses to WATP questions. We relate the 
observed over- and understatement patterns derived from the estimates of the one-sided error 
terms to the country context in order to give an indication about the transferability of the 
results. We also compare both raw and calibrated WATP to the actual expenditures by 
respondents in the year prior to the CV study. 
Our analysis is based on CV data collected in a national-representative survey in July-August 
2010 in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine (as in the previous 
chapter). These countries present a relevant context for a cross-country comparison given the 
past similarities in their health care sectors during the communist period, as well as the 
different pace of health care reforms during the post-communist era. Moreover, Bulgaria is 
the only country in the study where patients are exposed to formal patient copayments for 
physician visits (1% of minimum salary in the country per visit), and Hungary is the country 
with a one year experience of formal patient copayments for physician services (copayments 
were abolished in 2008). Therefore, this country set provides the possibility to explore 
hypothetical bias patterns not only in relation to socio-economic context, but also in relation 
to the naturalism of the monetary commitments. 
 
6.2 Methods 
We used the same data as in Chapter 5, i.e. from national representative household surveys 
held in July-August 2010 in the six CEE countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, and Ukraine. The target samples consisted of about 1000 respondents in each 
country. The sampling strategy is discussed in detail in Appendix B. For more details about 
the questionnaire see the previous chapter and Appendix D for the exact wording of the CV 
task. WATP was elicited via payment intervals followed by the exact statement within the 
selected interval. 
As discussed above, despite the extensive empirical evidence that in CV, respondents tend to 
overstate WATP, in situations where respondents perceive that fees might apply to them, 
WATP might be understated (Hoehn and Randall, 1987; Foster et al., 1997). In this study, 
both assumptions were tested. For this purpose, two stochastic frontier estimations were 
applied to WATP data: one with an additional half-normal disturbance term with a positive 
expectation, another with similar disturbance but a negative expectation.  
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The empirical stochastic frontier model is an extension of a linear model. It has the form of: 
iii uXWATP ±+=∑ εβ)ln(     (1) 
where )exp(∑ + iX εβ  was assumed to be an expression of the true underlying WATP with 
stochastic error term ( )εσε ;0~ Ni . Each observation may have an additional systematic 
deviation with expectation of iu± , and )exp( iu± is an inefficiency scale parameter, or the 
level of over- or understatement respectively (depending on the chosen sign). We assumed a 
half-normal distribution for systematic deviation, such that ( )ui Nu σ;0~± . 
Both technically and theoretically, only one assumption about either a positive or a negative 
inefficiency term may hold. We applied a simple test (Hofler and List, 2004) for the skewness 
of residuals from the linear predictor to adopt the correct assumption. Hence, for each country 
only one model which corresponded to the appropriate skewness direction was selected. 
Based on this model, inefficiency scores were predicted for each respondent: ( )exp( iu+ ) for 
over- and ( )exp( iu− ) for understatement models. Then, the stated individual WATP was 
calibrated by dividing the stated WATP by the inefficiency term: ( )iical uWATPWATPi exp
. = . 
Thus, the stated WATP was scaled up in case of understated WATP or down in case of 
overstated WATP. 
In case of a half-normal distribution, the zero expectation of the disturbance does not lead to a 
zero mean of the individual disturbances, as the whole density of the distribution is situated 
on either side of zero. In this case, another parameter is of interest uσ  as it actually represents 
the thickness of the one tail of the systematic disturbance. Thus, a higher uσ  actually 
represents a larger extent of under- or overstatement and, hence, leads to a higher mean 
disturbance and higher mean inefficiency scale )exp( iu± . 
Eventually, we compared both raw and scaled WATP measures to actual expenditure on 
physician services. This was done to see if the calibration improved the consistency of WATP 
with actual expenditure levels. However, WATP were measured per visit of a physician of 
high quality and with quick access, while the actual expenditure was for physician services of 
common quality and was measured on an annual basis. Therefore, due to these differences in 
measurement bases, we calculated predicted expenditure by multiplying the individuals’ 
number of visits by his/her raw and calibrated WATP, i.e. what one would have spent if one 
had paid one’s own WATP for each visit. Then we compared the aggregate means of the 
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predicted and actual expenditures qualitatively, but also on an individual level quantitatively. 
The latter was done by means of Spearman rank correlation of the predicted expenditure to 
actual total (formal and informal expenditure, the latter being a characteristic feature of 
patient payments in the CEE countries included in the analysis). We checked for correlations 
with informal expenditures as we expected the informal payments to depend more on WATP 
of the consumers than the formal one. 
 
6.3 Results 
Descriptive characteristics of the samples are presented in Table B.2 in Appendix B. The 
samples well represent the adult population in the countries under study according to their 
national statistics. Country ranking by both household income and income per person is as 
follows: Polish respondents are the richest, followed by Hungarian, and then by the 
Lithuanian respondents. Respondents from the other three countries have substantially lower 
income in the following descending order: Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine. This ranking well 
represents the country ranking by macro-indicators of GNI per capita (The World Bank, 
2013), except for the fact that Hungary has a slightly higher macro-indicator than Poland. The 
Polish sample is the youngest (average age: 44.12 years), slightly older are the Hungarian and 
Lithuanian samples on average (circa 46 years), then the Romanian and Ukrainian samples 
(circa 48 years), and the average age in the Bulgarian sample is the highest (50.4 years). Other 
sample characteristics are presented for reference as well (see Table B.2 in Appendix B). 
Table B.2 (Appendix B) also presents the past experiences with physician visits and payments 
for them, as well as the patterns of WATP for the services of medical specialists of good 
quality and quick access in case of major health problems. Ukrainian respondents report the 
lowest level of service consumption with an average of 1.98 visits to a medical specialist per 
year. The levels of service consumption in Romania (3.24 visits), Lithuania (3.67 visits) and 
Poland (3.78 visits) are rather similar. The highest consumption level is observed in Hungary 
(5.26 visits) followed by Bulgaria (4.48 visits). 
As indicated in Table B.2 (Appendix B), the lowest share of those who are not willing to pay 
is observed in Romania and Lithuania, as well as in Bulgaria. In Poland and Ukraine around 
26% respondents are not willing to pay, while the highest unwillingness is observed in 
Hungary – around 33%. In Bulgaria and Romania, the unwillingness is mostly explained by 
the inability to pay, in Lithuania and Ukraine slightly less emphasis is on inability than on 
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objection to pay, while in Hungary and Poland both reasons (unable and object to pay) are 
nearly equally prevalent. 
The mean WATP (positive values only) is the highest in Poland (€ 15.11 for a visit), followed 
by WATP in Hungary of € 13.91 per visit. Lithuanians and Romanians express similar WATP 
for a visit to a medical specialist: € 11.95 and € 11.16 respectively. Bulgarian respondents on 
average are willing to pay € 8.79, while Ukrainian respondents have the lowest WATP: € 6.77 
(see Table B.2 in Appendix B). It should be noted that WATP levels follow closely the 
country ranking by average income reported by the respondents discussed above. The only 
outstanding case is Romania where WATP is relatively high approaching the level of 
Lithuania while income is substantially lower and very close to that in Bulgaria.  
The results of the stochastic frontier analysis are presented in Table 6.1 together with the OLS 
results for comparison. The check of the skewness of the residuals from the OLS estimation 
shows that in Bulgaria, the understatement pattern is likely to be prevalent (negative 
skewness), while in the other five countries the overstatement pattern is more likely (positive 
skewness). In Bulgaria, the model based on the understatement assumption provides a rather 
significant one-sided variance. In Hungary, the positive-sided (overstatement) disturbance is 
present, but the test of its variance against zero shows a rather high probability of type-1 error 
(p-value is 0.19). This basically means that the larger share of the stated WATP is 
concentrated symmetrically around the linear predictor of the true WATP, while the density 
of understatements is comparatively low. In other countries, i.e. Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
and Ukraine, the variance of the positive-sided disturbance differs from zero. 
The results of the stochastic frontier modeling in terms of the predictors are rather consistent 
with those from the OLS estimation. Only some coefficients change in their level of 
significance when the inefficiency term is added, and only if they are not highly significant. 
As expected, the main predictor for the WATP level is income with a positive coefficient. The 
coefficients of ln(income) represent the income elasticity of WATP, which is low (less than 1) 
in all countries. The lowest income elasticity is in Poland (0.115), then in Romania (0.145), 
Bulgaria (0.175), Lithuania (0.166), and it is the highest in Hungary (0.241). In Ukraine, 
WATP appears to be rather homogeneous among income groups. In Hungary, males are 
willing to pay on average 13% more than women. Place of residence also plays role in 
Bulgaria and Hungary. In Bulgaria, small city dwellers are willing to pay more per visit than 
the rest of the population, while in Hungary and Lithuania, big city dwellers have a lower 
WATP than the others. 
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Table 6.1 Stochastic frontier estimation of the WATP level for physician services 
  Bulgaria Hungary Lithuania 
Effect 
 
OLS 
Frontier 
(underst.) 
OLS 
Frontier 
(overst.) 
OLS 
Frontier 
(overst.) 
Ln(age)  -0.024 -0.025 -0.012 -0.027 -0.089 -0.09 
  (0.082) (0.080) (0.081) (0.076) (0.078) (0.075) 
Ln(income)  0.175*** 0.175*** 0.240*** 0.241*** 0.174*** 0.166*** 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.069) (0.065) (0.036) (0.036) 
Ln(household size) -0.109* -0.109* -0.121** -0.087 -0.115* -0.045 
  (0.060) (0.058) (0.068) (0.065) (0.055) (0.053) 
Sex female ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
 male 0.061 0.066 0.131** 0.133** -0.031 -0.033 
  (0.046) (0.045) (0.062) (0.059) (0.049) (0.047) 
Residence village ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
 small city 0.234*** 0.203*** 0.085 0.057 -0.023 0.033 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.071) (0.067) (0.057) (0.056) 
 big city 0.062 0.034 -0.470*** -0.484*** -0.225*** -0.179*** 
  (0.069) (0.068) (0.097) (0.093) (0.067) (0.066) 
Education no or primary ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
 secondary 0.065 0.061 0.116 0.11 -0.002 -0.018 
  (0.067) (0.066) (0.072) (0.068) (0.083) (0.080) 
 high+ 0.159* 0.136* 0.03 0.035 0.024 0.002 
  (0.081) (0.079) (0.093) (0.088) (0.084) (0.081) 
Health status very bad  ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
 fair  0.018 -0.021 0.077 0.183* -0.054 -0.012 
  (0.084) (0.083) (0.108) (0.103) (0.091) (0.089) 
 good 0.018 -0.03 0.145 0.244** -0.012 0.019 
  (0.084) (0.084) (0.110) (0.105) (0.098) (0.096) 
 perfect 0.065 -0.014 0.136 0.236** -0.051 0.009 
  (0.092) (0.093) (0.118) (0.113) (0.110) (0.109) 
Constant  0.924** 1.479*** 0.702 -0.01 1.639*** 1.050*** 
  (0.438) (0.450) (0.497) (0.467) (0.386) (0.374) 
Ln(sig2(ε))       
Constant   -1.570***  -1.421***  -1.503*** 
    (0.142)   (0.148)   (0.117) 
Ln(sig2(u)): inefficiency       
Service user   0.507*  -0.062  0.089 
    (0.267)   (0.198)   (0.169) 
Constant   -1.502***  -0.146  -0.701*** 
    (0.390)   (0.219)   (0.198) 
Model statistics       
Number of observations 661 654 616 613 777 777 
F-test 6.37***  5.98***  3.50***  
Likelihood ratio test (chi2)   52.79***  72.32***  40.41*** 
R2 0.0974  0.0983  0.0479  
Adj. R2 0.0821  0.0818  0.0342  
Log-likelihood -574.80 -563.13 -688.91 -671.33 -766.31 -753.46 
AIC 1173.61 1156.25 1401.8 1372.72 1556.61 1536.92 
BIC 1227.53 1223.5 1454.9 1438.91 1612.48 1606.75 
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; ref. – reference group   (continued on the next 
page) 
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Table 6.1 (continued) Stochastic frontier estimation of the WATP level for physician services 
  Poland Romania Ukraine 
Effect OLS 
Frontier 
(overst.) 
OLS 
Frontier 
(overst.) 
OLS 
Frontier 
(overst.) 
Ln(age)  -0.078 -0.098 -0.082 -0.07 -0.055 -0.053 
  (0.089) (0.087) (0.091) (0.087) (0.081) (0.079) 
Ln(income)  0.120** 0.115** 0.136*** 0.145*** -0.009 -0.019 
  (0.058) (0.057) (0.040) (0.041) (0.049) (0.049) 
Ln(household size) -0.031 -0.031 -0.052 -0.01 -0.053 0.094 
  (0.064) (0.063) (0.059) (0.056) (0.062) (0.061) 
Sex female ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
 male 0.066 0.048 -0.069 -0.103* -0.013 -0.007 
  (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.053) (0.055) (0.054) 
Residence village ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
 small city -0.115* -0.124** -0.017 -0.052 -0.03 -0.042 
  (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.058) (0.066) (0.065) 
 big city 0.114 0.101 0.028 0.032 0.042 0.034 
  (0.075) (0.073) (0.077) (0.073) (0.067) (0.066) 
Education no or primary ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
 secondary -0.142** -0.120* 0.013 0.028 0.144 0.137 
  (0.072) (0.070) (0.079) (0.075) (0.128) (0.126) 
 high+ -0.134 -0.103 0.067 0.12 0.172 0.175 
  (0.096) (0.094) (0.093) (0.089) (0.134) (0.132) 
Health status very bad  ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
 fair  -0.062 -0.085 -0.024 0.016 -0.046 -0.029 
  (0.102) (0.099) (0.089) (0.082) (0.073) (0.074) 
 good 0.04 0.023 0.026 0.049 0.031 0.055 
  (0.105) (0.101) (0.092) (0.085) (0.093) (0.095) 
 perfect 0.017 -0.015 -0.026 -0.018 0.107 0.142 
  (0.117) (0.115) (0.117) (0.110) (0.133) (0.132) 
Constant  2.105*** 1.741*** 1.668*** 0.919** 1.684*** 1.232*** 
  (0.492) (0.481) (0.422) (0.410) (0.429) (0.427) 
Ln(sig2(ε))       
Constant   -1.294***  -1.593***  -1.224*** 
    (0.132)   (0.136)   (0.142) 
Ln(sig2(u)): inefficiency       
Service user   -0.197  -0.319**  0.092 
    (0.227)   (0.150)   (0.202) 
Constant   -0.732**  -0.135  -1.034*** 
    (0.298)   (0.157)   (0.335) 
Model statistics       
Number of observations 614 614 694 692 660 658 
F-test 2.52***  2.49***  1.15  
Wald test (chi2)   27.72***  37.48***  13.90 
R2 0.0440  0.0387  0.0191  
Adj. R2 0.0266  0.0231  0.0025  
Log-likelihood -610.37 -605.84 -725.15 -702.63 -660.05 -654.35 
AIC 1244.74 1241.68 1474.3 1435.25 1344.10 1338.71 
BIC 1297.78 1307.98 1528.81 1503.35 1398.01 1406.04 
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; ref. – reference group   
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Other characteristics have some but not a very strong effect. In Ukraine, WATP is practically 
not related to any of the explanatory characteristics, i.e. is homogeneous across population 
groups. Parameterization of the inefficiency term (under- or overstatement) shows that in 
Bulgaria users of services are more likely to understate their WATP, while in Romania they 
are less likely to overstate it. In other four countries, the inefficiency term is not related to the 
health care use or payment experience. 
The average ratios of over- or understatement are presented in Table 6.2. Among Bulgarian 
respondents the average understatement ratio is 0.67. In the other five countries, respondents 
tend to overstate with the mean overstatement ranging from 1.7 to 2.5. The difference in mean 
inefficiency scores is significant (by Scheffe comparisons) except for those in Romania and 
Hungary, and in Ukraine and Poland. Table 6.2 also contains the estimates for the mean 
WATP on the raw scale and mean calibrated WATP which account for the over- and 
understatement. 
 
Table 6.2 Calibrated WTP for physician services using inefficiency scores 
Country 
Mean 
ineffici
ency 
score 
Mean WATP 
(positive), € 
Average predicted 
expenditure 
(WATPi*visitsi), € 
Average 
actual 
expendit
ure, € 
Spearman rank correlation 
Predicted and 
total actual 
expenditure 
Predicted and 
informal 
actual 
expenditure 
WATP 
raw 
WATP 
scaled 
WATP 
raw 
WATP 
scaled 
WATP 
raw 
WATP 
scaled 
WATP 
raw 
WATP 
scaled 
Bulgaria 0.67 8.79 12.38 35.84 52.62 16.73 0.55 0.55 0.21 0.21 
 (0.00) (0.25) (0.30) (3.79) (4.85) (2.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Hungary 2.50 13.91 4.76 81.61 25.81 16.83 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.40 
 (0.09) (0.83) (0.07) (9.89) (1.23) (1.91) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Lithuania 2.01 11.95 5.23 43.65 17.87 26.98 0.49 0.50 0.33 0.34 
 (0.04) (0.50) (0.07) (5.29) (1.02) (3.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Poland 1.82 15.11 7.41 58.65 28.91 14.36 0.43 0.43 0.25 0.26 
 (0.03) (0.54) (0.13) (6.62) (1.92) (1.56) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Romania 2.31 11.16 4.25 34.59 13.77 48.92 0.52 0.53 0.37 0.38 
 (0.06) (0.50) (0.05) (3.55) (0.79) (8.76) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ukraine 1.76 6.77 3.34 15.13 6.42 19.92 0.61 0.62 0.47 0.48 
  (0.02) (0.29) (0.06) (3.77) (0.82) (2.43) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Comparison of WATP with the actual expenditures on physician services is also presented in 
Table 6.2. In case of Hungary, Lithuania, and Poland, the calibration makes the mean 
predicted expenditure more similar to actual expenditure, while in Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Ukraine it sets them more apart. At the individual level, we also checked for improvements of 
the correlation (Spearman rank) between predicted and actual total and informal expenditure. 
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Again, calibration does not lead to improvement in the consistency between them. Thus, these 
comparisons do not provide evidence for the validation of either of the WATP measures: 
neither raw, nor calibrated. 
 
6.4 Discussion and conclusion 
WATP calibration in the policy-making context is typically used to obtain more conservative 
estimates (Arrow and Solow, 1993). From this perspective, substantiation of the 
understatement model is not desirable as it only inflates the results. In such framework, we 
should have disregarded the understatement hypotheses, and the model for Bulgaria would 
simply resort to OLS estimates and no to the WATP calibration. However, we do not see 
grounds to disregard the possibility of understatement.  
The models appear to satisfy theoretical expectations. Income is the strongest positive 
predictor of the WATP level in both OLS and SFA in five countries, except Ukraine. In 
addition to income, age and place of residence are also recognized as the main WATP drivers 
in the literature, and are therefore proposed as key price discrimination criteria (McPake, 
1993). We, however, do not find any difference across age, but place of residence does play a 
role in Bulgaria (higher WATP in small city dwellers than in rural areas), Poland (lower 
WATP in small city dwellers than in rural area), and in Hungary and Lithuania (higher WATP 
in rural areas than in big city dwellers). Ukraine is a special case as none of the predictors is 
significant. We explain this by a well-established practice of informal charges (Gryga et al., 
2010), which shapes the perception of commonly accepted payment levels and, consequently, 
the stated WATP levels. 
In our study, where the same survey instrument was applied to the same physician services in 
different countries, a great variety is observed, including qualitative differences 
(overstatement and understatement). Thus our results demonstrate that the hypothetical bias 
correction mechanisms are context specific and, most probably, are not transferrable across 
countries. The range of the country average observed calibration ratios falls between 0.67 and 
2.5. Within the countries these ratios also have a big range, though their overall variation is 
small. The great variety of calibration ratios is in line with the earlier studies (for reviews see 
List and Gallet, 2001; Murphy et al., 2005). The mentioned reviews suggest that on average 
the calibration (overstatement) ratios are in the order between 2 and 3 which is comparable to 
what we observe.  
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We lack evidence to explain the quantitative differences at a cross-national level (i.e. the 
magnitude of the mean bias); however, we find that qualitative difference might be related to 
the realism of price changes as a consequence of the study. This aspect is strongest in 
Bulgaria, where patients do currently pay for physician services. Moreover, in the beginning 
of 2010, before the survey was held, there were discussions about a new law on mandatory 
health insurance which could bring possible new patient changes (Radu, 2010). 
Simultaneously, in this country we observe the significant left skewness of WATP data 
towards smaller values, and, consequently, the understatement assumption is supported. 
In the four countries which have no experience with official patient charges for physician 
services in the public sector (Lithuania, Poland, Romania) or they are even illegal (Ukraine), 
right skewness, i.e. overstatement, is found to be significant. In Hungary, WATP is somewhat 
skewed to the right which results in an insignificant average overstatement of WATP. We 
again explain the tendency to overstate by the low realism of the consequential price 
arrangements, as the official copayments were rejected during a national population 
referendum in Hungary (Edelényi et al., 2008). The fact that this overstatement is not 
significant in Hungary might be related to the fact that in Hungary, people have already had 
experience with the official fee implementation, which makes the realism of the potential 
price arrangements higher as opposed to other four countries. On the other hand, since the re-
introduction of these charges is not an issue in Hungary (neither during the survey nor at the 
moment), Hungarians have no specific reason to understate their WATP. 
Additionally, we find within country support for the idea that understatement is related to the 
perceived risk of the payment policy changes. This is the association of higher understatement 
levels in Bulgaria and lower overstatement in Romania with the higher service use. For a 
service user, in case of fee implementation, the real monetary commitments are more likely to 
occur than for a non-user. Hence, the perceived risks should be higher. Consequently, users 
are expected to understate their WATP. 
If the assumptions of the stochastic frontier model hold, the evidence described above brings 
together theories about the nature of the strategic behavior (Hoehn and Randall, 1987; Carson 
and Groves, 2007). Thus, the strategic answering patterns might be seen as the result of a 
trade-off a respondent makes between the desirability of the introduction of quality gains and 
the likelihood of pricing decisions as a result of the survey. In the countries where co-
payments are not introduced or limited, their introduction is an unlikely political action. 
Hence, respondents, who believe that the likelihood that their responses have consequences 
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for pricing policies is low but the desire for quality improvements is high, might tend to 
overstate their true WATP. In countries where co-payments exist, the likelihood of the 
consequential pricing arrangements is higher. This might prevent respondents from 
overstating their WATP and provoke concealing their real WATP.  
Our results provide empirical confirmation of the arguments of institutional economists and 
economic sociologists that economic action is not fully rational but it is embedded in the 
system of social relations (Granovetter, 1985) and, hence, is affected by institutional 
arrangements. Such findings bring the idea that there is much more heterogeneity in stated 
WATP than that which could be explained by observed factors, and part of it is related to the 
perceived risk of subsequent payment changes. One of the strategies to address this, applied in 
the present chapter, is to assume that there is a portion of ‘true’ WATP answers and try to 
retrieve it by allowing over- and/or understatement patterns as measured by the one-sided 
error term in the stochastic frontier analysis. 
In reality, assuming that respondents might have only one direction of strategic answering 
might be too restrictive. A possible solution is to search for ‘true WATP’ in the middle of the 
data, that is, allow simultaneous over- and understatement residuals in one model. This is 
possible by the application of the two-tiered stochastic frontier (Polachek and Yoon, 1996, 
1987; Groot and van den Brink, 2007; Hofler and List, 2004; Tomini et al., 2012a). Up till 
recently, the two-tiered estimator was limited to the case of two exponentially distributed 
inefficiency terms (Polachek and Yoon, 1996), which is restrictive and had convergence 
problems in application to our data. More flexible distributions of inefficiency terms (e.g. 
Tsionas, 2012) might make two-tiered stochastic frontier estimation more applicable to 
WATP data. Additionally, it is possible that there are several groups with their own ‘true 
WATP’ and, respectively, their own strategic/hypothetical bias pattern. In our data we 
observe several peaks which might indicate this. In this case, the relatively new latent class 
stochastic models (finite mixture models) are a good solution for accommodating this 
heterogeneity (Orea and Kumbhakar, 2004; Greene, 2005). 
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7.1 Introduction 
Generally, there is a lack of evidence from CEE countries about the effects of official patient 
charges on health care consumption due to limited experience with such payments. In this 
situation, as outlined in Chapter 1, SP techniques are a useful tool to explore these effects and 
to provide a base for informed decisions about the patient payment policies in a country. 
However, SP techniques, due to their hypothetical nature, are rarely trusted as a reliable 
source of information about the true preferences and WTP, especially for policy decisions. 
While empirical studies are needed to demonstrate the level of applicability of SP techniques 
in policy analysis, this research area remains rather underexplored. Therefore, this dissertation 
is focused on the application of SP techniques to the assessment of patient payments, 
specifically patient payments for basic physician services in CEE countries. The dissertation 
aim is formulated as follows: to apply SP techniques to study WTP for physician services in 
six CEE countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine), and to 
analyze to what extent WTP estimates can be used in the assessment of patient charges for 
physician services. 
To achieve this aim, the dissertation presents several empirical analyses. The analyses are 
based on two datasets: first, from a small-scale survey in Ukraine; second, from a larger 
survey held in 2010 in six CEE countries, namely Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, and Ukraine. Chapter 2 through 4 are devoted to the analysis of data from two SP 
techniques (DCE and CV defined in Chapter 1), collected in the small-scale survey in 
Ukraine. Chapters 5 and 6 exploit CV data from the six CEE countries to build potential 
demand pools and discover the patterns of hypothetical/strategic bias. 
In this chapter, we discuss the main findings of the analyses presented in the dissertation as 
well as their policy and methodology implications. The next section outlines six statements, 
which summarize the main findings of the dissertation, and elaborates on these statements. 
The specificities of the research designs and further research strategies are also discussed in 
this section. The chapter concludes by a general discussion and policy recommendations.  
 
7.2 Statement discussion 
The six statements presented in this section are divided in two main blocks (three statements 
in each block). In the first block, the methodological implications of our findings related to 
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the use of SP techniques for the assessment of patient payment policies are discussed. The 
second block of statements relates to the policy implications of our findings for the patient 
payment policies in the six CEE countries included in the analyses, as well as for the CEE 
region in general.  
7.2.1 The use of the stated preference techniques for the assessment of 
patient payments 
A major part of the findings presented in this dissertation are related to the use of two SP 
techniques, i.e. DCE and CV, for valuing physician services with the aim to assess the patient 
charges for these services. In particular, we analyze the consistency between the two 
techniques, the variation in the answering patterns across socio-demographic groups and 
countries, and the decisions mechanisms employed by respondents. Three statements are 
formulated based on the results of these analyses. 
The consistency between the discrete choice experiment and contingent valuation 
increases with the importance respondents attach to the presented task. 
In the dissertation, we compare stated WTP estimates obtained from the application of DCE 
and CV (see Chapter 3) at a disaggregate level (i.e. the comparison of the two WTP estimates 
per respondent). The DCE and CV data used for the comparison are collected in the same 
survey (a small-scale survey in Ukraine aiming at the valuation of the physician services). 
The findings suggest that DCE produces substantially higher estimates than CV. This is in 
line with previous studies that report disaggregated comparisons between the two techniques 
(Bijlenga et al., 2011; Ryan and Watson, 2009; van der Pol et al., 2008).  
However, unlike previous studies, we find that there is no consistent discrepancy between the 
two WTP estimates at the disaggregate level, i.e. there is no correlation between the WTP 
estimates from the two techniques. Our findings suggest that the discrepancy between the two 
estimates falls with the increase in the stated WTP level, i.e. they converge. This leads to a 
conclusion that respondents who place a higher value on the changes presented in the 
valuation tasks (DCE or CV task) discriminate better between the DCE profiles and, hence, 
are more consistent in their responses. In contrast, those who place a low or zero WTP on the 
changes, do not discriminate well between the DCE profiles and, consequently, are less 
confident in their responses or pay less attention to the tasks. 
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Thus, the strategy to improve the consistency between the WTP estimates obtained from the 
two SP techniques is to increase the importance of the valuation tasks presented to the 
respondents (e.g. adaptive choice designs) or to elicit the certainty of the choices made by 
respondents. Previous literature from different fields of economics has shown that the 
relevance and completeness of information provided to the respondent affects the stated WTP 
(e.g. Akcura, 2011; Kartman et al., 1996; Krupnick and Cropper, 1992); however, its effects 
on the consistency between the two SP techniques has not been studied so far. 
Another observation in this dissertation is that WTP estimates are more consistent if smaller 
changes in the service attributes are assessed. We denote this as a scope effect which implies 
that the magnitude and variation in the discrepancy between WTP obtained from DCE and 
CV are higher if large or total changes rather than marginal changes in quality and access 
attributes are assessed. Louviere et al. (2010) describe this effect in terms of “the respondent’s 
certainty in their decision” which varies with the scope of the changes valued. 
One way is to account for such effect by the application of certain analytical strategies. For 
example, the application of a non-linear utility specification (Lancsar and Louvierre, 2008; 
Lancsar et al., 2007; Hanson et al., 2005) might attenuate the scope effect as it allows for 
diminishing marginal utility and, hence, allows for lower marginal WTP for higher gains in 
quality and access. Another possibility to account for the differential uncertainty in the 
individual values is to apply Generalized Mixed Models (e.g. Fiebig et al., 2010), which allow 
modeling explicitly the heterogeneity in the error scale (its variance) across individuals. A 
more ambitious way is to apply design strategies that diminish the uncertainty in the 
respondent’s valuation. This will imply presentation of small rather than total or large changes 
in the attribute values which are most meaningful to a respondent. This is, however, not 
always possible, especially for qualitative attributes. 
It should be noted, however, that our conclusion about higher discrepancy between the two 
WTP estimates for a bigger scope of attribute changes under assessment, is based on 
observing changes in WTP for a limited number of profiles (two attributes by two levels). 
Thus, the relation we observe is discrete and limited. For a more precise assessment of the 
scope effect on the WTP consistency, the survey design would require the inclusion of a 
wider range of attribute levels in the valuation tasks, which might also require fewer attributes 
under consideration. 
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At this stage, our conclusions should be interpreted more as a signal for further research on 
the discrepancy between DCE and CV rather than an indication of exact ways of conducting 
DCE or CV studies. As suggested by our results, there is room for improving the consistency 
between DCE and CV. But the strategies to achieve this goal, discussed above, should be 
studied in detail for their direct effect on the consistency. This would imply the application of 
a controlled experiment with different groups of respondents being assigned to different 
versions of the valuation tasks. So far, DCE appears to be unsuitable for a cardinal paradigm 
(integrating marginal WTP across quality changes to obtain holistic value), neither in policy 
assessment nor even in cost-benefit analysis, as it is frequently done nowadays. Improving 
consistency in the WTP estimates by means of design and methodological aspects is a key to 
understanding the potential of both techniques for policy analysis. 
Stated willingness to pay is influenced by the perceived consequences for future policy 
and by past respondents’ experiences with payments and use of care. 
In CV, hypothetical or strategic bias arises when the respondents understate or overstate their 
true WTP. The empirical strategy for detecting these patterns is a stochastic frontier 
estimation where the skewness of WTP data is treated as a representation of overstatement 
(upward skewness) or understatement (downward skewness). In Chapter 6 of this dissertation, 
we show that the application of the stochastic frontier model of WTP to assess the patterns of 
hypothetical/strategic bias leads to different conclusions in different countries. Consequently, 
this bias correction mechanism is not transferrable across countries. 
We identify three factors which can explain the variation in the skewness of WTP across 
countries: the perceived impact on actual policy, the relevance and desirability of the valued 
changes, and the past experiences with payments. These factors provide an interpretation of 
our intra-country and cross-country findings.  
In countries, where obligatory patient charges are widespread and price increases are 
considered by the government, respondents might conceal their ‘true WTP’ due to fear of the 
consequential price increase. In particular, we found that in Bulgaria where obligatory patient 
charges for basic services are widely applied and the increase in their levels is under 
discussion (Radu, 2010; Atanasova et al, 2011), there is a downward skewness and the 
majority of the WTP answers are concentrated around the upper bound. Moreover, frequent 
users in Bulgaria, who are prone to pay and thus are most affected by charge increases, are 
even more likely to have a downward skewness in WTP (understated ‘true WTP’) compared 
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to other Bulgarian respondents. Thus, despite the urgent need of quality and access 
improvements in the public health care sector (Atanasova et al., 2011), the high likelihood of 
an actual price increase makes some of the respondents understate their ‘true’ WTP. 
In countries where actual price increases are unlikely to happen (obligatory patient charges 
are limited and their extension is not under discussion), the desire for improvements might 
lead to overstatement of the ‘true WTP’. In Hungary, where obligatory patient charges for 
basic services were in effect for one year but were abolished (Baji et al., 2011), and the 
reintroduction is prohibited for a certain period of time, the majority of the WTP answers are 
rather symmetrically distributed around the ‘true WTP’. In the rest of the countries in the 
study, i.e. Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine, where obligatory patient charges for 
basic services were an unlikely policy action or were limited at the moment of data collection, 
upward skewness (overstatement of ‘true WTP’) is observed.  
Thus, the strategic answering patterns (under- and overstatement) might be seen as the result 
of a trade-off a respondent makes between the desirability of changes described in the 
valuation task (i.e. quality and access improvements) and the likelihood of an actual price 
increase as a consequence of the survey perceived by the respondent (Hoehn and Randall, 
1987). At the same time, the desirability of changes described in the valuation task (i.e. 
quality and access improvements) might be valued differently in different countries 
depending on the actual need of such changes (lower in countries where changes are less 
needed and higher in countries where changes are more needed).  
Our findings suggest that there is much more heterogeneity in stated WTP than that which 
could be explained by observed factors, and part of it is related to the perceived likelihood of 
payment changes as a consequence of the survey. The application of a stochastic frontier 
model is a good strategy to discover strategic answering patterns assuming some portion of 
true WTP in the data. However, such estimations might be improved by the application of a 
two-tiered stochastic frontier model where simultaneously over- and understatement are 
allowed. Combining latent class models with stochastic frontier estimation may also allow 
distinguishing latent population groups with own over- and understatement patterns. From a 
policy-making perspective, when conservative WTP estimates are sought, downward 
calibration after estimating stochastic frontier may provide valuable information. Upward 
calibration, in contrast, should be approached with caution and is not suitable in this 
framework. As explained for the case of Bulgaria, upward calibration can be used when WTP 
data are used for prioritizing government investments but not for pricing decisions.  
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Different mechanisms underlie the decision to be willing to pay and the level of 
willingness to pay. 
Based on data from Ukraine (see Chapter 4), we found that different mechanisms drive the 
decision about being willing to pay and the decision about the level of WTP. The level of 
WTP, once the decision to be willing to pay is taken, is mostly explained by economic status, 
i.e. level of monetary income. In the decision to be unwilling to pay, two separate motivations 
may be distinguished: inability and objection. Inability is related to the perceived income 
level (despite its monetary value) while the likelihood of objection is not related to the 
observed economic characteristics of the respondents. We also observe that a person stating 
inability to pay is less likely to pay in real life for a visit to a physician while stated objection 
to pay is not related to the respective behavior in real life. 
Our results support the current practice in the CV literature of dealing with the decision on 
being willing to pay and the stated WTP level as separate decision steps. They are also in line 
with econometric considerations about biased results of the simple Tobit I specification (e.g. 
Yoo et al., 2001) where only the second stage decision, i.e. level of WTP, is explicitly 
modeled. Our results suggest that the model specification should allow for the possibility of 
different factors explaining different decision steps, which is most often done in the CV 
literature. The first stage decision might be seen as a perceptional issue, while to define the 
level of WTP, respondents most likely anchor on real budgetary constraint and needs. 
The distinction between true zeros and protesters in CV studies is an important analytical 
choice affecting the results (Boyle, 2003). The question about the motivation for being unable 
to pay helps in making this distinction. Absence of a relation between stated objection to pay 
and making payment in real life makes it clear that this motivation indicates that the zero 
answer is more likely to be a ‘protest’ and in real life a person would not necessarily attach 
zero value to the service offered. Reporting inability to pay, in contrast, is associated with not 
paying for the services consumed in real life (with odds ratio to those who paid of 4.65). 
Thus, the concentration of ‘true’ zeros among those who sate inability is much higher. 
However, for none of the reported motivations (i.e. inability and objection), can an exact 
conclusion about ‘truthfulness’ of the zero WTP be made.  
Given these results, a conservative strategy for dealing with zero answers would be excluding 
only pure protesters, i.e. those who object only, from the analysis of the WTP level. In this 
case, a relatively small part of true zeros among those who object will be ignored, but a small 
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part of protesters of those who state inability will be included. The resulting trade-off between 
omitting true zeros and including protesters is not clear. Further research could focus on 
design strategies to derive ‘true scores’ or ‘true functions’ which represent or predict the 
propensity of being true zero WTP for the answers stating unwillingness to pay depending on 
motivation and other covariates. This will require study designs where stated WTP questions 
would be followed by real life experiments. 
7.2.2 Policy implications for the design of patient payments in Central and 
Eastern Europe  
This subsection presents the main findings of this dissertation with regards to the policy 
implications for the CEE countries formulated based on the application of the SP techniques 
to the assessment of patient payments for the physician services in these countries. We show 
that unregulated patient payments represent a burden in the CEE countries and argue that with 
proper policy designs, official patient payments might be an acceptable policy tool. 
Current unregulated out-of-pocket payments for physician services represent a 
substantial financial burden to patients in Central and Eastern European countries. 
In Chapter 6, of this dissertation, a comparison of the actual annual expenditure by individuals 
on outpatient physician services to WTP for such services of high quality and quick access 
was made. It was shown that in Romania and Ukraine, where informal charges are mostly 
spread, people spend more on the physician services of common quality than their stated 
willingness and ability to pay for high quality service. When downward calibration of WTP 
accounting for possible overstatement is applied, the same is also observed in Lithuania.  
This evidence brings up the idea that current unregulated informal and quasi-formal charges 
that are prevalent in the three countries mentioned above (Murauskiene et al., 2012; Belli, 
2003; Danyliv et al., 2012b), are a substantial financial burden to the public. It is recognized 
that these payments impair access and are regressive as they impose more burden to the lower 
income groups (Atanasova et al., 2012; Baji et al., 2012b; Szende and Culyer, 2006; 
Murauskiene et al., 2012; Danyliv et al., 2012b; Lewis, 2000). 
It should be noted, however, that in case of Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine, we talk about 
informal and quasi-formal charges, which are not regulated by the government. These charges 
do not account for the population’s ability to pay and make no formal exemptions for 
vulnerable groups, thus, being highly regressive in theory and in practice (Szende and Culyer, 
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2006; Lewis, 2007). Moreover, out-of-pocket payments might also impose a higher burden 
for groups with higher health care needs (Golinowska and Tambor, 2012) and, thus, 
unregulated charges without upper limits may have impoverishing effects in case of major 
health problems. 
Thus, current out-of-pocket patient payments which are not regulated are a burden to patients 
in CEE countries, especially to low-income and vulnerable groups. They are non-transparent 
(patients usually do not know what amount they have to pay after service provision) and do 
not account for patients socio-economic status. Measures to formalize health expenditure 
should become a policy priority, especially in Lithuania, Romania, and Ukraine, but also in 
the CEE region in general. Introduction of the official charges (Jakab and Kutzin, 2009; 
Baschieri and Falkingham, 2006; Barber et al, 2004; Akashi et al., 2004) and severe 
anticorruption measures (Golinowska, 2010) might be seen as a response to these payments. 
Under certain conditions patient payments are an acceptable policy tool in Central and 
Eastern European countries. 
Substantial shares of the population in the six CEE countries included in the study are willing 
to pay for physician services provided that the services are of adequate quality and access. 
WTP ranges from 66.5% in Hungary to 81.43% in Romania (see Chapter 5). The level of 
WTP for the physician services is also substantial in all six countries. WTP levels in this 
study may be more precisely considered as WATP due to the wording of the tasks. Even with 
this correction, the mean and median levels of WATP represent rather high amounts when 
compared to the indication of the service cost. They are higher than the cost of services in 
Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine, nearly equal to service cost in Bulgaria, and equal to a 
rather substantial part of the service cost in Poland and Lithuania. Even if downward 
calibration of the stated WATP is applied (see Chapter 6) the mean WATP still represents not 
less than 50% of the service cost. 
The amount of patient charges for basic services is usually set so that it does not cover the 
cost of the service, but only some share. Given that the level of WATP is comparable to at 
least half of the service cost, patient payments might have a good potential in all six countries 
in the study. The demand pool modeling (see Chapter 5) also demonstrates that low co-
payments of up to € 2.5 should not represent a high burden in the five countries, especially if 
exemptions for vulnerable groups are designed. Ukrainian consumers would react more 
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abruptly to the introduction of the small fee of up to € 2.5 and, hence, a more sensitive study 
tool should be applied to better elicit the preferences within this payment interval. 
All types of WTP modeling applied in this dissertation, i.e. direct WTP (Chapter 4), survival 
analysis (Chapter 5), and stochastic frontier modeling (Chapter 6), yield similar conclusions 
about socio-demographic and economic drivers of WTP. WTP and, consequently demand 
pools, are related to household income in five countries, but less in Ukraine. There, the well-
established payment practices (informal and quasi-formal payments) (Gryga et al., 2010) 
perhaps eliminate some variation in stated WTP due to common ideas in society about a fair 
price. In Ukraine, elderly people are less likely to be willing to pay and this tendency might 
be explained by the remnants of the communist views in this group as they still feel nostalgic 
about the old times of free social benefits (Survey, 2011). The observed demand differences 
across place of residence, which are observed in Hungary, but also in Bulgaria, Lithuania, and 
Poland are in line with the theoretical and empirical literature suggesting price discrimination 
by geographical area (McPake, 1993). 
Thus, the WTP data in all six countries suggest that payments might be seen as an acceptable 
policy tool in case adequate polices for protecting vulnerable groups are implemented, 
informal charges are eradicated, and feasible fee levels are established. The vulnerable groups 
subject to fee exemption might be based on household income level in Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania. In Ukraine, age should also be seen as an exemption 
criterion. A regional (place of residence) principle for fee segregation is harder to apply. The 
higher values expressed by dwellers of small cities in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Lithuania might 
actually be related to the relatively more difficult access to these services than in urban areas. 
This is the case in most countries despite the level of development (World Health 
Organization, 2008).  
Special attention in the patient payment policy should be devoted to the fee for direct referrals 
avoiding primary physician contact (GP or her counterparts). Based on DCE and CV data 
from Ukraine (Chapter 2 and 3), it is shown that there is no explicit preference in the 
population for addressing a GP or a medical specialist directly. However, groups with a 
higher socio-economic status might prefer direct referral. Given the positive effect of the gate-
keeping in terms of system efficiency (González, 2010; Zielinski et al., 2008; Starfield, 1992; 
Schwenkglenks et al., 2006), it might be a good strategy to impose penalizing fees for direct 
referrals, as it is in most CEE countries. With a very slight preference towards direct referral 
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(around € 0.6 per visit in Ukraine) the fee that will efficiently reduce this practice should not 
be high. 
A rather substantial challenge for the introduction of official patient charges is the existence 
of informal payments. There is a debate in the literature whether formal charges might 
substitute informal payments (Jakab and Kutzin, 2009; Baschieri and Falkingham, 2006; 
Barber et al, 2004; Akashi et al., 2004) or whether they will impose a double burden on a 
patient with regressive outcomes (e.g. Atanasova et al., 2012; Baji et al., 2012a; Rückert et 
al., 2008; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1992). Based on the analysis of Ukrainian data in this 
dissertation (Chapter 2), it is expected that there might also be a problem on the patient’s side 
in switching to formal charges as there is no explicit preference for paying formally over 
paying informally. This may transform into resistance to the introduction of official charges 
as patients might continue to pay informally if this is required by health care providers. The 
new payments may be considered not as an alternative, but as additional compulsory levies. 
More than that, official charges might be perceived as detached from personal communication 
with the physician and unlike informal payments not assuring quicker access and better 
quality of care. The positive side is that no reverse preference is observed and this is a signal 
that public attitudes can be changed. Therefore, the implementation of official charges should 
be supported by active measures to build social resistance towards informal payments, which 
is absent now.  
People in Central and Eastern European countries are willing to pay for quality and 
access, so patient payment policies should be tied to quality and access improvements. 
WTP for physician services is driven by the quality level of the services. Based on CV data 
from Ukraine, we outline in Chapter 4 that people place a high economic value on quality and 
access improvements. Thus, patient charges should be implemented together with effective 
investment policies targeted at improving quality and access. The probability to object to pay 
for these services is mostly explained by low quality/access characteristics. Additionally, the 
likelihood of the ability to pay and the level of positive WTP are positively and strongly 
related to the quality/access profile. Combined with the evidence that Ukrainians in general 
are not satisfied with the quality of care they receive (Gorshenin Institute, 2011), these 
findings underline the necessity of quality/access improvements in health care and patient 
charges may generate additional funds for these purposes. 
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Societal benefits (expressed through the increase in WTP) gained from quality improvements 
in the state of medical equipment, maintenance of the physician office, and reduction of 
waiting time is 16.5 UAH (€ 1.43) per visit to a GP and 23.0 UAH (€ 1.99) per visit to a 
medical specialist (for December 2009). This can be regarded as the investment potential in 
the increased quality of the services. The average salary in the heath sector in 2009 was € 135, 
and salaries constitute between 75% and 80% of the public health facilities. By indirect 
evidence the cost of service does not exceed € 3 – € 5 per physician consultation 
(reimbursement tariff for private insurance companies by Tverdokhlib and Horshkov, 2011). 
Thus, it is clear that even these, moderate in absolute numbers, investment amounts make a 
substantial share of the current cost of services.  
Quality improvements in Ukraine may not be achieved with infrastructural changes only (i.e. 
capital investments, organizational changes, better training). Physicians are the main quality 
agents in this case, but they are severely underpaid. This is one of the main reasons of the 
current widespread informal payments aimed to compensate for the lack of remuneration and 
assure better quality and quicker access to care. Thus, the official remuneration should be 
considered as one of the main quality investment components. Failure to account for 
physician needs in this process may cause resistance to changes and a continuation of 
selective care based on informal contributions. 
In Chapter 2, the relative importance of the quality and access characteristics of physician 
services in Ukraine is elicited through DCE. Apart from clinical excellence, which is the main 
quality indicator per se, the social quality and access characteristics play an important role in 
the choice of a physician. Above all, the most highly valued characteristic relates to the 
interpersonal aspects of care. A number of studies from other countries also find interpersonal 
aspects the most important value component (e.g. Vick and Scott, 1998; Coulter, 1995; Leon, 
2003; review by Wensing et al., 1998). 
In our study, the interpersonal aspects were represented by the attribute ‘attitude of the 
medical staff’. However, this is a broader concept which implies the need for attention, 
information, and involvement in care. The preference for these aspects is even more 
prominent among elderly people. All these issues are fully neglected now in the care 
provision process in Ukraine, and in public facilities patients are often treated arrogantly, not 
to mention completeness of the information and involvement in decisions (Gryga et al., 2010). 
Elderly people in Ukraine lack special care programs designed for their needs, and most often 
are treated as ‘close to dying’ and thus as such that do not require much attention (Bezrukov, 
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2003). Even informal payments cannot always assure a sufficient level of attention due to the 
lack of regulation (e.g. Vian et al., 2006). Thus, in the investment agenda, the training of 
medical staff in communicational skills should be given priority, especially for those 
specialists who provide care for elderly. Ideally, standards of care should establish minimal 
requirements to communication with patients. Feedback procedures should also enable that 
patients realize their rights to decent treatment and involvement in the decisions about their 
own health. 
Still, people highly value the clinical efficiency and safety of care, which was represented by 
the state of medical equipment. Preferences for good maintenance of the physician’s office 
and reduced travel and waiting time are approximately of the same magnitude. Therefore, 
policy interventions aimed to improve access and state of medical facilities should be given 
the same priority, and be ranked lower compared to improvements in interpersonal aspects of 
care and medical technology. The societal benefits gained from the improvement of some of 
these characteristics were mentioned above and may be considered as investment potential. 
Residents of rural areas lack most of these and, hence, place a higher value on well-
maintained premises which underlines the necessity of redistribution of capital investment to 
rural areas. 
 
7.3 Final conclusion 
This dissertation has shown, as anticipated in objective 7 of this dissertation, that despite the 
limitations discussed in Chapter 1, SP techniques provide useful information to policy makers 
which may help them in designing patient payment policies that correspond well to public 
preferences. This is especially valuable in CEE countries with a lack of experience with actual 
patient payments as there no data are available on actual reactions to official payment 
regimes. Values obtained via DCE could be used for the estimation of relative preferences, 
i.e. marginal WTP indicates only the relative importance of the quality and access 
characteristics. CV may be used for a holistic assessment of WTP, but still it is not a direct 
indication of the actual fee as it might be subject to hypothetical bias. On the other hand, in 
the absence of actual behavior data, CV measures might be used as an indication of the 
reservation price and, hence, for measuring possible consumer reactions to the fee variations. 
Country specific CV instruments may better account for meaningful payment differences, 
which are also related to the income level and disparities in the country. 
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In this dissertation, we addressed three methodological issues of the application of SP to the 
assessment of patient payment policies for physician services, i.e. consistency between the 
DCE and CV estimates of WTP (objective 3), the respondents’ decision process (the outcome 
of addressing objective 2), and the strategic answering patterns (objective 5). We also 
discussed three policy-related aspects based on our findings, i.e. the burden of current 
unregulated payments given the level of quality of the services (objective 6), the potential 
consumption reaction to the introduction of the patient charges (objective 4 and partly 
objective 2), and public preferences for quality and access improvements of the physician 
services (objective 1). 
The question of the correspondence and consistency between WTP estimates obtained from 
DCE and CV methods was addressed. Lack of consistency between them implies that 
obtaining holistic values of the services by integrating the marginal WTP across changes in 
attributes might be an erroneous approach, which nonetheless seems to be taken for granted 
by some researchers as was shown in Chapter 1. On the other hand, the consistency between 
the two approaches may be increased by enhancing the relevance of the valuation tasks to 
respondents, i.e. relevant attributes, meaningful attribute levels. The development of such 
strategies (e.g. accounting for valuation certainty, adaptive choice designs etc.) with thorough 
assessment of their impact on the consistency might eventually lead to a rather clear link 
between marginal and holistic WTP. 
In terms of modeling holistic WTP obtained in a CV task, the decision about stating positive 
WTP and about choosing its level are clearly separate decisions. Moreover, there might be a 
way to address the problem of distinction between the true zeros and protesters. In this 
dissertation, the distinction between the objection and inability motives was done and the 
latter seems more likely to be true zeros than the former. Further, techniques allowing for the 
assessment of the ‘true’ zero propensities based on the stated motivation are necessary in 
order to bring CV estimates closer to the real-life WTP. Simply ignoring the problem of true 
zeros might lead to biased estimates. 
The results of this dissertation also reveal that the strategic answering patterns in SP are 
related to the country context in terms of experience with and potential consequences for 
patient payments for the services under valuation. In a policy-making context, conservative 
WTP estimates may be obtained by the application of downward calibration techniques, e.g. 
based on stochastic frontier estimation. In countries where potential price consequences are 
likely, respondents might be concealing their true WTP. However, upward calibration is 
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unlikely to be adopted by policymakers. Inclusion of latent classes in the stochastic frontier 
estimation might separate WTP heterogeneity due to socio-demographic differences from the 
one due to strategic answering. 
Form a policy perspective, the results of this dissertation confirm that the current payment 
practices for physician services, which include unregulated informal and quasi-formal 
payments, represent a financial challenge to the CEE countries. In countries where they are 
most prevalent, there is a mismatch between public preferences for physician services and 
expenditure on them. That is the current level of quality and access does not correspond to the 
level of the charges born by patients. Therefore, measures targeted at both: a reduction of the 
informal charges and an increase in the quality of the services, would be beneficial. 
The decision on the acceptance of official charges (co-payments) for physician services is a 
multidimensional issue and involves broader considerations than just the results of modeling 
stated WTP. We attempted to show what would happen if they were accepted in CEE 
countries, based on the stated WTP. Our results demonstrate a potential consumption reaction 
to the introduction of certain levels of charges and the difference in the speed of this reaction 
in population groups. We find that on average rather substantial shares of the population in 
CEE countries are willing to pay, and by conservative estimates, the average WTP covers at 
least half of the service cost in these countries. The least harmful but efficiency enhancing 
strategy would be charges for self-referrals to specialists (avoiding the GP). In countries with 
well-established informal payment practices, however, formal charges would meet opposition 
unless public opinion, which tolerates informal payments at present, is changed. 
Finally, this dissertation makes a point of the necessity and structure of quality and access 
improvements of physician services in Ukraine. People are willing to pay for quality and 
access improvements in these services and the amounts represent a substantial part of the 
service cost. Notably, the highest value component in the service provision is the 
interpersonal aspects of care and, hence they should get most attention in the development of 
health care reform strategies. Nowadays however, most of the attention of Ukrainian policy 
makers is concentrated on infrastructural issues, such as maintenance and equipment of 
facilities (e.g. MOH, 2010) while the attitude of medical staff to patients is neglected. The 
results of this dissertation suggest that the prioritization should be changed or, at least, 
interpersonal aspects should appear on the agenda (not only in Ukraine but also in other CEE 
countries). 
Chapter 7 
146 
Our study demonstrates the way SP may be used to study potential effects of patient charges 
on health care consumption in non-existent markets. Patient charges for physician services, 
though ignored and dreaded in CEE countries, may be an efficient policy tool in light that 
people in these countries are ready and able to pay substantial amounts formally if the 
services are provided with adequate quality and quick access. The charges should be however 
supplemented with adequate exemption mechanisms to secure access to essential health care 
services. 
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Appendix A 
Brief methodological report on data collection:  
Small scale (pilot) survey in Ukraine in 2009 
 
The survey was subcontracted to Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). The 
questionnaire was developed by the research team and adjusted according to the 
recommendations of KIIS. Prior to the survey, a pre-test on a convenience sample of 55 
respondents was conducted. The questions were followed by a feedback from the respondents 
who described the problems with understanding or answering the questions. Based on the 
results of this pre-test, the questionnaire, stated preference tasks in particular, was revised and 
adjusted.  
The survey was carried out in December 2009 -January 2010. The fieldwork took place on 
December 11-28, 2009. An informed consent was obtained from all individuals included in 
the study. The study instruments and methodology were reviewed by the Institutional Review 
Board at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and a waiver from a full ethical 
review was obtained. 
To get a representative all-Ukrainian sample of 300 interviews for the limited budget of the 
pilot survey, KIIS proposed to employ a stratified, multi-stage area probability sample of a 
big nationwide study. This allowed reducing transportation costs. However, information about 
the non-response rate and, consequently, non-respondents’ characteristics was not available. 
Thus, the pilot survey interviews were added to the interview chain at the secondary sampling 
units. The sampling methodology was developed by the sub-contractor. The sample of 
households from which sample persons were selected, was based on randomly sampled voting 
precincts within proportionally sampled settlements (e.g., cities towns, villages). 
Stage 1: Selection of primary sampling units (settlements) 
Ukraine is divided into 24 regions (oblasts), Kyiv and the Crimea. Each oblast is divided into 
counties (rayons), and one city in each region is designated as the county center. In official 
statistics, the rural population consists only of villages; the urban population is defined as 
comprising all cities and urban type villages. The sample was stratified according to whether 
population points were considered urban or rural. At the first stage of the sample 
development, 110 primary sampling units were selected by probability proportional to size 
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principle. This consisted of 60 cities and towns, 13 urban type villages (PGT) and 36 villages. 
Nuclear infected territories around the Chernobyl and individuals permanently 
institutionalized in medical facilities, military quarters, and prisons were not covered in the 
sampling.  
Stage 2: Selection of secondary sampling units (voting precincts) 
Voting precincts were used as secondary sample units, because official statistics about them is 
accessible. They cover all territory of the country, are located more or less evenly, and have 
moderate size. Within each primary sampling unit, several voting precincts were randomly 
chosen taking into account the number of residential routes, which is proportional to the 
number of apartments. The number of selected voting precincts depended on the size of the 
ultimate clusters in the large nationwide survey. The sample of this pilot survey includes 207 
secondary sampling units. 1-2 respondents were interviewed in each secondary sampling unit. 
Stage 3: Household and respondent selection 
A randomized-number rule was used to select the street, household and apartment that the 
interviewer was to visit first. Before selecting ‘potential respondents’, an interviewer 
enumerates and lists adult (i.e., 18 and older) household members living in a consecutive run 
of apartments (i.e., from lower to higher apartment numbers) until he or she has a list of 
occupants sorted by (1) apartment, (2) gender, and (3) age. After generating a list of 
occupants, the interviewer seeks to recruit every third occupant for the study (i.e., the 3rd 
occupant is to be interviewed if the assignment for the secondary sampling unit is 1 interview, 
and the 3rd and the 6th are to be interviewed if the assignment includes 2 interviews). 
Overall 303 effective interviews were conducted during the fieldwork stage. 127 interviewers 
took part in the survey. 10% of interviews were controlled. That included the control analysis 
of interviewers’ diaries and control phone calls to check the fact and quality of the interviews 
in the selected households. As a consequence of the control, none of the questionnaires was 
removed from the final data file. The sample developed for the survey is representative for 
adult population of Ukraine – the resident population aged 18 and older; it is random at each 
step of selection. The summary statistics of the sample is presented in Table A.1. 
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Table A.1 Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample (303 respondents) 
Characteristic Observations 
Percent 
of total 
Percent of  
non-missing Mean (S.D.) 
Age   
aged 18-34 72 23.76% 23.76% 47.5 (16.2) 
aged 35-54 127 41.91% 41.91% valid n = 303 
aged 55+ 104 34.32% 34.32%   
Sex   
Male 98 32.34% 32.34%   
female 205 67.66% 67.66%   
Place of residence   
village 122 40.26% 40.26%   
town (20-500) 116 38.28% 38.28%   
big city (500+) or capital 65 21.45% 21.45%   
Education level   
lower than secondary 61 20.13% 20.20%   
secondary 174 57.43% 57.62%   
higher or degree 67 22.11% 22.19%   
(missing) 1 0.33%    
Health status   
absolutely sick to bad 49 16.17% 16.17%   
fair 139 45.87% 45.87%   
good to perfect 115 37.95% 37.95%   
Voluntary insurance policy   
no 287 94.72% 95.35%   
yes 14 4.62% 4.65%   
(missing) 2 0.66%    
Size of the household   
1 member  41 13.53% 13.53% 3.03 (1.56) 
2 or more members  262 86.47% 86.47% valid n = 303 
Number of children in the household   
no children  181 59.74% 60.33% 0.55 (0.84) 
1 or more children  119 39.27% 39.67% valid n = 300 
(missing) 3 0.99%    
Share of household members who do not work or earn   
less or one half of family not 
working 166 54.79% 54.97% 0.53 (0.35) 
more than half of family not 136 44.88% 45.03% valid n = 302 
(missing) 1 0.33%    
Income (descriptive)   
not sufficient 105 34.65% 35.71%   
meets the need 126 41.58% 42.86%   
allows saving 63 20.79% 21.43%   
(missing) 9 2.97%    
Total 303 100% 100%   
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Table A.1 (continued) Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample (303 respondents) 
Characteristic Observations 
Percentage  
of total 
Percentage 
of  
non-missing 
Mean (S.D.) 
Income (level, UAH)   
1000 UAH or less 58 19.14% 21.72% 2 346.8 (1 781.1) 
from 1001 to 2000 UAH 104 34.32% 38.95% valid n = 267 
from 2001 to 4000 UAH 66 21.78% 24.72%   
4001 UAH and more 39 12.87% 14.61%   
(missing) 36 11.88%     
Experience in visiting and paying to a physician   
did not visit 55 18.15% 18.97%   
visited did not pay 101 33.33% 34.83%   
visited and paid 134 44.22% 46.21%   
(missing) 13 4.29%    
Total 303 100% 100%   
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Appendix B 
Brief methodological report on data collection: 
Survey from six CEE countries in 201011 
 
The data collection took a form of household survey carried out in July 2010 in six CEE 
countries - Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Ukraine. The data collection 
was sub-contracted to Gallup International. The subcontractor used the survey questionnaire 
developed by the research team. The questionnaire and its translations were adjusted based on 
recommendations by the sub-contractor. The sub-contractor was responsible for the 
preparation of the data collection, the data-collection and the creation of the database. 
The objective of the survey was to provide quantitative data on past payments for health care 
services, data on preferences and willingness to pay for health care improvements. The 
objective also was to provide data comparable across the countries. For this purpose, the 
questionnaire for all countries was identical, and the data collection process took place 
simultaneously in all six countries in a compact period of time – 20 calendar days. In all 
countries, the surveys were conducted based on face-to-face individual interviews. The 
respondents were identified using the same sampling methodology for all countries. The aim 
was to have 1000 effective interviews per country that present samples representativeness of 
the countries. 
The sampling methodology was developed by the sub-contractor. It was based on a multi-
staged random probability method: 
Stage 1: Distribution of sampling points. 
The sampling points in each country were distributed proportionally to regional, urban/rural 
and ethnic characteristics of the population. Within each region, the cities and towns 
belonging to the same group were put in an alphabetical order. The cities and towns included 
in the survey, were selected at random from that list. The number of sampling points in the 
                                               
11 The survey represented the first wave of data collection held within the framework of the International Project 
ASSPRO CEE 2007 (Assessment of patient payment policies and projection of their efficiency, equity and 
quality effects: The case of Central and Eastern Europe). The Project was financed by the European Commission 
under FP7 Theme 8 Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities, Grant Agreement no. 217431. For details see: 
www.assprocee2007.com 
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rural areas was calculated based on the ratio urban/rural population in a country. In total, there 
were ca. 150 sampling points per country. 
Stage 2: Selection of addresses/ households. 
The objective was to identify, 8-10 respondents per sampling point. To select 
addresses/households of potential respondents, the random route method was used. For each 
sampling point, a starting point and direction were determined. The household selected for the 
survey was every forth address on the left-hand side of the street in urban areas, turning left at 
intersections and, after reaching a dead end, going back to the last crossing and further 
proceeding at random. In a block-of-flats of up to four floors, every fifth apartment household 
was selected, counting from the first apartment on the left of the ground floor. In cases of 
unsuitable household, the interviewers approached the apartment next-door and continued 
doing this until reaching a suitable household. At that point, the interviews resume the 
standard step of every fifth apartment. In a block-of-flats of 5 floors and more, the selection is 
every tenth apartment. In rural areas, every fourth inhabitable house on both sides of the 
interviewer’s route was selected. In compounds of several houses behind a common fence, the 
interviewer had to select the fourth one from the left (counting from the gate), or if there were 
less than four houses behind a common fence, then the interviewer went out of the common 
yard, counting the houses as if they were along the street. 
Stage 3: Selection of the respondent within the household selected. 
The selection of the respondent within the selected household was done by using the “last 
birthday” principle. In this procedure, the interviewer asked to speak to the adult member of 
the household who had the last birthday. The last-birthday method is based on the assumption 
that the assignment of birthdates is a random process and also every household member has 
an equal chance of being selected. Only one individual per household was interviewed. 
Stage 4: Replacement of the respondent/household. 
If the respondent determined on stage 3 refused or was unavailable to take part in an interview 
after two call backs recorded in the fieldwork report, a replacing respondent was identified 
following stage 2-3. The sampling procedure described above, is known as an efficient 
method for selecting a sample representative for the population for a particular country. It is 
proven by practice that the sample produced by this method does not differ significantly from 
the official statistical data on age, gender and other demographic parameters. The sub-
contractor organised and managed the interviewers’ training to clarify the fieldwork standards 
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and the specificities of the questionnaire. A high number of interviewers were involved in the 
survey to avoid the interviewer bias that might occur when one interviewer carries out many 
interviews.  
The final number of effective interviews in the dataset, number of interviewers per country, 
and median duration of interview are presented in Table B.1. The duration of the interviews 
was as expected – on average 30 min per interview. Number of effective interviews is no less 
than 1000 in each country.About 10% of all interviews per country were verified (re-
contacted) either by telephone or in person by the sub-contractor. The verifications of the 
interviews confirmed that that the interviews were carried out in reality. The sub-contractor 
entered the data collected according to the preliminary data entry mask consulted and agreed 
with the research team.  
 
Table B.1 Short summary of the results of data collection 
 Bulgaria Hungary Lithuania Poland Romania Ukraine 
Number of effective 
interviews (respondents) 1003 1037 1012 1000 1000 1000 
Total number 
of interviewers 108 130 84 70 100 111 
Median duration of 
interviews (minutes) 35.00 35.00 33.00 27.00 30.00 32.00 
 
The sub-contractor also performed the standard data cleanup and logical checks procedures. 
The research team checked the representativeness of the sample and the overall quality of the 
dataset. The sample characteristics related to age, gender place of residence and household 
income are overall comparable to the countries’ national statistics. The descriptive statistics of 
the samples are presented in Table B.2. 
 
Table B.2 Descriptive characteristics of the study samples 
  Bulgaria Hungary Lithuania Poland Romania Ukraine 
Total number of the respondents 1003 1037 1012 1000 1000 1000 
Categorical characteristics 
Sex male 46.86% 46.38% 43.18% 47.00% 41.70% 41.50% 
female 53.14% 53.62% 56.82% 53.00% 58.30% 58.50% 
Place of 
residence 
village 29.81% 29.22% 33.60% 37.00% 43.80% 31.50% 
town 44.37% 50.92% 39.13% 40.00% 33.70% 32.80% 
city 25.82% 19.86% 27.27% 23.00% 22.50% 35.70% 
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Table B.2 (continued) Descriptive characteristics of the study samples 
  Bulgaria Hungary Lithuania Poland Romania Ukraine 
Categorical characteristics 
Education 
level 
≤ lower/secondary 22.93% 51.01% 12.65% 25.05% 23.10% 7.30% 
upper secondary 53.84% 32.50% 42.89% 61.22% 50.70% 62.40% 
≥ post-secondary  23.23% 16.49% 44.47% 13.73% 26.20% 30.30% 
Self-reported 
health status 
very bad or bad 13.81% 11.86% 9.29% 12.20% 15.90% 24.00% 
Fair 27.33% 27.39% 37.55% 25.90% 29.80% 49.20% 
Good 33.13% 34.23% 33.20% 32.50% 38.40% 19.00% 
very good/perfect 25.73% 26.52% 19.96% 29.40% 15.90% 7.80% 
Chronic 
disease 
any 47.36% 45.13% 47.33% 35.50% 42.60% 46.00% 
diabetes 8.20% 10.51% 4.94% 6.50% 7.00% 3.50% 
cardio-vascular 33.60% 31.63% 27.96% 19.50% 28.50% 27.10% 
kidney,liver,lung 10.10% 5.59% 10.67% 4.50% 12.70% 14.50% 
other problems 23.94% 20.93% 29.15% 21.50% 21.40% 28.50% 
Perceived 
level of 
income 
not sufficient 36.09% 24.61% 23.06% 15.50% 38.24% 29.11% 
meets expenses 55.02% 48.25% 47.32% 48.97% 43.09% 55.67% 
allows saving 8.89% 27.14% 29.62% 35.52% 18.67% 15.22% 
Willingness to 
pay 
Willing 75.96% 66.54% 80.90% 72.96% 81.43% 73.47% 
(s.e.) 1.36% 1.47% 1.24% 1.41% 1.24% 1.40% 
Not willing 24.04% 33.46% 19.10% 27.04% 18.57% 26.53% 
(s.e.) 1.36% 1.47% 1.24% 1.41% 1.24% 1.40% 
Continuous characteristics 
Age, years mean 50.49 46.34 46.38 44.12 48.49 48.56 
(s.e.) 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.56 
Monthly household 
 income, €  
mean 358.01 587.10 531.40 733.16 357.34 252.66 
(s.e.) 8.77 10.29 13.93 14.31 10.61 5.32 
Size of the household,  
members 
mean 2.90 2.66 2.61 3.10 2.63 2.83 
(s.e.) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Monthly income 
 per person, €  
mean 135.87 252.15 225.73 273.81 157.82 101.02 
(s.e.) 3.14 4.33 5.54 5.45 5.70 2.43 
Number of children mean 0.44 0.47 0.56 0.61 0.50 0.56 
(s.e.) 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Number of members  
with chronic disease 
mean 0.80 0.61 0.63 0.59 0.57 0.77 
(s.e.) 0.81 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.73 0.81 
Payment experience in the past year for outpatient physian services    
Number of visits mean 4.48 5.26 3.67 3.78 3.24 1.98 
(s.e.) 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.12 
All types of payments, 
€  
mean 16.81 16.85 26.98 14.35 48.92 19.91 
(s.e.) 2.46 1.90 3.09 1.56 8.76 2.43 
Informal payments, €  mean 3.40 9.99 11.77 3.48 14.68 6.81 
(s.e.) 1.37 1.20 2.14 0.76 2.94 1.01 
Official payments, €  mean 13.18 6.96 15.19 10.79 33.90 13.03 
(s.e.) 2.00 1.05 1.88 1.20 6.62 1.85 
Willingness and ability to pay for the services of medical specialists    
All zeros included, €  mean 6.63 9.05 9.63 10.97 8.94 4.92 
(s.e.) 0.23 0.58 0.43 0.45 0.42 0.23 
median 7.50 5.26 7.43 9.76 6.98 4.12 
Only positive, €  mean 8.79 13.91 11.95 15.11 11.16 6.77 
(s.e.) 0.25 0.83 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.29 
median 7.50 10.00 8.57 12.20 7.44 5.15 
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Appendix C 
Examples of the valuation tasks used in the small  
scale survey in Ukraine in 2009 
An example of a discrete choice task  
Question: Imagine you have some major or severe symptoms. 
[Description for the interviewer: Major or severe symptoms are those that are unfamiliar or badly familiar to 
you, you are anxious if they pass or aggravate, they may cause discomfort and prevent from usual activities, you 
may have pain up to very severe. These symptoms make you think of referral to a physician]. 
Given this and taking into account your real life situation, which of the physicians from each pair (A or B) would 
you choose if you met the following choices in the real market? Please perform all 16 choice tasks. 
Characteristics that differ across two physicians are bolded. 
 
Choice # 
Physician A 
• General practitioner [district/family 
doctor/internist] 
• Outdated medical equipment  
• Old looking physician’s office 
• Polite treatment of medical staff 
• 15 min travelling to the office  
• 45 min waiting in front of the office  
• 20 UAH out of the patient’s pocket 
• Informal payment 
Physician B 
• General practitioner [district/family 
doctor/internist] 
• Out-dated medical equipment  
• Old-looking physician’s office 
• Arrogant treatment of medical staff 
• 15 min travelling to the office  
• 10 min waiting in front of the office  
• 20 UAH out of the patient’s pocket 
• Informal payment 
If you had to choose what physician would you choose? 
□ A  □ B 
 
An example of a contingent valuation task 
 
Question If the Government would invest into health care so that characteristics of 
the abovementioned physician would improve to the following: 
• General practitioner [district doctor / internist, family doctor] 
• Modern medical equipment  
• Renovated physician’s office 
• Polite treatment of medical staff 
• 15 min travelling to the office  
• 10 min waiting in front of the office 
would you be willing to pay official fee for each visit? 
  Yes 
 No 
 
 
    
If no: What is the reason for your unwillingness to pay?   
 1 = Not able to pay    
 2 = Object to pay for this medical service    
 3 = Not able to pay and object to pay for this medical service   
    
If yes: What is the maximum amount of money that you are willing to pay?   
 1 = Less than 20 UAH   
 2 = Between 20 and 60 UAH   
 3 = Between 60 and 100 UAH  
4 = More than 100 UAH 
  
    
 How much exactly?  UAH 
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Appendix D 
An example of a CV task used in the full 
 scale survey in six CEE countries in 2010. 
Next questions concern your WILLINGNESS and ABILITY to pay for medical services provided by the state or 
included in the social health insurance package. Imagine that you could obtain these services with GOOD 
QUALITY and QUICK ACCESS if you pay an OFFICIAL FEE to the health care facility (e.g. polyclinic, clinic 
or hospital).  
 
SHOW CARD 
This card presents the meaning of good quality and quick access.  
GOOD QUALITY would mean: 
- Modern medical equipment 
- Renovated health care facility  
- Polite staff with good reputation and skills 
QUICK ACCESS would mean: 
- Max 30 min travelling to the health care facility 
- Max 10 min waiting in front of the physician office  
- Max 1 month waiting for a planned surgery 
At the bottom of the card, you can also see possible fees intervals regarding physician’s and hospital services. 
Higher fee would mean better quality and quicker access. Fees are fixed prices and are not necessarily 
dependent on the service costs, since a part of the costs are covered by public funds. 
 
Q.1 In case you experience a MAJOR HEALTH PROBLEM (unfamiliar symptoms that make you concerned), 
will you be willing to pay an official fee for a consultation and examination by a MEDICAL SPECIALIST in 
order to obtain services with good quality and quick access as described in the card? 
 YES -> go to Q.2 
 NO -> skip Q.2 
 
Q.2 Considering the fee intervals regarding physician’s services shown on the card, how much exactly are 
you WILLING and ABLE to pay for such visit in order to obtain services with good quality and quick 
access? 
If the respondents states an interval, ask for an exact amount. If the respondent is not able to indicate an 
exact amount, fill in the midpoint of the interval. 
Midpoints:  
Less than 5.- Euro   (midpoint 2.50 Euro) 
From 5.- to  10.- Euro  (midpoint 7.50 Euro) 
More than 10.- Euro   (midpoint 12.50 Euro) 
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Summary       
 
Willingness to pay derived using stated preference techniques (i.e. valuation methods, 
assessing willingness to pay for certain benefits in hypothetical purchase or choice scenarios) 
is increasingly used for the valuation of health care benefits. The use of stated preference 
techniques is conditioned by their ability to provide monetary values for previously unknown 
or non-traded benefits for which no proxy markets are known. Another advantage is that 
stated preference techniques capture passive use values, i.e. utility obtained from the mere 
availability of a benefit without usage, which is especially relevant in health care. 
Nonetheless, stated preference techniques have gained very limited space in the assessment of 
patient charges and their design. This might be due to uncertainty whether stated willingness 
to pay actually reflects the willingness to pay in real world decisions. This uncertainty is 
known as hypothetical bias. Moreover, the two main stated preference techniques, discrete 
choice experiments and contingent valuation, do not demonstrate convergence in their 
valuation measures. 
Despite the abovementioned problems, stated preference techniques, if appropriately 
designed, are recognized as a valid tool for the valuation of environmental benefits. By the 
same token, in many health care systems, where health benefits have never been traded, stated 
preference techniques are the only way of assessing patients’ willingness to pay. This is the 
case in many post-socialist Central and Eastern European countries where formal patient 
charges for health care services are not common. 
Patient charges for physician services are advised as an efficient policy tool for the reduction 
of unnecessary use of services, superseding informal charges (which are widespread in 
Central and Eastern European countries) and to some extent as an additional source of health 
care funding. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, in the post-socialistic context, many 
countries are reluctant to undertake such unpopular measures as the introduction of formal 
charges for physician visits. This ignorance, however, lacks evidence from the assessment of 
patient charges and their effects. Most of the evidence is based on revealed preference data 
(i.e. data or past service utilization) and, hence, comes from Western Europe, USA, and some 
Asian countries, where patient charges are already effectively implemented. For Central and 
Eastern European countries such evidence is lacking. 
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As outlined in Chapter 1, the overall aim of this dissertation is to apply stated preference 
techniques in order to study the willingness to pay for physician services in Central and 
Eastern European countries, and to analyze to what extent willingness to pay estimates can be 
used in the assessment of patient charges for physician services. The following countries are 
included in the study: Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine. These 
countries present a relevant context for a cross-country comparison given the past similarities 
in their health care sectors during the communist period, as well as the different pace of health 
care reforms during the post-communist era. 
 
For the purpose of the dissertation, the following objectives are defined: 
1. To investigate aspects of the value added of physician services by determining the 
marginal willingness to pay for service quality and access characteristics using a 
discrete choice experiment technique. 
2. To study the socio-economic and demographic drivers of the willingness to pay and 
level of the willingness to pay for physician services using a contingent valuation 
technique. 
3. To compare the willingness to pay estimates from the two main stated preferences 
techniques, i.e. discrete choice experiment and contingent valuation, in terms of their 
consistency. 
4. To use the stated willingness to pay values to define the potential demand pools at 
different levels of patient charges for physician services. 
5. To assess the possible overestimation of the willingness to pay by the respondents 
using calibration techniques. 
6. To compare willingness to pay estimates with service cost and actual payments. 
7. To discuss the implications of the willingness to pay estimates for determining 
feasible levels of patient charges for physician services and for the overall assessment 
of patient payment policies. 
 
The above objectives are applied to physician services in the health care systems of the six 
Central and Eastern European countries mentioned above. In all countries, except for Ukraine, 
social health insurance systems have been introduced. In Ukraine, a publicly funded system 
(the so called Semashko system of USSR) still exists. In most of these countries there are 
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patient charges for commodities (pharmaceuticals and devices). However, patient charges for 
basic health care services are not common. Only in Bulgaria, a relatively low fee of around 
€ 1 for a visit to a physician was introduced in 2000 and still functions. In Hungary, a small 
visit fee of about € 1 existed for about one year in 2007 but was abolished at a national 
referendum in 2008. In the other four countries, formal patient charges during the time this 
research was conducted were applied only to the services outside the basic service package. In 
all countries however, quasi-formal charges set by health care providers in the absence of 
clear government regulations, as well as informal (under-the-table) payments exist at all 
levels of health care provision, including physician services.  
 
The first three objectives of the dissertation are dealt with by an application of discrete choice 
experiments and contingent valuation tasks in a small scale survey in Ukraine. Chapters 2 
through 4 are devoted to the analysis of the data collected in this survey. The fourth and the 
fifth objectives are the main research questions in Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation 
respectively. To tackle these objectives at a cross-country level, we use the willingness to pay 
estimates from the contingent valuation tasks in the representative surveys held in the six 
Central and Eastern European countries in July-August 2010. The sample in each country is 
representative of the adult population of the country and contains around 1 000 respondents. 
Calibration is conducted by applying a stochastic frontier model. Potential demand pools are 
built by the application of a semi-parametric survival analysis to willingness to pay data. 
Eventually, the results of the two last chapters allow addressing the two last objectives of this 
dissertation. More broadly, the relevance and reliability of these results are addressed in the 
general discussion of the dissertation (Chapter 7). 
 
Chapter 2 provides evidence on the preferences of Ukrainian consumers for health care 
improvements, which can help to design reforms that reflect societal priorities. In particular, 
Chapter 2 aims to elicit and to place monetary values on public preferences for outpatient 
physician services in Ukraine. The method of discrete choice experiment is used on a sample 
of 303 respondents, representative for the Ukrainian population. The random effect logit 
model with interactions provides the best fit for the data and is used to calculate the marginal 
willingness to pay for quality and access improvements.  
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At a sample level, there is no clear preference to pay formally rather than informally or vice 
versa. We also do not find that visiting a general practitioner is preferred over direct access to 
a medical specialist. However, there are differences between population groups. Quality-
related attributes of physician services appear to be important to respondents, especially the 
attitude of medical staff. Thus, the improvement of interpersonal aspects of outpatient care 
should be given priority when deciding on investments in quality improvements in Ukraine. 
Other aspects, i.e. social quality and access, are important as well but their improvement 
brings fewer social gains.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the potential and feasibility of official patient charges for public health 
care services in Ukraine by studying the patterns of fee acceptability, ability and willingness 
to pay for public health care across population groups. We use contingent valuation data 
collected from 303 respondents representative of the adult Ukrainian population. Three 
decision points were separated: objection to pay, inability to pay, and level of positive non-
zero willingness to pay. These decisions were studied for relations with quality profiles of the 
services, and socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents and their households.  
The likelihood to object to pay is found to be mostly determined by quality characteristics of 
the services. Objection to pay is not related to respective behavior in real life. The likelihood 
of being unable to pay is associated with older age, a larger share of nonearning household 
members and a lower income. The level of positive willingness to pay is positively related to 
income (+7% per 1000 UAH increase in income) and is lower for people who visited a 
physician but did not pay (-22%). The rather substantial willingness to pay levels (between 
0.9% and 1.9% of household income) for one visit to a physician, indicate a potential for 
official patient charges in Ukraine. The patterns of inability to pay support the need of 
exemption criteria based on age, income, and other aspects of economic status. The 
willingness to pay patterns highlight the necessity for payments that are proportional to 
income.  
 
As explained in Chapter 4, discrete choice experiments and contingent valuation are often 
applied to value health care benefits. However, whether the two techniques yield converging 
willingness to pay estimates is not studied well. Thus, Chapter 4 aims to compare at a 
disaggregated level the willingness to pay estimates for physician services obtained from a 
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discrete choice experiment and from a contingent valuation study (the two studies presented 
in Chapter 2 and 3). We study the consistency between the estimates and whether there are 
systematic differences between the two types of estimates. The same as for Chapter 2 and 3, 
the analysis is based on data from a household survey in Ukraine that includes 303 
respondents and is taken to be representative of the Ukrainian population. The respondents 
participated in both the discrete choice experiment (16 choice tasks) and contingent valuation 
(4 valuation scenarios) in the form of a payment scale followed by open-ended questions 
about the exact maximum willingness to pay.  
We find that the discrete choice experiment produces higher willingness to pay estimates than 
the contingent valuation does, and the estimates are not consistent across the two techniques. 
A difference between the willingness to pay estimates from the discrete choice experiment 
over those derived from the contingent valuation technique is found (i) for respondents who 
do not discriminate well between the profiles, and (ii) for an increase in the presented attribute 
level changes. The implications for achieving better convergence between the willingness to 
pay estimates from the two techniques are discussed. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 5, patient charges for health care services are implemented in 
developed countries to reduce unnecessary service use. However, evidence on their potential 
effects in Central and Eastern Europe is lacking. Thus, in Chapter 5, we provide evidence on 
the potential impact of patient charges on the consumption of specialized physician services 
in the six Central and Eastern European countries included in this dissertation: Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. We apply a semi-parametric survival 
analysis to the stated willingness and ability to pay in order to identify potential demand 
pools, i.e. shares of population willing and able to pay a certain fee in case they need a 
service, and we also calculate price, income and age semi-elasticities. Data are collected 
through national surveys held in 2010 among representative samples of about 1000 
respondents in each of the six Central and Eastern European countries included in the 
analysis.  
Our results suggest that median willingness and ability to pay in the studied countries ranges 
from € 5.15 to € 12.2 and the country ranking by willingness and ability to pay follows 
exactly the ranking by income level. Low service charges, up to € 2.5 in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Lithuania and Romania, and up to € 5 in Poland should not cause many people to drop out of 
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the demand pool. The lower payment interval should be studied in more detail for Ukraine, 
however, with a more sensitive scale. Official service charges together with 
exemption/reduction criteria are argued to be beneficial as an alternative to informal 
payments.  
 
Chapter 6 is devoted to the proper assessment of skewed willingness to pay data for 
specialized physician services. The analysis is based on the same data as in Chapter 5, i.e. 
contingent valuation data from six CEE countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, and Ukraine. The willingness to pay levels are modeled with a stochastic frontier 
regression accounting for positive and negative skewness, assumed to be representing 
overstatement and understatement of the true level of willingness and ability to pay 
respectively. The willingness to pay levels are calibrated based on individual predictions of 
the inefficiency scores. The raw and calibrated willingness to pay levels are compared to 
actual expenditure by making annual predictions for expenditure if respondents were actually 
paying amounts equal to their willingness to pay.  
Our results suggest that the skewness of willingness to pay across countries is explained by 
the interaction of three main factors: the perceived impact on actual policy, relevance and 
desirability of the valued changes, and past use of the services. In countries, where obligatory 
patient charges are in effect and, consequently, price increases are likely, respondents might 
conceal their ‘true willingness to pay’, especially the users. In countries where actual price 
increases are unlikely to happen, in contrast, the desire for improvements might lead to 
overstatement of the ‘true willingness to pay’, especially infrequent or non-users. Despite the 
adopted estimate, i.e. raw or calibrated, Ukrainians and Romanians actually spend more on 
current services than their maximal willingness to pay for services with high quality and quick 
access which indicates that current unregulated charges impose a substantial burden in these 
countries. 
 
Chapter 7 presents the discussion of the key findings outlined in Chapter 2 to 6. They are 
divided into two main parts: those related to the use of the stated preferences for the 
assessment of patient payments, and to the policy implications for the design of patient 
payments in the six Central and Eastern European countries.  
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As for the use of the stated preference techniques, there is still much to be done in improving 
their applicability. The consistency of the willingness to pay estimates obtained from the 
discrete choice experiment and contingent valuation techniques might be improved by 
increasing the importance of the tasks to the respondents or accounting for the certainty with 
which the respondents make choices. Additionally, strategies for improving consistency might 
imply also assessment of the marginal (small) changes in the benefits or application of non-
linear utility functions. In any case, we believe, discrete choice experiment estimates should 
not be used for obtaining holistic measures of willingness to pay. 
We also discuss that stated willingness to pay is jointly influenced by consequences for future 
policy perceived by the respondents, and by past respondents’ experience with payments and 
use of care. Thus, as discussed in Chapter 6, strategic answering patterns (under- and 
overstatement) might be seen as the result of a trade-off a respondent makes between the 
desirability of changes described in the valuation task (i.e. quality and access improvements) 
and the likelihood of an actual price increase as a consequence of the survey perceived by the 
respondent. Our results suggest that there is much more heterogeneity in stated willingness to 
pay than that which could be explained by observed factors, and part of it is related to the 
perceived likelihood of payment changes as a consequence of the survey. 
In this dissertation, we also discuss that different mechanisms underlie the decision to be 
willing to pay and the level of willingness to pay. Our results support the current practice in 
the contingent valuation literature of dealing with the stated willingness-to-pay level and 
willingness to pay as separate decision steps. We find that the question about the motivation 
for being unable to pay helps in making the distinction between true zeros and protesters. 
Thus, the conservative strategy may be excluding those who object to pay from the analysis 
However, those who object to pay are not necessarily ‘protests’, they are just more likely to 
be ’protests’. Thus, further research should be focused on deriving the propensity of ‘protest’ 
depending on the stated motivation for being unwilling to pay. 
With regards to the policy implications of the analysis of stated willingness to pay, we argue 
that the current situation with unregulated out-of-pocket payments for physician services 
represent a substantial financial burden to the public in Central and Eastern European 
countries, especially in Romania and Ukraine, where informal charges are widely spread, and 
to some extent in Lithuania. Measures to formalize health expenditure should become a policy 
priority in the Central and Eastern European region in general. Informal and quasi-formal 
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payments are non-transparent and do not account for patients socio-economic status, while 
wisely designed official patient payments would. 
We argue that under certain conditions patient payments for physician services are an 
acceptable policy tool in Central and Eastern European countries. This conclusion is done 
based on the observations of rather high shares of the populations that are willing to pay, and 
levels of willingness to pay are comparable to the service cost or even cover them. The 
preconditions for the implementation of official charges include feasible payment levels, 
effective exemption criteria, and eradication of informal charges, as well as the provision of 
services with good quality and quick access. Small co-payment levels would not cause too 
many drop-outs from the potential demand pools in all the six Central and Eastern European 
countries in the study, but the exact levels should be studied with the country-specific 
instruments. The vulnerable groups subject to fee exemption might be based on household 
income level in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. 
In Ukraine, age should also be seen as an exemption criterion in addition to income. 
Strategies to impose penalizing fees for direct referrals should be considered in Ukraine, as it 
is in most Central and Eastern European countries. Informal charges might become a 
challenge for the introduction of official patient charges due to no preference for paying 
formally. However, there is no explicit preference for paying informally, which calls for 
active measures to build social resistance towards informal payments. 
It is also discussed that willingness to pay for physician services is driven by the quality level 
of the services. In the Ukrainian example, it is shown that benefits gained from quality 
improvements are rather high and are comparable to service cost. Therefore, any patient 
payment policy should be tied to quality and access improvements. We also find that, apart 
from clinical quality and safety, patients value most the interpersonal aspects of care (attitude, 
information, involvement etc.), especially the elderly people. Therefore, investments in 
quality enhancement programs should be targeted at the training and education of medical 
staff, especially in the behavioral aspects, rather than at infrastructure. 
In our study, we provide an example of how willingness to pay derived from stated 
preferences might be used in the assessment of patient charges and their design. Despite their 
limitations, stated preference techniques provide better and more information than national 
referendums on the acceptability of patient payments. Discrete choice experiments provide 
ordinal measures that are useful in setting priorities for investments in quality characteristics 
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of the health benefits. Contingent valuation values of willingness to pay provide holistic 
measures which may be used as an indication of service value. 
Thus, stated preferences may be used to assess the level of acceptability of official patient 
payments for physician services, defining feasible levels of payments and their heterogeneity 
across population groups, and for defining investment priorities in the quality and access 
characteristics of the services. Gradual implementation with constant reassessment will help 
to arrive at optimal policies which best address policy objectives, do not impair equity and 
access, and match public preferences. 
Our study demonstrates the way stated preference techniques may be used to study potential 
effects of patient charges on health care consumption in the non-existent markets. Patient 
charges for basic physician services, though ignored and dreaded in Central and Eastern 
European countries, may be an efficient policy tool in light that people in these countries are 
ready and able to pay substantial amounts formally if the services are provided with adequate 
quality and quick access. The assurance of services of good quality and quick access, as well 
as the elimination of informal payments will be an essential step prior to the implementation 
of such charges. 
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Samenvatting 
De bereidheid tot het betalen voor diensten van artsen in Oekraïne en andere Centraal 
en Oost-Europese landen: een toepassing van stated-preferences technieken om 
patiëntenvoorkeuren te meten. 
 
Om de baten van de gezondheidszorg te meten wordt er in toenemende mate gebruik gemaakt 
van de zogenaamde stated-preference techniek; een waarderingsmethode waarbij de 
betalingsbereidheid voorspeld wordt aan de hand van hypothetische situaties en scenario’s. 
De stated-preferences hebben een aantal voordelen zoals de mogelijkheid een waarde toe te 
kennen aan niet-markt goederen en diensten en de waarde mee te rekenen van passieve 
gebruikers, niet-gebruikers en potentiële gebruikers. Desalniettemin spelen stated-preference 
technieken een minimale rol in het vaststellen van eigen bijdragen en het ontwerp daarvan. 
Dit komt door de onzekere voorspellende, theoretische en convergente validiteit van deze 
technieken. Echter, in veel gezondheidszorgsystemen waar gezondheidsbaten nooit vermarkt 
zijn geweest, zoals in veel postsocialistische Centraal en Oost-Europese landen, is het gebruik 
van stated-preference technieken de enige manier om de betalingsbereidheid te beoordelen. 
Eigen bijdragen van patiënten voor de diensten van artsen is een efficiënte manier om 
onnodig gebruik van deze diensten te reduceren en kan de informele betalingen (die 
wijdverspreid zijn in Centraal- en Oost-Europa) vervangen en tot op zekere hoogte gezien 
worden als een aanvullende bron van financiering. Desondanks zijn in Centraal- en Oost-
Europa in de postsocialistische context veel landen niet bereid een dergelijke impopulaire 
maatregel te nemen, al is er geen onderzoek gedaan naar eigen bijdragen en de effecten 
daarvan. Veel bewijsmateriaal is gebaseerd op revealed-preference data (i.e. data betreffende 
het gebruik van diensten in het verleden) en komt uit West Europa, de Verenigde Staten en 
enkele Aziatische landen, waar eigen bijdragen al effectief geïmplementeerd zijn. Voor de 
Centraal en Oost-Europese landen ontbreekt dergelijk bewijs. 
Zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 1 is de algemene doelstelling van deze dissertatie het 
toepassen van stated-preference technieken om de betalingsbereidheid voor 
dienstverrichtingen van artsen te bestuderen in Centraal en Oost-Europese landen. Daarnaast 
wordt geanalyseerd tot op welke hoogte de schattingen van betalingsbereidheid kunnen 
worden gebruikt in het vaststellen van eigen bijdragen voor diensten van artsen. De landen 
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Bulgarije, Hongarije, Litouwen, Polen, Roemenië en Oekraïne worden in deze dissertatie 
behandeld. Deze landen bieden een relevante context voor een cross-country vergelijking 
gezien zowel de overeenkomsten in de zorgsector tijdens de communistische periode, als de 
verschillen in tempo waarmee hervormingen in de zorgsector tijdens de postcommunistische 
periode zijn doorgevoerd.   
In alle bovengenoemde landen, behalve Oekraïne, zijn sociale zorgverzekeringen 
geïntroduceerd. In Oekraïne is nog steeds sprake van een publiek gefinancierd systeem (het 
USSR Semashko systeem). In de meeste van deze landen betalen patiënten voor bepaalde 
artikelen (zoals farmaceutica en hulpmiddelen). Echter, betalingen voor basis 
gezondheidszorgdiensten zijn niet alledaags. Alleen in Bulgarije is in 2000 een relatief lage 
vergoeding van € 1 voor een bezoek aan een arts geïntroduceerd. In Hongarije werd iets 
dergelijks in 2007 ingevoerd, maar in 2008 weer afgeschaft na een nationaal referendum. In 
de andere vier landen zijn formele betalingen door de patiënt (in de tijd dat deze dissertatie is 
geschreven) alleen gebruikelijk voor diensten die buiten het basis zorgpakket vallen. In alle 
landen echter is er sprake van quasi-formele betalingen (die vastgesteld worden door 
zorgverleners in de afwezigheid van nationale regelgeving), en informele (zwarte) betalingen 
op alle niveaus van de zorgverlening, inclusief voor de dienstverrichtingen van artsen. 
In hoofdstuk 2 worden de publieke voorkeuren voor de kwaliteits- en toegangskenmerken 
van poliklinische diensten in Oekraïne in relatieve en monetaire termen verklaard. De 
methode van het discrete keuze experiment wordt gebruikt in een steekproef van 303 
respondenten die representatief zijn voor de Oekraïense bevolking. Binnen de steekproef is er 
geen duidelijke voorkeur voor formele dan wel informele betalingen. We vinden ook geen 
bewijs dat een bezoek aan een huisarts te prefereren is boven directe toegang tot een medische 
specialist. Er zijn echter wel verschillen tussen bevolkingsgroepen. Kwaliteit-gerelateerde 
eigenschappen betreffende de dienstverlening van artsen schijnen voor de respondenten 
belangrijk te zijn, met name de houding van de medische staf. Het verbeteren van de 
interpersonele aspecten in de poliklinische zorg - door te investeren in training van de 
medische staf - moet dus prioriteit krijgen wanneer men moet beslissen over investeringen in 
kwaliteitsverbeteringen in Oekraïne. Andere aspecten zoals sociale kwaliteit en toegang tot 
zorg, zijn ook belangrijk, maar een verbetering daarvan geeft minder sociale winst. 
Hoofdstuk 3 richt zicht op het potentieel en de haalbaarheid van het invoeren van officiële 
eigen bijdragen voor publieke gezondheidszorgdiensten in Oekraïne. Hiervoor worden 
patronen van de aanvaardbaarheid van vergoedingen, evenals het vermogen en de 
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bereidwilligheid te betalen voor de publieke gezondheidszorg onder bevolkingsgroepen 
bestudeerd. Hierbij wordt gebruik gemaakt van contingente waarderingsdata die verzameld 
zijn onder 303 respondenten die representatief zijn voor de Oekraïense volwassen bevolking 
(dezelfde als die in hoofdstuk 2). Drie beslispunten werden gedefinieerd: het bezwaar tegen 
de betaling, het onvermogen om te betalen en het niveau van een positieve bereidheid om te 
betalen. De waarschijnlijkheid van bezwaar tegen betaling wordt grotendeels bepaald door de 
kwaliteitskenmerken van de diensten. Bezwaar tegen betaling is niet gerelateerd aan dergelijk 
gedrag in de werkelijkheid. De waarschijnlijkheid om niet te kunnen betalen hangt samen met 
een hogere leeftijd, een groter aandeel niet-verdienende leden in het huishouden en een lager 
inkomen. Het niveau van een positieve bereidheid om te betalen is positief gerelateerd aan het 
inkomen (+7% per 1000 UAH inkomensverhoging) en is lager voor mensen die een arts 
hebben bezocht en niet hebben betaald (-22%). De enigszins substantiële bereidheid tot 
betaling (tussen 0.9% en 1.9% van het huishoudelijk inkomen) voor één bezoek aan een arts, 
wijzst op een potentieel voor officiële eigen bijdragen in Oekraïne. De patronen van 
onmogelijkheid tot betalen ondersteunen de behoefte aan uitzonderingscriteria gebaseerd op 
leeftijd, inkomen, en economische status. De patronen van de bereidheid tot betalen 
benadrukken de noodzakelijkheid voor betalingen al naar gelang het inkomen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 beoogt de geschatte bereidheid tot het betalen voor dienstverrichtingen van 
artsen verkregen door het discrete keuze experiment en door de contingente 
waarderingsmethode (de twee studies gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 2 en 3, gebaseerd op één 
meting) met elkaar te vergelijken. Er wordt gekeken naar de consistentie tussen de schattingen 
en of er systematische verschillen zijn tussen de twee typen schattingen. Het discrete keuze 
experiment geeft een hogere schatting van betalingsbereidheid dan de contingente 
waarderingsmethode, en de schattingen zijn niet consistent tussen de twee technieken. 
Het verschil tussen de schattingen van betalingsbereidheid verkregen door het discrete keuze 
experiment en deze verkregen door de contingente waarderingsmethode is hoger (i) voor 
respondenten die zich niet onderscheiden in de verschillende profielen, en (ii) voor een 
toename in de gepresenteerde  niveauveranderingen van de eigenschappen in de profielen. De 
implicaties van het bereiken van een betere convergentie tussen de schattingen verkregen door 
de twee verschillende technieken, worden besproken. 
In hoofdstuk 5 geven we bewijs betreffende de potentiële impact van eigen bijdragen op het 
gebruik van gespecialiseerde diensten van artsen in de zes Centraal en Oost-Europese landen 
die onderdeel zijn van deze studie. We passen een semi-parametrische ‘survival’ analyse toe 
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op de gestelde betalingsbereidheid en de mogelijkheid tot betalen om zodoende de potentiële 
‘pools van vraag’ te identificeren, i.e. het aandeel van de bevolking dat bereid en in staat is 
een bepaalde vergoeding te betalen als er behoefte is aan een medische dienstverrichting. We 
berekenen ook prijs, inkomen en leeftijd semi-elasticiteit. Data zijn verzameld door middel 
van nationale enquêtes gehouden in 2010 onder een representatieve steekproef van ongeveer 
1000 respondenten in ieder van de zes Centraal en Oost-Europese landen die deel uitmaken 
van de analyse. Onze resultaten suggereren dat de mediaan van de bereidheid en mogelijkheid 
tot betalen in de bestudeerde landen varieert van € 5.15 tot € 12.2, en de ranking van landen 
naar bereidheid en mogelijkheid tot betalen volgt precies de ranking naar inkomensniveau. 
Lage vergoedingen voor diensten, tot € 2.5 in Bulgarije, Hongarije, Litouwen en Roemenië, 
en tot € 5 in Polen, zullen niet veel mensen uit de pool van vraag verjagen. Het lagere 
betalingsinterval moet in meer detail bestudeerd worden voor Oekraïne, waarbij gebruik 
gemaakt moet worden van een gedetailleerdere schaal. Officiële betalingen voor diensten mét 
vrijstelling- of lagere eigen bijdragen voor bepaalde groepen wordt als een aantrekkelijk 
alternatief gezien voor informele betalingen.  
Hoofdstuk 6 wordt gewijd aan een beoordeling van de asymmetrische betalingsbereidheid 
voor gespecialiseerde dienstverrichtingen door artsen. De analyse is gebaseerd op dezelfde 
data als in hoofdstuk 5, i.e. contingente waarderingsdata van zes Centraal en Oost-Europese 
landen: Bulgarije, Hongarije, Litouwen, Polen, Roemenië en Oekraïne. De niveaus van 
betalingsbereidheid worden gemodelleerd met een stochastic frontier regressie, met positieve 
scheefheid (overstatement) en negatieve scheefheid (understatement). De niveaus van 
betalingsbereidheid worden gekalibreerd, gebaseerd op individuele voorspellingen van de 
inefficiëntiescores. 
De onbewerkte en gekalibreerde niveaus van betalingsbereidheid worden vergeleken met de 
daadwerkelijke uitgaven. Onze resultaten suggereren dat de scheefheid van de 
betalingsbereidheid dwars door de landen heen wordt verklaard door de interactie van drie 
hoofdfactoren: de waargenomen impact op het actuele beleid, de relevantie en wenselijkheid 
van de gewaardeerde veranderingen, en ervaringen met betalingen in het verleden. In landen 
waar verplichte betalingen effectief zijn en ten gevolge daarvan prijsverhogingen aannemelijk 
zijn, zouden respondenten hun werkelijke betalingsbereidheid verborgen kunnen houden. 
Daartegenover staan de landen waar prijsverhogingen niet waarschijnlijk zijn en waar de 
wens voor verbeteringen kan leiden tot een overstatement van de werkelijke 
betalingsbereidheid. Ongeacht de aangenomen schatting, i.e. onbewerkt of gekalibreerd, 
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spenderen Oekraïners en Roemenen meer aan medische dienstenverrichtingen dan hun 
maximale betalingsbereidheid voor snel toegankelijke diensten van hoge kwaliteit, wat 
aangeeft dat de huidige ongereguleerde betalingen een substantiële drempel opwerpen in deze 
landen. 
Hoofdstuk 7 presenteert de discussie van de belangrijkste bevindingen uit hoofdstuk 2 t/m 6. 
Ze worden verdeeld in twee delen: bevindingen gerelateerd aan het gebruik van stated-
preferences om eigen bijdragen te beoordelen, en gerelateerd aan the beleidsimplicaties voor 
het ontwerpen van eigen bijdragen in de zes Centraal en Oost-Europese landen. We 
beargumenteren dat de consistentie tussen het discrete keuze experiment en de contingente 
waarderingsmethode toeneemt met het belang dat de respondenten aan een gepresenteerde 
taak hechten. We bespreken ook dat de gestelde betalingsbereidheid wordt beïnvloed door 
zowel de waargenomen consequenties voor toekomstig beleid als door ervaringen met 
betalingen en het gebruik van zorg in het verleden. Onze bevindingen geven ook aan dat er 
verschillende mechanismes ten grondslag liggen aan de beslissing om te willen betalen en het 
niveau daarvan. Vanuit een beleidsperspectief bespreken we dat huidige ongereguleerde 
betalingen uit eigen zak voor dienstverrichtingen door artsen een substantiële drempel vormen 
voor patiënten in Centraal en Oost-Europese landen. We betogen dat onder bepaalde 
voorwaarden eigen bijdragen een acceptabele beleidstool is in Centraal en Oost-Europese 
landen. Tot slot geven we aan dat mensen in Centraal en Oost-Europese landen bereid zijn te 
betalen voor kwaliteit en toegang, en beleid over eigen bijdragen zal gebaseerd moeten 
worden aan de verbetering hiervan. 
Ter conclusie geven we een voorbeeld hoe betalingsbereidheid afgeleid van stated-
preferences gebruikt kan worden in de raming van eigen bijdragen voor dienstverrichtingen 
door artsen en het ontwerp daarvan: het niveau van aanvaardbaarheid van deze betalingen, het 
definiëren van haalbare niveaus van betalingen en de heterogeniteit onder bevolkingsgroepen, 
en voor de definiërende investeringsprioriteiten in de kwaliteits- en de 
toegangskarakteristieken van de dienstverrichtingen. Eigen bijdragen voor basiszorg, hoewel 
vermeden en gevreesd in Centraal en Oost-Europese landen, kunnen een efficiënte 
beleidsinstrument zijn in de zin van dat mensen in deze landen er klaar voor, en in staat toe, 
zijn formele substantiële bedragen te betalen als de diensten makkelijk toegankelijk en van 
hoge kwaliteit zijn. De zekerheid van diensten van goede kwaliteit en makkelijke 
toegankelijkheid, evenals de eliminering van informele betalingen zijn een essentiële 
voorwaarde voor het implementeren van eigen bijdragen. 
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Анотація 
 
Готовність сплачувати за послуги лікарів в Україні та інших країнах Центральної 
та Східної Європи: Застосування висловлених уподобань для оцінювання 
платежів пацієнтів. 
 
Готовність сплачувати, отримана із застосуванням методів висловлених уподобань 
(методів оцінювання певних благ у гіпотетичних сценаріях вибору чи купівлі), все 
частіше використовується для оцінювання послуг охорони здоров’я. Висловлені 
вподобання мають низку переваг, зокрема вони дозволяють отримати оцінки товарів та 
послуг, що раніше були відсутні на ринку, а також отримати оцінки від пасивних і 
потенційних споживачів, а також тих, хто не користувався цими послугами. Однак, ці 
методи відіграють досить обмежену роль в оцінюванні платежів пацієнтів та 
плануванні їхнього дизайну. Це відбувається через невизначену достовірність та 
надійність оцінок, отриманих за допомогою цих методів. З іншого боку, в багатьох 
системах охорони здоров’я, де послуги ніколи не були предметом торгівлі, як, зокрема, 
у багатьох пост-соціалістичних країнах Центральної та Східної Європи, висловлені 
вподобання є єдиним можливим методом оцінювання готовності сплачувати. 
Платежі пацієнтів є ефективним інтрументом політики в охороні здоров’я, здатним 
зменшити надмірне споживання послуг, врегулювати неофіційні платежі (дуже 
поширені у країнах Центральної та Східної Європи), а також до певної міри генерувати 
додаткові кошти. В Центральній та Східній Європі, однак, в пост-соціалістичному 
контексті, уряди більшості країн не готові впроваджувати такі непопулярні заходи, як 
офіційні платежі пацієнтів. Однак, наукових підстав для такої відмови практично 
немає. Більшість проведених досліджень базуються на виявлених вподобаннях (даних 
фактичного споживання), а тому походять із країн Західної Європи, США, та деяких 
розвинених країн Азії, де платежі пацієнтів вже ефективно впроваджені. В країнах 
Центральної та Східної Європи таких досліджень не проводилося. 
Як окреслено в розділі 1, загальна мета цієї дисертації – застосувати методи 
висловлених вподобань для оцінювання готовності сплачувати за послуги лікарів в 
країнах Центральної та Східної Європи, а також проаналізувати наскільки готовність 
сплачувати, отримана з їх використанням, може бути застосована в оцінюванні 
Анотація 
206 
політики платежів пацієнтів за послуги лікарів. До цього дослідження увійшли шість 
країн: Болгарія, Угорщина, Литва, Польща, Румунія та Україна. Ці країни мали подібні 
системи охорони здоров’я в комуністичні часи, але різні траєкторії та темпи реформ у 
пост-комуністичний період, а тому є хорошою базою для порівняння. 
В усіх країнах-учасницях цього дослідження, окрім України, було впроваджено 
системи соціального страхування. В Україні ж і до сьогодні діє система охорони 
здоров’я, фнінасована із державного бюджету (система Семашко як у СРСР). В 
більшості з цих країн існують платежі пацієнтів за медичні товари (препарати та 
обладнання). Однак, платежі пацієнтів за базові послуги охорони здоров’я існують 
лише в Болгарії. Там, відносно невисокий платіж (близько € 1 за візит до лікаря) було 
впроваджено у 2000 р. В Угорщині такий невисокий платіж (близько € 1 за візит) 
проіснував один рік у 2007 р., але був скасований за результатами всенародного 
референдуму у 2008 р. В інших чотирьох країнах офіційна оплата на час проведення 
дослідження існувала лише за послуги поза страховим пакетом. В усіх цих країнах, 
однак, квазі-офіційні платежі, встановлені надавачами послуг охорони здоров’я за 
відсутності державного регулювання, а також неофіційні платежі існують на всіх 
рівнях надання допомоги, включно з послугами лікарів. 
У розділі 2 цієї дисертації, досліджено громадські вподобання щодо характеристик 
якості та доступу послуг лікарів в Україні у відносному та монетарному виразі. Для 
цього застосовано експеримент дискретного вибору на вибірці із 303 респондентів, що 
репрезентують доросле населення країни. На рівні вибірки не спостерігаємо вираженої 
переваги сплачувати офіційно, чи навпаки – неофіційно. Також немає чітких вподобань 
щодо того, відвідувати лікаря загальної практики (дільничного лікаря) чи звертатися 
одразу ж до вузького спеціаліста. Однак, є певна неоднорідність цих уподобань серед 
соціально-демографічних груп населення. Важливими при виборі лікаря є атрибути 
якості послуг охорони здоров’я, особливо ставлення медичного персоналу. Отже, 
покращення міжососбистісних аспектів первинної допомоги шляхом інвестицій в 
освіту та навчання медичного персоналу має стати пріоритетом у фінансуванні охорони 
здоров’я. Інші аспекти якості та доступу також важливі для пацієнтів, однак їхнє 
покращення принесе менше вигоди. 
Розділ 3 зосереджений на потенціалі та можливості впровадження офіційних платежів 
пацієнтів за послуги лікарів шляхом вивчення їхньої прийнятності, а також здатності та 
готовності сплачувати за ці послуги серед груп населення. Для цього використано дані 
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умовного оцінювання проведеного серед 303 респондентів, що реперзентують доросле 
населення країни (як у розділі 2). Виокремлено три рівні прийняття рішення: відмова 
сплачувати, неспроможність сплачувати, та рівень готовності сплачувати. Імовірність 
відмови сплачувати найбільше пов’язана з якісними характеристиками послуги. 
Відмова сплачувати в гіпотетичному завданні не пов’язана із відповідною поведінкою 
на реальному ринку. Імовірність бути неспроможним/ою сплачувати пов’язана зі 
старшим віком та нижчим економічним статусом. Рівень готовності сплачувати 
позитивно пов’язаний із доходом, а також є нижчим серед людей, які відвідували 
лікарів але не платили за це. Досить високий рівень готовності сплачувати (між 0.9% та 
1.9% доходу домогосподарства) за візит до лікаря вказує на потенціал офіційних 
платежів в Україні. Картина неспроможності сплачувати вказує на необхідність 
критеріїв виключення, що базуватимуться на віку, доході, та інших аспектах 
економічного статусу. Рівні готовності сплачувати підкреслюють, що платежі повинні 
бути пропорційні до доходу. 
Розділ 4 має на меті дезагреговане порівняння оцінок готовності сплачувати, отрманих 
із експерименту дискретного вибору та умовного оцінювання (двох методів, 
застосованих у розділах 2 та 3 на єдиній вибірці). Для цього досліджено узгодженість 
між цими оцінками, а також чи є систематична різниця між ними. За нашими 
результатами, оцінки, отримані з експерименту дискретного вибору, є вищими, ніж з 
умовного оцінювання, але вони неузгоджені між собою. Різниця між цими оцінками 
росте (і) для респондентів, які не розрізняють представлені якісні профілі послуг, та (іі) 
зі зростанням різниці у рівнях якісних атрибутів між представленими до вибору 
варіантами. Наслідки цих результатів для досягнення кращої узгодженості між 
оцінками готовності сплачувати обговорено в цьому розділі. 
У розділі 5 оцінено можливий вплив платежів пацієнтів на споживання послуг 
медичних спеціалістів в шести країнах Центральної та Східної Європи, що увійшли в 
це дослідження: Болгарії, Угорщині, Литві, Польщі, Румунії та Україні. Для цього 
застосовано напівпараметричний аналіз виживання до даних із готовності та здатності 
сплачувати за ці послуги. Це дозволило побудувати криві потенційного попиту, що 
показують частки населення, яке готове та спроможне сплачувати платежі певного 
рівня в разі медичної потреби. Також обраховано цінові еластичності, а також 
еластичності за доходом та віком. Дані було зібрано за допомогою опитувань, 
провдених у 2010р. серед реперезентативних вибірок в шести країнах, близько 1000 
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респондентів у кожній із країн. Результати цього дослідження свідчать, що медіанна 
готовність та можливість сплачувати коливається від € 5.15 до € 12.2, а порядок країн 
за цим показником відповідає рівню доходів в країні. Невисокі платежі, до € 2.5 в 
Болгарії, Угорщині, Литві та Румунії, та до € 5 в Польщі не зумовлюють суттєвого 
зниження потенційного попиту. Нижній ціновий інтервал необхідно детальніше 
вивчати в Україні із застосуванням шкали, чутливої до менших змін готовності 
сплачувати. В цьому розділі аргументовано, що платежі пацієнтів можуть бути 
виграшною альтернативою неофіційним платежам в разі впровадження відповідних 
критеріїв виключення та пільг. 
Розділ 6 присвячений належному оцінюванню скошених даних готовності сплачувати 
за послуги медичних спеціалістів. Аналіз базується на тих же даних, що й у розділі 5, 
тобто даних умовного оцінювання із шести країн Центральної та Східної Європи: 
Болгарії, Угорщини, Литви, Польщі, Румунії та України. Рівень готовності сплачувати 
оцінено із застосуванням моделі стохастичного кордону, враховуючи позитивну та 
негативну скошеність даних, яка трактується як відповідно завищування та 
занижування справжньої готовності сплачувати частиною респондентів. Рівень 
готовності сплачувати зважено на предбачені коефіцієнти неефективності 
(завищування чи занижування). Незважені та зважені оцінки порівняно із фактичними 
річними видатками на послуги медичних спеціалістів. Результати цього розділу 
свідчать, що напрям скошеності готовності сплачувати, тобто занижування чи 
завищування оцінок, в різних країнах пояснюється спільним впливом таких факторів: 
очікуваним впливом результатів опитування на реальну цінову політику, актуальності 
та бажаності оцінюваних якісних змін, і частотою споживання послуг. В країнах, де 
платежі пацієнтів діють і, відповідно, можливим є підняття цін, респонденти, особливо 
споживачі послуг, схильні приховувати справжній рівень готовності сплачувати. В 
країнах, де впровадження чи підняття цін є малоймовірним, бажаність змін може 
призвести до завищування справжньої готвність сплачувати, особливо серед нечастих 
користувачів. 
У Розділі 7 представлено обговорення основних результатів, описаних в попередніх 
розділах. Їх розділено на дві групи: ті, що стосуються використання висловлених 
вподобань для оцінки платежів пацієнтів, а також ті, що стосуються  висновків для 
політики платежів пацієнтів в шести країнах Центральної та Східної Європи. Ми 
доводимо, що узгодженість між оцінками готовності сплачувати, отриманими із 
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екперименту дискретного вибору та умовного оцінювання, зростає зі зростанням 
важливості атрибутів та послуг представлених респонденту. Також ми показуємо, що 
рівень висловленої готовності сплачувати залежить від очікуваних наслідків 
опитування для політики платежів, необхідності якісних покращень, та частоти 
споживання. Також наші результати дозволяють говорити про те, що різні механізми 
лежать в основі рішення бути готовим сплачувати та визначення рівня готовності 
сплачувати. З точки зору політики, ми показуємо що теперішня ситуація з 
неврегульованими платежами є суттєвим фінансовим тягарем для пацієнтів в 
Центральній та Східній Європі. Ми також доводимо, що за певних умов платежі 
пацієнтів є прийнятним інструментом політики в охороні здоров’я в цих країнах. 
Насамкінець, показано, що люди в країнах Центральної та Східної Європи готові 
сплачувати за якість та доступ, а тому будь-які впровадження платежів повинні 
супроводжуватися покращенням цих характеристик. 
Отже, в цій дисертації показано як готовність сплачувати, оцінена за допомогою 
висловлених уподобань, може бути використана для оцінювання платежів пацієнтів та 
аспектів їхнього дизайну: прийнятності таких платежів, визначенні рівня платежів, 
неоднорідності готовності сплачувати серед груп населення, визначення інвестиційних 
пріоритетів в якість та доступ. Платежі пацієнтів за послуги охорони здоров’я, хоча їх і 
уникають в країнах Центральної та Східної Європи, можуть стати ефективним 
інструментом політики в тому сенсі, що люди готові офіційно сплачувати суттєві 
кошти за послуги адекватної якості та доступу. Забезпечення такої якості і доступу, а 
також викорінення неофіційних платежів, буде необхідним кроком у встановлені 
оптимальної політики платежів пацієнтів. 
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Аннотация 
 
Готовность платить за услуги врачей в Украине и других странах Центральной и 
Восточной Европы: Применение выраженных преференций для оценки платежей 
пациентов. 
 
Готовность платить оцененая с помощью методов выраженных предпочтений (методов 
оценки благ в гипотетических сценариях выбора или покупки) все чаще используется 
для оценивания услуг здравоохранения. Выраженные предпочтения имеют ряд 
преимуществ, в частности они позволяют получить оценки товаров и услуг, которых 
раньше на рынке не было, а также получить оценки пассивных и потенциальных 
пользователей этих услуг, и тех, кто не пользовался ими. Однако, эти методы играют 
ограниченную роль в оценке платежей пациентов и планировании их дизайна. Это 
просиходит по причине неопределенной достоверности и надежности оценок, 
полученых с помощью этих методов. С другой стороны, во многих системах 
здравоохранения, где услуги никогда не были предметом торговли, как, в частности, во 
многих пост-социалистических странах Ценральной и Восточной Европы, выраженные 
предпочтения являются единственным способом оценки готовности платить. 
Платежи пациентов являются эффективным инструментом полити здравоохранения, 
который способен уменьшить чрезмерное использование услуг, уреглировать 
неофициальный рынок (очень распостраненный в странах Ценральной и Восточной 
Европы), а также в некоторой степени генерировать дополнительные стредства. В 
Ценральной и Восточной Европе, однако, в пост-социалистическом контексте, 
правительства большинства стран не готовы внедрять такие непопулярные меры, как 
официальные платежи пациентов. Научных обоснований для такого отказа практически 
нет. Большинство проведенных исследований базируются на выявленных 
предпочтениях (данных фактического использования), и поэтому были проведены в 
странах Западной Европы, США и некоторых развитых странах Азии, где платежи 
пациентов уже эффективно внедрены. 
Как описано в разделе 1, общая цель этой дисертации – применить методы 
выраженных предпочтений для оценки готовности платить за услуги врачей в странах 
Центральной и Восточной Европы, а также проанализировать насколько готовность 
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платить, полученная с примнением єтих методов, может быть использована для 
оценивания политики платежей пациентов за услуги врачей. В данное исследование 
вошли шесть стран: Болгария, Венгрия, Литва, Польша, Румыния и Украина. Эти 
страны имели похожие системы здравоохранения в коммунистические времена, но 
разные траектории и темпы реформ в пост-коммунистический период, а поэтому 
являют собой хорошую базу сравнения. 
Во всех странах-учасницах этого исследования, кроме Украины, были внедрены 
системы социального страхования. В Украине же и по сей день действует система 
здравоохранения, финансированная из государственного бюджета (система Семашко 
как в СССР). В большинстве этих стран действуют платежи пациентов за медицинские 
товары (препарты и оборудование). Однако, платежи пациентов за базовые услуги 
здравоохранения действуют только в Болгарии. Там относительно невысокий платеж 
(около € 1 за визит к врачу) был утсановлен в 2000 г. В Венгрии такой же небольшой 
платеж (около € 1 за визит к врачу) просуществовал всего один год в 2007 г., но был 
отменен на всенародном реферндуме в 2008 г. В остальных четырех странах 
официальная оплата на время проведения исследования взималась только за услуги вне 
страхового пакета. Во всех этих странах, однако, квази-официальные плетжи, 
установленные провайдерами услуг из-за отсутсвия государственного регулирования, а 
также неофициальные платежи существуют на всех уровнях оказания помощи, 
включительно с услугами врачей. 
В разделе 2 этой диссертации, исследованы общественные предпочтения касательно 
характерстик качества и доступа услуг врачей в Украине в относительном и 
монетарном выражении. Для этого применено эксперимент дискретного выбора на 
выборке из 303 респондентов, репрезентирующих взрослое население страны. На 
уровне выборки не наблюдается четко выраженных предпочтений платить официально, 
или наоборот – неофициально. Также нету четких предпочтений осуществлять визит к 
врачу общей практики (участковому врачу), либо обращаться напрямую к узкому 
специалисту. Однако, есть некоторая неоднородность этих предпочтений среди групп 
населения. Важными при выборе врача являются атрибуты качества услуг 
здравоохранения, особенно отношение медицинского персонала. Следовательно, 
улучшение межличностных аспектов первичной помощи путем инвестиций в 
образование и обучение медицинского пресонала должны стать приоритетом 
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финансирования здравоохранения. Другие аспекты качества и доступа также важны для 
пациентов, но их улучшение принесет меньше выгоды обществу. 
В разделе 3 рассматривается потенциал и возможности внедрения официальных 
платежей пациентов за услуги врачей путем исследования их приемлимости, а также 
способности и готовности платить за эти услуги среди групп насления. Для этого 
использованы данные условного оценивания проведенного среди 303 респондентов, 
которые репрезентируют взрослое население Уркаины (как и в разделе 2). Выделено 
три уровня принятия решений: отказ платить, неспособность платить, и уровень 
готовности платить. Вероятность отказа платить более всего связана с качестовм услуг. 
Отказ платить в гипотетичском задании не связан с соответствующим поведением в 
реальной жизни. Вероятность быть неспособным/ой платить связана со старшим 
возрастом и худшим экономическим статусом. Уровень готовонсти платить позитивно 
связан с доходом, а также является ниже среди людей, которые обращались к врачам но 
не платили за это. Довольно высокий уровень готовоности платить (между 0.9% и 1.9% 
от дохода домохозяйства) за визит к врачу указывает потенциал официальных 
платежей в Украине. Картина неспособности платить указывает на необходимость 
критериев исключения, котрые бы базировались на возрасте, дохде, а также других 
аспектах экономического статуса. Уровни готовности платить подчеркивают, что 
платежи пациентов должны быть пропорциональны доходу. 
Раздел 4 имеет целью дезагрегированное сравнение оценок готовности платить, 
полученых с помощью експереимента дискретного выбора и условного оценивания 
(двух методов, примененных в разделах 2 и 3 на единой выборке). Для этого изучена 
согласованность между этими оценками, а также есть ли систематическая разница 
между ними. По нашим результатам, оценки эксперимента дискретного выбора выше 
нежели условного оценивания, но они не согласованны между собой. Разница между 
оценками выше (і) для респондентов, котрые не отличают представленые качественные 
профили услуг, и (іі) при росте разницы в уровнях качественных атрибутов между 
представлеными для выбора вариантами. Выводы из таких результатов для достижения 
лучшей согласованности между оценками готовности платить обсуждены в этом 
разделе. 
В разделе 5 оценено возможное влияние платежей пациентов на потребление услуг 
медицинских специалистов в шести странах Центральной и Восточной Европы, 
которые вошли в исследование: Болгарии, Венгрии, Литве, Польше, Румынии и 
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Украине. Для этого применен полупарметрический анализ выживаемости на данных 
про готовность и способность платить за эти услуги. Это позволило построить кривые 
потенциального спроса, котрые показывают доли населения, готовых и способных 
платить платежи разного уровня при медицинской необходимости. Также были 
посчитаны ценовые эластичности, а также эластичности по доходу и возрасту. Данные 
были получены с помощью опросов, проведеных в 2010г. среди репрезентативных 
выборок в шести странах, около 1000 респондентов в каждой из стран. Результаты 
этого исследования показывают, що медианная готовность платить варьируется от 
€ 5.15 до € 12.2, а порядок стран за этим показателем соответсвует уровням дохода в 
них. Невысокие платежи до € 2.5 в Болгарии, Венгрии, Литве и Румынии, и до € 5 в 
Польше не вызовут существенного снижения потенциального спроса. Нижний ценовой 
интервал необходимо подробнее изучать в Украине с использованием шкалы, 
чувствительной к меньшим изменениям готовности платить. В этом разделе 
аргументировано, что платежи пациентов могут быть лучшей альтернативой 
неофициальным платежам при внедрении соответсвующих критериев исключения и 
льгот. 
Раздел 6 посвящен надлежащему оцениванию скошенных данных о готовности 
платить за услуги медицинских специалистов. Анализ основывается на тех же данных, 
что и в разделе 5, а именно данных условного оценивания из шести стран Центральной 
и Восточной Европы: Болгарии, Венгрии, Литвы, Польши, Румынии и Украины. 
Уровень готовности платить оценен с использованием модели стохастической границы, 
учитывая позитивную и негативную скошенность данных, которая трактуется как 
соответсвенно завышение и занижение действительной готовности платить частью 
респондентов. Уровень готовности платить взвешен на оцененные коэффициенты 
неэффективности (завышения или занижения). Невзвешенные и взвешенные оценки 
сравнены с фактическими годовыми издержками на услуги медицинских специалистов. 
Результаты этого раздела свидетельствуют, что скошенность готовности платить в 
разных странах объясняется совмесным влиянием следующих факторов: ожидаемым 
влиянием результатов опроса на реальную политику, актуальности и желаемости 
оцениваемых изменений, и частотой использования услуг. В странах, где платежи 
пациентов действительны, и, соответственно, возможным является поднятие цен, 
респонденты, особенно пользователи услуг, склонны скрывать настоящий уровень 
готовности платить. В странах, где внедрение или поднятие уровня платежей 
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маловероятны, желаемость изменений может вызвать завышение действительной 
готовности платить, осбенно среди нечастых пользователей медицинских услуг. 
В разделе 7 пердставлено обсуждение основных результатов, описаных в предидущих 
разделах. Их разделено на две группы: те, которые касаются использования 
выраженных предпочтений для оценки платежей пациентов, а также те, которые 
касаются выводов для политики платежей в шести странах Центральной и Восточной 
Европы. Мы показываем что согласованность между оценками готовности платить, 
полученых с помощью эксперимента дискретного выбора и условного оценивания, 
растет при увеличении важности атрибутов и услуг, представленных респонденту. 
Также мы показваем, что уровень выраженной готовности платить зависит от 
ожидаемых последствий опроса для политики платежей пациентов, необходимости 
качественных изменений, а также частоты пользования. Также наши результаты 
позволяют утверждать, что разные механизмы лежат в основе решения быть готовым 
платить и определением уровня готовности платить. С точки зрения политики, мы 
показываем, что теперешняя ситуация с неурегулированными платежами является 
существенным финансовым бременем для пациентов в Центральной и Восточной 
Европе. Мы также доказываем, что при некторых условиях платежи пациентов 
являются приемлимым инструментом политики здравоохранения в этих странах. 
Наконец, показано, что люди в странах Центральной и Восточной Европы готовы 
платить за качество и доступ, а поэтому любые внедрения политики платежей должны 
сопровождаться усовершенствованием этих характеристик. 
Таким образом, в данном исследовании показано как готовность платить, оцененная с 
помощью вираженных предпочтений, может быть использована для оценки платежей 
пациентов и аспектов их дизайна: их приемлемости, определения уровня платежей, 
неоднородности готовности платить среди групп наседения, определения 
инвестиционных приоритетов в качество и доступность. Платежи пациентов за услуги 
здравоохранения, хотя их и избегают в странах Центральной и Восточной Европы, 
могут стать эффективным инструментом политики в том смысле, что люди готовы 
официально платить существенные суммы за доступные услуги адекватного качества. 
Обеспечение такого качества и доступности, а также искоренение неофициальных 
платежей, будет необходимым шагом при внедрении политики платежей пациентов. 
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